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Credit Risk, Liquidity Risk and Asset Dynamics:  
Theory and Empirical Evidence 
Rui Zhong, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2013 
In this dissertation, we first generalize Leland (1994b)’s structural model from 
constant volatility to the state-dependent volatility with constant elasticity (CEV) and 
obtain the analytical solution for most variables of interest, including first-passage default 
probability, corporate debt and equity value. After incorporating jumps into asset 
dynamics, we develop an efficient algorithm to calculate the first passage default 
probability by adopting a restricted structure of default times and derive numerical 
solutions for the variables of interest. We find that the extra parameter in the CEV 
structural model has a significant impact on the optimal capital structure, the debt 
capacity, the term structure of credit spreads, the duration and convexity of risky debt, the 
equity volatility, the asset substitution impacts and the cumulative default probabilities. 
Further, we incorporate the liquidity risk of the secondary bond market into the 
structural model with a constant elasticity of variance through the rollover channel and 
derive the analytical expressions for the variables of interest with an innovative method 
in Chapter 2. We find that state dependent volatility has noticeable impacts for all the 
interesting results, including the endogenous default boundary, the optimal leverage and 
the credit spreads, which depend on the value of the state dependence parameter.  
iv 
 
In Chapter III, we compare the empirical performance of the two alternative 
volatility assumptions that we used in our study within the context of the Leland (1994b) 
model. Using time series data from both firm and risk level, We document that CEV 
structural model with the elasticity parameter around -0.67 on average exhibits a superior 
fitting in the CDS spreads across all the maturities. The relationship between the sign and 
value of E and the firm specific measures of default risk, such as leverage ratios, CDS 
spreads and current ratios indicates that there is a tendency for E  to increase as the risk 
of the firm decreases, but that the tendency is weak and fluctuates. We also note that the 
CDPs generated by the CEV structural model can fit the Moody’s observed data much 
better compared to these with constant asset volatility.  
In the last Chapter, we study the market efficiency between the CDS and Loan CDS 
(LCDS) markets by constructing a CDS and LCDS parity relation under the no arbitrage 
assumption. We document persistent and significant violations of this relation with the 
cross sectional data from both markets. We identify time-varying and significant positive 
arbitrage profits from an artificial default risk-free portfolio that trades in both markets 
and simultaneously longs an undervalued contract and shorts the corresponding 
overvalued contract for exactly the same underlying firm, maturity, currency and 
restructure clauses. We show that the profits cannot be accounted for by trading costs or 
imperfect data about loan recovery rates in the event of default. Using panel regressions 
with macroeconomic and firm-level variables, we find that firm-level informational 
asymmetry and difficulty of loan recovery in case of default are much more important 
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Chapter I STRUCTURAL MODELS OF THE FIRM UNDER TIME-
VARYING VOLATILITY AND JUMP PROCESS ASSET DYNAMICS  
1. Introduction 
 A very large number of studies, both theoretical and empirical, on corporate bond 
pricing and the risk structure of interest rates have appeared in the literature following the 
pioneering work of Merton (1974) and Black and Cox (1976), which in turn were 
inspired by the seminal Black and Scholes (1973) model of option pricing. These studies 
adopted the methodological approach of contingent claims valuation in continuous time, 
in which the value of a firm’s assets played the role of the claim’s underlying asset and 
allowed the valuation of the various components of the balance sheet under a variety of 
assumptions. This approach has been shown to be sufficiently flexible to tackle some of 
the most important problems in corporate finance, such as capital structure, bond 
valuation and default risk, under a variety of assumptions about the type of bonds 
included in the firm’s liabilities. The resulting models came to be known as structural 
models of bond pricing, as distinct from another class of models known as reduced form 
models, in which there is no link between the default risk of bonds and the firm’s capital 
structure.1  
Under continuous coupon payment and first-passage default2 assumptions, Leland 
(L, 1994a,b) and Leland and Toft (LT, 1996) first studied corporate debt valuation and 
optimal capital structure with endogenous default boundary for infinite maturity debt and 
                                                 
1 For the reduced form models see Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Duffie and 
Lando (2001). These models lie outside the topic of this paper. 
2 Under the first-passage default assumption, a firm will claim default when the asset value first crosses the 
pre-determined default boundary. This default boundary can be determined endogenously (Leland, 1994a,b, 
Leland and Toft, 1996) or exogenously (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995).  
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finite maturity debt, respectively. Because of the computational complexity of the 
valuation expressions, a major emphasis in the structural models was placed on the 
derivation of closed form expressions, rather than numerical results based on 
approximations3 or simulations.4 Such a focus allowed relatively easy estimations of 
numerical values given the parameters of the model, but at the cost of maintaining simple 
formulations of the mathematical structure of the asset value dynamics, in which a 
univariate diffusion process still follows the original Black and Scholes (1973) and 
Merton (1974) assumption of a lognormal diffusion with constant volatility.5 This is all 
the more surprising, in view of the fact that the option pricing literature has long 
recognized that such an assumption is no longer adequate to represent underlying assets 
in option markets, and has introduced factors such as rare events, stochastic volatility and 
transaction costs. Choi and Richardson (2009) studied the conditional volatility of the 
firm’s assets by a weighted average of equity, bond and loan prices and found that asset 
volatility is time varying. Hilberink and Rogers (2002) and Chen and Kou (2009) extend 
the Leland (1994b) model by incorporating a Levy process with only upward jumps and 
with two-sided double exponential jumps 6 , respectively. In their study of the term 
structure of credit default swaps (CDS), Huang and Zhou (2008) note that time varying 
asset volatility should potentially play a role in structural models in order to fit into the 
                                                 
3 Zhou (2001) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). 
4 Brennan and Schwartz (1978), and more recently Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) are examples of studies 
that rely on numerical simulations. 
5 Most structural models are univariate and assume a constant riskless rate of interest. Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), Briys and de Varenne (1997), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) use bivariate 
diffusion models, in which the term structure of interest rates follows the Vacisek (1977) model and the 
asset value is a constant volatility diffusion. As the empirical work in Chan et al (1992) shows, the Vacisek 
model does not fit actual term structure data. Further, Leland and Toft (1996) note that this bivariate 
diffusion refinement plays a very small role in the yield spreads of corporate bonds.  
6 Zhou (2001) was the first to introduce jumps into structural models under the first passage default 
assumption, but no analytical solution is presented and he did not study the impact on optimal capital 
structure with endogenous default boundary. Huang and Huang (2003) also incorporate double exponential 
jumps into a structural model, but they only focus on corporate debt valuation and credit spread.   
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empirical credit default spread data. Huang (2005), and Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2008) 
incorporate stochastic volatility and jumps into the Merton (1974) model by assuming 
that default occurs only at maturity and find that incorporating jumps and stochastic 
volatility may help to improve the matching of the top quality credit spreads.  
In this paper we incorporate similar generalizations into the dynamics of the asset 
value in the context of the L (1994b) and LT (1996) models, which allow default at times 
other than the maturity of the debt. We consider several alternative specifications that 
include a state-dependent volatility with and without jumps, and a stochastic volatility, 
again with and without jumps in both the asset value and the volatility processes. For the 
state dependent case we consider the Constant Elasticity of Variance (CEV) model, 
originally formulated by Cox (1975) in the context of option pricing,7 which has an extra 
parameter and includes constant volatility as a special case. By borrowing heavily from 
the option pricing literature we manage to derive closed form expressions for almost all 
the variables of interest in the absence of jumps, including corporate debt value, total 
levered firm value, optimal leverage and equity value. Because of discontinuities, we 
only obtain quasi-analytical numerical solutions for several of these same variables when 
we include in the asset dynamics an independent jump component with multinomial 
amplitudes; for computational purposes default times are constrained to occur at fixed 
discrete intervals. As a special case, we also obtain quasi-analytical solutions for the 
variables of interest for the constant volatility model in the presence of jumps without 
restricting the type of distribution of the amplitude of the jump component.8 
                                                 
7 See also Emmanuel and MacBeth (1982), Cox and Rubinstein (1985), and Schroder (1989). 
8 Kou and Wang (2003) and Huang and Huang (2003) develop analytical solutions for this model, but at the 
price of restricting the jump amplitude distribution to a double exponential.  
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Similar results are also obtained from the stochastic volatility specification with and 
without jumps. In this more complex specification all results, with and without jumps, are 
derived quasi-analytically, with the important difference that without the discontinuities 
due to the jump components the default times are much more tightly spaced, 
approximating the continuous time default case. The general formulation and the nested 
nature of the various specifications allow us to gauge the impact of each additional 
feature of asset dynamics in approximating observed patterns in the variables of interest 
such as credit spreads and default probabilities. For this reason in the numerical 
applications we first compare the various cases of asset dynamics in the absence of jumps, 
and then we introduce jumps in each case. 
Apart from the asset value dynamics, we follow the general assumptions initially 
formulated by Merton (1974), in which default occurs when the asset value hits a lower 
default-triggering threshold. While in Merton’s model default could only take place at 
maturity, Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994a,b,1998) and LT adopted debt 
assumptions that allowed default to take place before maturity. All these models can be 
included in our formulations, with the mixed jump-diffusion models that we present 
allowing default at discrete predetermined times. To our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to relax the constant volatility assumption of the earlier studies and still derive closed 
form solutions under continuous coupon payment and first passage default assumptions, 
and also the first model to incorporate jumps with distributions other than a double 
exponential at times other than debt maturity.9   
                                                 
9Zhou (2001) is the first paper to introduce jumps into structural models by using simulation. Kou and 
Wang (2003) and Huang and Huang (2003) obtain the analytical solution of the first passage default time 
by restricting the jump amplitude distribution to a double exponential. 
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Since our extensions have implications for several strands of literature that have 
dealt with different problems in corporate finance, we review briefly the key issues 
examined by the class of models that we generalize. All these issues can be dealt with the 
same type of integrated models of the levered firm that we examine. The main such issue 
is the capital structure choice, which originates in the classic Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
analysis of the levered firm in the presence of taxes, according to which capital structure 
is chosen as a trade-off between the tax advantage of debt and the costs of possible 
bankruptcy. The pioneering work in this area that comes closest to our own approach is 
that of Leland (1994a,b,1998), and LT.10 Since several authors have raised doubts on 
whether the trade-off approach can really be invoked to justify observed leverage ratios, 
several studies focused on agency problems between stockholders and debt holders, or 
stockholders and managers.11 These and other related studies show clearly the importance 
of the structural models in linking the default probabilities and yield spreads to the capital 
structure decision, a linkage that is missing from the reduced form models.  
As already noted, we use the asset value of the unlevered firm as the basic 
underlying process for the valuation of the various components of the balance sheet of the 
levered firm, following Leland (1994a, b) and LT. In a variant of the basic model, 
presented in Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001), the firm value is estimated from the 
dynamics of the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), split between the claimholders 
and the government.12 A direct modeling of the dynamics, division and valuation of the 
firm’s cash flows would in principle also be possible in our models, but it will need to 
                                                 
10 See also, Sarkar and Zapatero (2003), Ju et al (2005) and Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) 
11 See Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Leland (1998), Morellec (2004), and Ju et al (2005). 
12 See also Sarkar and Zapatero (2003).  
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confront the troublesome issue of the valuation of non-traded assets, which is beyond the 
scope of this paper, and which in earlier studies is either avoided or carried out only 
under the most elementary assumptions.13 
We close this literature review by noting a variant of the reduced form models, 
which is particularly popular in the financial mathematics literature. In that stream the 
primary asset dynamics, in the familiar forms of diffusion or jump diffusion, are applied 
not to the asset value but to the equity returns, as in the option pricing literature.14 The 
advantage of this approach is that the equity returns, unlike firm value, are observable 
and available in high frequency data. Its disadvantage is, as with the reduced form models, 
that it does not allow the modeling of the firm’s balance sheet and the linkage of the 
default process with the firm’s capital structure, and for this reason will not be pursued in 
this paper. There exist statistical methods by which the parameters of the asset value 
dynamics can be estimated from the observed dynamics of the equity value for any given 
model.  
In what follows we present in Section 2 the various cases of asset dynamics that 
have been used in the option pricing literature, as well as the fundamental building blocks 
of the L and LT structural models of the firm to which they will be applied. Section 3 
presents the fundamental notions of the cumulative first passage to default probability 
(CFPD) and unit price (UP), on the basis of which all economic variables of interest can 
be computed, and develops the equations in closed form or semi analytical format for 
their estimation within each one of the asset dynamics presented in Section 2. Due to the 
                                                 
13 Sarkar and Zapatero (2003, p. 38, footnote 1) avoid the issue, while Morellec (2004) assumes that agents 
are risk neutral and the approach of Goldstein et al (2001) is only suitable to constant parameter diffusion 
processes for the cash flows.     
14 See, in particular, Carr and Linetsky (2006) and Campi et al (2009).  
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numerical accuracy and convergence issues for the quasi analytical estimations, these key 
building blocks cannot be estimated to an acceptable degree of accuracy and time 
partition for the stochastic volatility models with and without jumps. For this reason we 
present numerical results for FPDP and UP only for the constant and state dependent 
volatilities and compare their performance with and without jumps. Section 4 compares 
all the variables of interest of the full L and LT models for the cases of constant and state 
dependent volatilities, the only cases for which a direct comparison is possible under the 
assumption that default is possible at any time point. Section 5 concludes.       
2. Economic Setup 
2.1 Unlevered asset dynamics 
Following Leland (1994a, b), we consider a firm whose assets are financed by 
equity and debt with a tax-deductible coupon. As in all previous related literature, the 
values of the components of the firm’s balance sheet are estimated as contingent claims 
of the state variable V, the value of the unlevered firm’s assets representing its economics 
activities, which follows a mixture of a continuous diffusion process DV with time-
varying variance tQ together with an independent Poisson jump process (the physical or 
P- distribution): 
  J tdV q dt v dW JdNV P KP      (2.1) 
Where P is the instantaneous expected rate of return of asset; q is the payout rate to 
the asset holders, including coupon payments to debt holders and dividends to equity 
holders; K is the jump arrival intensity and JP the mean of the logarithm of the amplitude 
8 
 
distribution, ln(1 )J ;  W is a standard Brownian motion; and N denotes the number of 
Poisson jumps. Three forms of time varying variance are considered: constant elasticity 
of variance (CEV), stochastic volatility (SV), and stochastic volatility with volatility 
jump (SVJ), which can be expressed by, 
 : t tCEV v V
ET  (2.2) 
  : vt t tSV dv v v dt v dWN V    (2.3) 
  : v v vt t tSVJ dv v v dt v dW J dNN V     (2.4) 
The constant risk free rate is denoted by r . Under the risk neutral measure (Q-
distribution), Equation (2.1) becomes, 
  Q Q Q Q QJ tdV r q dt v dW J dNV K P      (2.5) 
This mixed process continues until the asset value hits or falls below a threshold 
value, denoted by K, for the first time. In such a case, a default event will be triggered 
and liquidation takes place immediately. Assuming the absolute priority is respected, the 
bond holders will then receive  1 KD , while the equity holders receive nothing. The 
remaining asset value equal to KD is considered as a bankruptcy cost.  
Unlike the case of the constant volatility or the pure CEV diffusion, the derivation 
of the Q-distribution for TV  given its P-distribution is not a trivial process in the presence 
of jumps, unless it is assumed that the jump component is non-systematic. Otherwise, the 
parameters of the jump component of the mixed process need also to be transformed in 
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the transition from the P- to the Q-distribution, in addition to the replacement of P by r . 
Similarly, the transition from the P- to the Q-distribution is not trivial for the stochastic 
volatility process, with or without jumps.  In empirical applications in the option pricing 
literature the two distributions are extracted from the underlying and the derivative asset 
markets respectively. Nonetheless, the reconciliation between the two separate estimates 
has not generally been successful. We discuss this issue when we implement the model in 
subsequent sections. 
We denote the bond maturity by T, and the first passage time when the asset value 
reaches the threshold value by W . The risk neutral asset value dynamics then become,  
   , 0
min{ , }, 0
Q Q Q Q Q
J t
t
dV r q dt v dW J dN if t T
V
V V K if t TW
K P W
W
­        °®°   d ¯
 (2.6) 
In what follows we’ll examine two kinds of first passage default time W : 
continuous (or unrestricted) default,  Tc ,0W , and discrete (or restricted) default, dW . 
For discrete default, we discretize the maturity of debt, T, into N sub-intervals and define 
NTt / ' ; then, tid ' W , 1,2,i N .  
i Constant Volatility with jumps in asset value 
We define ctv V which is constant and equation (2.6) becomes, 
   , 0
min{ , }, 0
Q Q c Q Q Q
J
t
dV r q dt dW J dN if t T
V
V V K if t TW
K P V W
W




Without the jump component the asset dynamics follow a geometric Brownian 
motion with a constant volatility for which an analytical solution for the first passage 
default probability exists.15 Incorporating jump components introduces discontinuities 
into the asset value dynamics, implying that an analytical solution for the first passage 
default probability exists only for particular forms of distribution of the jump amplitude 
such as the double exponential of Kou and Wang (2003), who use Laplace transform 
techniques to derive the first passage default probability.16  Similarly, the numerical 
approximation of the first passage default probability by discretizing Fortet’s equation, 
developed by Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001), does not work after incorporating 
jumps. In the following section, we present a numerical algorithm to approximate the first 
passage default probability after incorporating the jump component without any 
restrictions on the distribution of jump amplitude given the characteristic function of the 
jump amplitude distribution, )(ZI J . The following Lemma, whose proof is obvious, 
applies to this case and is noted for future references.  
Lemma 1: When the asset dynamics follow (2.7) and TW !  ,  if  the characteristic 
function of the jump amplitude distribution, )(ZI J , exists, then the characteristic function 
of the asset value ln TV   is: 
 2 2ln ( )( ) exp ( ) exp ( ( ) 1)2T
c
i V CV Q JTE e i r q T TZ Z VM Z Z K M Z§ ·ª º     ¨ ¸¬ ¼ © ¹  (2.8) 
                                                 
15 See Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994a, b) and Leland and Toft (1996). 
16 Huang and Huang (2003) also used this diffusion process to study the credit spread of corporate bonds.  
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The conditional distribution of TV given the jump diffusion process (2.7) can be 
found by inverting (2.8).  
ii CEV with jumps in asset value 
By combining (2.2) and (2.6), the asset dynamics with CEV and jumps in asset 
value can be written as, 
  , 0
min{ , }, 0
Q Q Q Q Q
J t
t
dV r q dt V dW J dN if t T
V
V V K if t T
E
W
K P T W
W
­        °®°   d ¯
 (2.9) 
Without the jump components, the parameter E , the elasticity of the local volatility, 
is a key feature of the CEV model. For 0E  the model becomes a geometric Brownian 
motion with constant volatility. For 0E !  ( 0E  ) (the state-dependent volatility is 
positively (negatively) correlated with the asset price.17  In equity markets, the well-
known “leverage effect” shows generally a negative relationship between volatility and 
equity price. There are also some suggestions that the economically appropriate range is
0 1E! !  ,18 even though empirical evidence in the case of the implied risk neutral 
distribution of index options finds negative values significantly below this range. 
Jackwerth and Rubinstein (2001) find that the unrestricted CEV model when applied to 
the risk neutral distribution extracted from S&P 500 index options is able to generate as 
good out-of-sample option prices as the better known stochastic volatility model of 
                                                 
17 As Emmanuel and Macbeth (1982, p. 536) were the first to point out, for ߚ ൐ Ͳ the local volatility 
becomes unbounded for very large values of V, and there are technical issues concerning the mean of the 
process under both the physical and the risk neutral distribution. This problem is solved by assuming that 
the volatility is bounded and becomes constant for V exceeding an upper bound; see Davydov and Linetsky 
(2001, p. 963), A similar lower bound when ߚ is < 0 prevents the formation of an absorbing state at 0.    
18 See Cox (1996), and also Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1999), who term this model the restricted CEV. The 
arguments in favor of the restricted CEV model are mostly applicable to index options and will not affect 
our formulation.  
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Heston (1993).  Note that all this empirical evidence only reveals the elasticity of 
volatility of equity value but not of asset value. The observed negative relationship 
between the equity value and equity volatility could be generated even with constant 
asset volatility or even with slightly positive elasticity of asset volatility. Hereafter we 
shall study positive, negative and zero E scenarios without any restrictions.  
The CEV model yields a distribution of the asset value TV  conditional on the initial 
value tV  and, hence, initial volatility that has the form of a non-central chi-square
2( , , )z uF Q , denoting the probability that a chi-square-distributed variable with u degrees 
of freedom and non-centrality parameter v would be less than z. The shape of this 
distribution is given analytically most often in terms of its complementary form 1-
2( , , )z uF Q , denoting in our case the probability T TV vt . For 0E  this probability is 
given analytically by,19   
 2 2Pr ( ) 1 ( , , ) ( ,2 , )T Tob V v c b a a b cF Ft      (2.10) 
Where  
 
2 ( ) 2 1
2 2( )













   
 
   
  
 (2.11) 
This distribution is the equivalent of the lognormal when the volatility is constant. It 
has been tabulated and is easily available numerically. Several additional results hold 
about the ),,(2 vuzF distribution when the parameter u is an even integer that can 
                                                 
19 See Schroder (1989, p. 213-214). 
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simplify the computations. Nonetheless, the main result necessary for the extension to the 
mixed jump diffusion process by using the chi-square distribution’s characteristic 
function holds even for non-integral degrees of freedom.20 
For the mixed jump-CEV diffusion process (2.9) when T!W , we derive a quasi-
analytical form of the conditional distribution of the unlevered asset value TV  given the 
initial value tV  the equivalent of (2.1)-(2.2) for the CEV diffusion if the riskless rate r is 
replaced by the instantaneous drift P . In order to obtain quasi-analytical solutions we 
shall also restrict the class of distributions of the amplitudes of the jump processes that 
we’ll consider, to discrete multinomial jumps, presenting results only for the binomial 
case without loss of generality. The quasi-analytical form is derived by the inversion of 
the characteristic function of the distribution, for which efficient numerical procedures 
exist. 
Let ,  1,...,iL i n denote the amplitude of the ith jump given n jumps in the interval 
> @0,T , and let TY denote the jump component in that period, with nTY , the conditional 








  . From (2.1) and the independence of the diffusion and the 
jump components, we have DT T TV V Y . The following auxiliary result, proven in the 
appendix, will be necessary for the estimation of the distribution of TV under the mixed 
process. 
 Lemma 2: The characteristic function of the distribution of TV is given by  
                                                 
20 See Johnson et al  (1995, p. 433). 
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and the parameters c, b are given by (2.11).  
From this result we can now derive the distribution of TV  under the mixed process 
under a binomial distribution, by inverting the characteristic function given by Lemma 2. 
The following result is also proven in the appendix. 
Proposition 1: Let 2  ,j jl L j u dE   and a given by (2.11). Then the probability 
distribution of  TV  is given by 
    1
0 0
Pr ( ) 1 Pr ( | , )
!
j j
j iT i i j
T T t u u T T u d
j i
jnT











Im( ( ))1 1Pr ( | , )
2





i j D T
T T u d
i Z i j
D u d
e i yob Z a N j y l l














Although this distribution is not given in closed form, the expressions (2.14)-(2.15) 
yield semi-analytical expressions for it under the binomial jump amplitude assumption, 
which easily and obviously generalizes to a multinomial one.  
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iii  SV with jump in asset value and jumps in asset volatility (SVJJ) 
The diffusion process of asset value with stochastic volatility and jumps in both 





min{ , }, 0





dV r q dt v dW J dN if t T
V
dv v v dt v dW J dN




­        °°°    ®°   d °°¯
 (2.16) 
This diffusion process was first used by Duffie, Pan and Singleton (DPS, 2000) to 
describe the dynamic process of equity value. As with the CEV process, the bivariate 
mixed jump diffusion of (2.16) was also used in option pricing, with the P- and Q-
distributions extracted from the underlying asset and the option market respectively. As 
Eraker, Johannes and Polson (2003, p. 1294) note, such a joint estimation does not 
necessarily reduce the uncertainty in the estimates, unless the jump risk premia are 
arbitrarily restricted. Nonetheless, since in structural models equity and debt are 
derivative assets on the total asset value, SVJJ should also be a candidate process to be 
considered when we want to assess the effects of alternative asset dynamics 
specifications.  
A major difficulty in empirical studies on structural models is that the unlevered 
asset value is a non-tradable asset and its P-distribution cannot be extracted from the 
financial markets. In what follows we study the effects of the SVJJ asset dynamics 
specification on the economic variables of interest and discuss empirical implementation 
in subsequent sections. Note that SVJJ contains stochastic volatility (SV) and stochastic 
volatility with jumps only in asset value (SVJ) as special cases.  
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There are three sources of risk in SVJJ: the stochastic volatility process, the jumps 
in asset value and the jumps in asset volatility. We follow DPS (2000) in the model 
specification, assuming that the jump components and the bivariate diffusion process are 
mutually independent, with ( , )Q v vCov dW dW U , and that the jump amplitude 
distributions in asset value and asset volatility are correlated as well with correlation JU , 
and with common arrival intensity K . The distribution of the jump amplitude in asset 
variance is exponential with mean vJP  , while the jump amplitude in asset value is 
lognormally distributed with standard deviation, JV , and mean vJ J zP U , where vz is a 
realization of jump amplitude in asset volatility. The following result is extracted from 
DPS. 
Lemma 3: When the asset value dynamics follow (2.16) with T!W , the bivariate 
characteristic function of the distribution of lnVT and Tv  at time T  conditional on lnV0 





1 2 0 0
1 2 1 1 0 2 2 0
( , , ln , )
exp ( , , ) ( , ) ln ( , )
T Ti V v SVJJE e V v
A t B t V B t v
I I M I I
I I I I




 1 1 1 2 1 20
1( ) (1 ) ( ) 2 log( ) ( , , , )
2 exp( ) 1
t
J
v EA r q t i t D b t h B B
a E Dt
NI K P I K I Iª º       « »¬ ¼ ³  











Where , , , ,a b c D E and 1 2 1 20 ( , , , )
t
h B B I I³  are defined in the proof in appendix B. The 
distribution of TV  conditional on the initial values 0V  and 0v  can now be found by 
inverting (2.17).  
2.2  Stationary debt structure  
We consider a claim such as a corporate bond on this underlying asset, denoted by
( , , )F V v t under the bivariate diffusion case, or ( , )F V t under the state-dependent volatility 
with and without jumps. This claim pays a continuous nonnegative coupon C  per unit 
time as long as the firm is solvent,21 and it must satisfy a partial differential equation 
(PDE) whose form depends on the asset dynamics. For instance, under a general state 
dependent volatility the following PDE has to be satisfied when the firm finances the net 
cost of the coupon by issuing additional equity, with the subscripts denoting partial 
derivatives and W denoting the default time. 
21 ( )
2
[ ( (1 ) ] 0  if  0
( , ) (1 ) min{ , }  if  0
VV J V tvV F r q VF F
E F V J F C rF t T




­    °°°        ®°°    d°¯
 (2.18) 
A closed form solution for such an equation for debt claims that are generally time-
dependent is not available even under constant volatility and without jumps. Nor is it 
                                                 
21 The firm is solvent only when the asset value is above the threshold value for bankruptcy all the time and 
never below it, starting from the issue date of this corporate bond. 
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available for the more complex bivariate diffusion asset dynamics, in which the PDE also 
depends on the price of volatility risk. For the constant volatility case without jumps L 
and LT adopted particular debt maturity and repayment structures that allowed the 
solution of (2.18) as if the value of the debt claims were time-independent. In this paper 
we apply the same maturity and repayment structures and solve both the Leland (1994a,b) 
and the LT  models for our asset dynamics cases, but we use L as our base case, since this 
model, with its exponential stationary debt structure, generates the most elegant results22. 
We assume that the debt has a total principal value P  at time 0 when it is issued with 
coupon rate C . As time goes by, the firm retires this debt at a proportional rate g. Thus, 
the remaining principal value of this debt value at time t is gte P , and the debt holders 
receive a cash flow ( )gte C gP   at time t, provided the firm remains solvent. Hence, the 




aT gte dt g
f
   ³  (2.19) 
Thus, the average maturity under the L model is the reciprocal of the proportional 
retirement rate. In order to get a stationary debt structure we assume that the firm replaces 
the retired debt with newly issued debt having the same principal and coupon so as to 
keep the total principal and total coupon payments independent of time. We denote the 
total value of all the outstanding debt by ( )D V or ( , )D V v for the bivariate diffusion. 
Because all outstanding debts are homogenous, the initial total principal P, the coupon 
                                                 
22 Compared to LT, the L model yields a simpler analytical solution. The debt service rate is C+gP under 
L, while it is C+P/T under LT. The two models are fully consistent with each other in their results if L’s 
retirement rate g is changed to match the average maturity of debt structure under LT. The LT model is 
discussed in the appendix. 
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rate C, and the retirement rate g (or equivalently, the average maturity ௔ܶ ) define the 
debt characteristics and can be used at time 0 as control parameters to value all the 
outstanding debt. When the volatility of the unlevered asset value is constant L derived 
this value ( )D V  analytically. If the volatility is time-varying then the solution of the 
corresponding PDE depends on the structure of time-varying volatility.  
The key to the estimation of ( )D V or ( , )D V v lies in two basic concepts: the first 
passage default, probability and the unit price. Omitting for notational simplicity the 
arguments ( , , )V v K . The first passage probability is denoted by  |f tW , where t W is 
the probability that the underlying asset hits or falls below the default boundary for the 
first time conditional on the initial status of the underlying asset at time t . Thus, the 
cumulative first passage density (CFPD)  
 ( | ) ( | )
T
t
F T t f t dW W ³  (2.20) 
Similarly, we define the unit price (UP) denoted by up  as the price of a security 
which pays $1 when the default event occurs before the maturity T of a claim. In a risk-
neutral world with risk free rate, r , we have, 
 ( | , ) ( | )
T r
u t
p T r t e f t dW W W ³  (2.21) 
We define also the value of a risky perpetuity ( )d V , corporate debt of an infinite 




 ( ) [1 ( )] ( )(1 ) ,  where ( ) ( ,0)d d d u
Cd V p r p r K p r p r
r
D     f  (2.22) 
Under the Leland (1994b) debt structure the weighted-average maturity of the risky 
corporate debt is aT , where 1/ ag T  from equation (2.19). At time 0 the firm issues 
perpetual debt with principal P and coupon payment C. Since the debt payout rate is 
( )gte C gP   at time t and the debt holders’ claim on the principal is (1 ) gtKeD   in case 
of bankruptcy, the value ( , )D V v of this debt at time 0 is, for all asset dynamics, 
 ( )
0 0
( , ) [ ( )](1 ( 0)) (1 ) ( 0)rt gt r g tD V v e e C gP F t dt K e f t dtD
f f
       ³ ³  (2.23) 
Which becomes after integration by parts, 
 ( , ) (1 ( )) (1 ) ( )d d
C gPD V v p r g Kp r g
r g
D       (2.24) 
In the following section we estimate the CFPD and UP for all cases of asset 
dynamics examined in this paper. We derive an analytical solution for the CEV case and 
a quasi-analytical solution for the SV case of asset dynamics without jumps and develop 
an efficient numerical algorithm for all the cases with jumps: constant volatility, CEV 
and SVJJ, all under discrete time default. 
3. First Passage Default (FPD) Probability and Unit Price (UP) 
3.1 Unrestricted default: CEV and SV 
For unrestricted (or continuous) default, we assume that the default events could 
occur at any time point before the maturity of the debt. In other words, the first passage 
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default time is (0, ]TW  . This assumption has been used in most of the literature of 
structural models. The advantage of this assumption is that it is much easier to arrive at 
an analytical solution for the CFPD and UP under a diffusion process for the asset 
value23. Such an analytical solution is very convenient for the study of many important 
variables such as optimal capital structure, credit spreads, debt capacity, agency cost, etc. 
In this first subsection we focus on the continuous default assumption and derive an 
analytical solution for the CFPD and UP under the CEV diffusion process. We also study 
the CFPD and UP under the SV process by a numerical approximation algorithm 
proposed by Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).  
i The CEV process 
Without the jump components, the asset dynamic in (2.9) can be written as, 





dV r q dt V dW if t T
V
V K if t T
EK P T W
W
­       °®°   d ¯
 (3.1) 
Since the value of a unit security is also that of a down and out barrier option with 
$1 payment, we can use available results from option pricing to prove the following 
lemmas. Firstly, we study the UP for a claim with infinite maturity. 
Lemma 4: Under a general state dependent volatility ߪሺܸሻ  the price of a unit 
security which pays one dollar when the asset value V hits the barrier K under the risk 
neutral distribution is given by 
                                                 
23 See Black and Cox (1976), Leland (1994a, b), Leland and Toft (1996), Kou and Wang (2003) and Sarkar 

















f  ³  (3.2) 
where ߶௥ሺܸሻ  is the decreasing fundamental solution of the following ordinary 
differential equation (ODE) for U(V,t), 
          2 21 , , , 0, 0
2 V
V V U V t r q VU V t rU V t VV     !  (3.3) 
Proof: See Proposition 1 of Davydov and Linetsky (2001). 
When the volatility is constant, the above ODE has a solution   *r V V JI  , where 
*J  is the solution of a quadratic equation, yielding24:  
   2* 22rr V V V J JJ VI      (3.4) 
When the volatility is state-dependent, there is no analytical solution for the general 
form. We have, however, an analytical solution for the state-dependent variance under a 
CEV process given by 
Lemma 5: When the state dependent volatility is given by the CEV process 
 V V EV T , the solution of PDE (3.3) is given by 
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 (3.5) 
Where,  
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,k mW x  and  ,k mM x  are the Whittaker functions. 
Proof: See Proposition 5 of Davydov and Linetsky (2001). 
The combination of equations (3.2)-(3.5) may now be used to provide the analytical 
solution for the UP while the CFPD is always equal to 1 because of the infinite maturity. 
The Whittaker functions  ,k mW x  and  ,k mM x  are the fundamental solutions for the 
Whittaker equation and are available in the Matlab (or Mathematica) software.25 Since 
the sign and value of E  affect the probability of default by increasing (decreasing) the 
volatility in “bad” states when 0E  ( 0E ! ), the shape of  r VI  is also strongly 
affected by that parameter. It is a monotonic decreasing (increasing) function with respect 
to asset value V when 0E  ( 0E ! ), In addition, the slope of the function increases with 
the absolute value of E .26  
For the claim with finite maturity, T, the semi-analytical solution for UP and CFPD 
could be derived by the following lemma. 
Lemma 6: When the state dependent volatility is given by the CEV process 
 V V EV T , the cumulative first passage cumulative default probability,  | 0CEVF T , 
and the price of a unit security,  | 0up T  equal 
                                                 
25 See Whittaker and Watson (1990, pp. 339-351). 
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 (3.6) 
Where 1L  denote the inverse of the Laplace transform evaluated at the appropriate 
maturity T and  VOI  is defined in equation (3.5). 
Proof: See appendix. 
There are several numerical algorithms that can be used to invert the Laplace 
transform in order to get  | 0CEVF T  and  2 | 0CEVup T 27 .  | 0CEVF T can also be 
estimated numerically with the one-dimensional Fortet equation.  
ii The Stochastic Volatility process 
After removing the jump components in the asset value and the asset volatility 
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 (3.7) 
                                                 
27 Davydov and Linetsky (2001) use an Euler numerical integration algorithm, with the details shown in 
their appendix D, p. 964. Kou and Wang (2003) use the Gaver-Stehfest algorithm, with the details showing 




The correlation between QW and vW is vU . To our knowledge, no analytical 
solutions for CFPD and UP exist for this general form of diffusion process. By restricting 
the drift of asset the diffusion process,   0r q  , and the correlation 0vU  
simultaneously, the analytical solution for CFPD and UP can be found by the method of 
images or the eigen-function expansion method28. Since the restrictions are unrealistic, 
we will not discuss this semi-analytical solution here.  
As the continuous property of the asset diffusion process is maintained with the 
stochastic volatility, the Fortet equation algorithm could be used to compute the CFPD 
probability and the UP. Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) first introduced this algorithm 
into the finance literature to solve the default probability with a stochastic interest rate. 
Collion-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) extend the Fortet algorithm from a one-
dimensional to a two-dimensional Markov process.29 Elkamhi, Ericsson, Jiang and Du 
(2012) applied this algorithm to the first passage default probability calculations with 
stochastic volatility. 
Consider a two-factor Markov process ^ `,t tz v ,where  lnt tz V K as in (3.7) with 
a free transition density, denoted by  0 0 0, , | , ,0t tf z v t z v  with 0 0 tz z! ! and a 
probability density that the first passage time through zero at time W , given 0 tW  , and 
the asset volatility takes the value vW at that time, denoted by  1 0 00, , | , ,0f v z vW W . Thus, 
the two-dimensional generalization of the Fortet’s equation can be expressed as, 
      0 0 0 1 0 0 00 0, , | , ,0 0, , | , ,0 , , | 0, ,
t
t t t tf z v t z v f v z v f z v t v dvdW WW W Wf ³ ³  (3.8) 
                                                 
28 See Lipton (2001) 
29 Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) also show that the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) algorithm can 
only approximate the exact solution of their model.  
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The probability density functions  0 ...f  and  1 ...f  can be obtained by the 
discretization algorithm proposed by Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). Denote the 
maximum and minimum asset variance values as v  and v , respectively. We discretize 
the time T  and asset variance v into TN  sub-periods and vN  sub-intervals, respectively. 
Define jt j t ' with Tt T N'  , ^ `1,2, , Tj N , and iv v i v  ' with   vv v v N'  
, ^ `1,2, , vi N . The discretized version of (3.8) is,
      0 0 0 1 0
0
, , | , ,0 , , , | 0, ,
T v
t t j i t t
t v v
f z v t z v q t v f z v t vW W
  
 ¦¦  (3.9) 
Where  
    1 1 0 0, 0, , | , ,0j i i jq t v t vf v t z v ' '  
The  1 ,j iq t v can be calculated recursively as follows, 
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¦¦  (3.10) 
Given the joint probability density function  0 0 0, , | , ,0t tf z v t z v , the CFPD 
probability with stochastic volatility is given by, 
  0 0 1
1 1




F z v T q t v
  
 ¦¦  (3.11) 
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3.2 Discrete default 
Although the analytical (or semi-analytical) solution for CFPD and UP can be 
derived under a continuous default assumption, this assumption does not allow the 
derivation of CFPD and UP in the presence of jump components. Note also that in the 
empirical world default mostly occurs on certain critical discrete times such as the 
coupon payment date or the maturity date of the corporate bonds. On the other hand, 
incorporating jumps into the diffusion process of asset value seems to be very critical 
especially during financial crisis periods; such jumps cannot be included under 
continuous default assumption.30 In order to be consistent with the discrete default data 
and also to incorporate jump components in the asset diffusion process, we present an 
efficient numerical algorithm for the approximation of CFPD and UP with the discrete 
default assumption under which the first passage default time, tid ' W where, 
Ni "2,1 .  The CFPD and UP of this algorithm converge to the results of continuous 
default when 0t' o .  
The key to developing the equivalent of equation (3.1)-(3.2) after incorporating 
jump components is the default time density function ( , , )f t V K , the first passage time 
probability distribution for this model for a given 0V . A closed form expression for
( , , )f t V K or for the value of a risky perpetuity does not exist for the mixed process. 
Instead, we develop an algorithm based on time discretization, as in the solution of 
                                                 
30 Kou and Wang (2003) have to restrict the distribution of jump amplitude to be a double-exponential 
distribution in order to derive a semi-analytical solution for CFPD by Laplace transform since the double-
exponential distribution is memoryless. 
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Fortet’s equation,31 using the distributions of TV derived in previous section under each 
scenario. Given ( ) Pr ( )  T t T T t tF v v ob V v V v d   , vt Kt , we set T t t  ' ,  and 
evaluate from (2.10)-(2.11) the probability ( , )t t tF v t v'  and the associated density




'  ,   
  1 0 1( ) ( 0, ) , , ( , ) ( )t t k t t t t s k s s
K
f v f v v f v f v t v f v dv
f
' ' ' ' {  ³  (3.12) 
For [2, ]k n . We then have the following result, whose proof is obvious and is 
omitted.  
Proposition 2: If (0, ]TW  denotes the first passage time to default, 
0 0( 0, ) Pr { 0, }G T V ob T VW d denotes its distribution, and iQ  denotes the probability that 
the firm asset value will lie below its default value K  at i t' given that it lies above it at 
, 1,2 1j t j i'   ,  these probabilities are  given by the relations 
1 0 2 1
( 1) 1 ( 1) ( 1)
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and 0( 0, )G T V  can be approximated by 
                                                 
31 See Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). Fortet’s equation cannot be used either in its continuous or in 
its discrete time format, since the asset value path is discontinuous and at default the asset value may be 







iG T V Q ¦  (3.14) 
Where ( , ),  1,...,i i tf k t V i n''  is given by (3.12). 
A key input in evaluating this algorithm is the probability density function 
 ,T tf V V , which has closed form expression for the constant volatility and CEV. After 
incorporating jumps an analytical expression exists only in the form of the characteristic 
function. The probability density function can be expressed as the inverse Fourier 
Transform of characteristic function,  , ,tV\ I W , which yields, 
    1, , ,
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Ti V
T t tf V V e V d




 ³  (3.15) 
The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) technique32 can be applied here to reduce the 
computational time significantly.  Given 0, 0a b ! are sufficiently large in absolute 
value, a valid approximation to  ,T tf V V is, 







f V V e V dI \ I W IS




'  , j a jI   ' and  , ,j j tV\ \ I W  for 0,1, ,j N . The integral can 
be approximated as, 
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S S {'  for k from the same grid as j . Thus, the 
approximation becomes, 
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The summation term is a discrete Fourier transform, and the FFT technique is 
readily available in computation softwares, such as Matlab, R, etc. In addition, as the 
transition matrix is the same for each time step because of the Markov property and only 
needs to be calculated once, the computational time can be reduced further even for a 
complicated distribution. The key issue in evaluating the results of interest is the proper 
value of a  and b . Although the discrete time methods to estimate the CFPD and UP 
measures are applicable to all asset dynamics presented in Section 2, their practical 
implementation in the SV and SVJ cases is limited for reasons of accuracy and 
computational time to a number of time partitions that is too small for most empirically 
interesting problems, For this reason we limit ourselves in what follows to the constant 
and state dependent volatility cases, and we examine the effects of our discretization for 
these cases. We will test the convergence of the first passage default probabilities 
produced by this algorithm to those under continuous default under the calibration of the 
constant volatility case. 
3.3 Calibrations and numerical results 
In this section, we will test the convergence of restricted default to un-restricted 
default under constant volatility asset dynamics and compare by calibrations the term 
structure of first passage default probabilities and unit prices generated by different asset 
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dynamics, including constant volatility and CEV under un-restricted default. In our base 
case, we assume the risk free interest rate 8%r  ; firm’s payout rate 6%q  ; initial 
asset volatility 0 20%V  ; the current asset value $100V  ; the exogenous default 
boundary $50K  . 33  We consider 1E   and 1E   , and set 0V ET V   under CEV 
asset dynamic.  
i Restricted default versus unrestricted default 
In Section 3.2, we introduced the concept of restricted default under which the 
default events only occur at pre-specified discrete time points. It can be daily, weekly, 
monthly etc. The discrete default structure is more flexible but also more computationally 
intensive compared to the unrestricted default structure. The most important advantage of 
our algorithm is that it can apply to any asset dynamics including the jumps given the 
analytical expression of the characteristic function of the underlying asset. Theoretically, 
the CFPD probabilities under a restricted default structure should converge to those under 
the unrestricted default structure as the number of discrete default points goes to infinity. 
Numerically, Figure I-1 shows the clear convergence trend of the CFPD probabilities 
under restricted default to those under continuous default when the discrete default 
interval decreases from one quarter to one week.   
[Insert Figure I-1 about Here] 
                                                 
33 The calibration of risk free rate, payout ratio and asset volatility are similar to Leland and Toft (1996). 
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ii CFPD probabilities under CEV and Jumps 
In this section, we will only do a static analysis of the jump impacts on the 
cumulative default probabilities and associated implied volatilities, in which the lowest 
value of E is limited to -1.  
[Insert Figure I-2 about Here] 
[Insert Figure I-3 about Here] 
Figure I-2 and Figure I-3 report respectively the term structure of CFPD 
probabilities and term structure of IVs for diffusion-jump and CEV-jump processes under 
varying calibrations. In order to make all the scenarios comparable, we use the base 
calibration for asset dynamics without jumps and set the base case for jump at 
0.05, 0.2, 1/10J J JP V K    . Both diffusion and CEV models with and without base 
case jumps are plotted by dashed and solid lines. For the CFPD probabilities, the 
presence of jump components shifts upwards sharply the default probabilities compared 
to that of the base case without jumps across all the models. The shift depends on the 
jump calibration. For instance, increasing jump intensity or the volatility of jump 
amplitude or decreasing the expected value of jump amplitude will increase the CFPD 
probabilities, even doubling the CFPD probabilities for the longest maturity of 20 years 
compared to the no jump case when the intensity is equal to 1/ 2JK  . As for the term 
structure of IVs shown in Figure 14, we find that the jump components shift the term 
structure of IVs upward from the no jump base case under all scenarios and also twist the 
shape of term structure according to the model. For the constant volatility case( 0E  ), 
the jump component would increase the IV for short term debt, not enough for our 
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parameter choices to account for the observed downward term structure of empirical IV, 
but raising the possibility that a higher or a systematic jump risk may indeed explain the 
observed structure. For the CEV-jump models the jump component has a more noticeable 
impact on the long term maturity, especially for positive E .  
We conclude that jump components, for all the difficulties that they present in 
deriving analytical solutions, have significant impacts on default probabilities. The 
evidence that we present from our numerical algorithm can only be considered 
preliminary, and more research is needed, especially with respect to improving the 
accuracy of the derived solutions. Such improvements may allow a shorter discretization 
interval and, thus, bring the results of the algorithm closer to the unknown continuous 
time solutions. 
4. The Structural Model Under CEV Diffusion Process 
Since we derived an analytical solution for the value of the risky debt with 
stationary structure as in Section 2 under the CEV diffusion process by combining 
equation (3.2) and (3.5), the analytical solution for the equity and asset value will be 
derived as well in this section. Then we will study in this section the endogenous default 
boundaries, optimal capital structure, term structure of credit spreads, debt capacity, 
duration and convexity of corporate debt, equity volatility and asset substitution effect. 
4.1 Equity value and asset value  
The value of the equity can be derived by valuing the tax shield due to the 
deductibility of the coupon interest and the bankruptcy cost. The corporate tax rate for the 
firm is denoted by w . As the interest paid to the bondholder is tax-deductible, the firm’s 
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total value is increased by the tax shield due to debt financing. However, the bankruptcy 
costs increase as well if the firm issues more debt to finance its projects. According to the 
trade-off theory, the manager of this firm should balance the tax benefit and the 
bankruptcy cost by maximizing the total firm value. This value can be expressed by, 
    , , ( , )v V K V TB V K BC V K    (4.1) 
Where  ,v V K  is the total firm value, TB(V,K) is the tax benefit due to debt 
financing and ( , )BC V K  is the bankruptcy cost. For a risky debt with infinite maturity, 
the discount rate under the risk-neutral distribution to calculate the expected present value 
of one dollar when default occurs for the first time is the risk free rate. For a risky debt 
with finite maturity T, the discount rate will be the sum of the risk free rate plus the 
proportional retirement rate g that depends on the maturity of the debt. The tax benefit 
available to the firm equals the total tax benefit for a risk-free bond minus the tax benefit 
loss due to the default event34, which yields, 
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I   (4.2) 
The bankruptcy cost is the present value of the loss due to the default event, equal to, 




VBC V K K
K
ID I  (4.3) 
Thus, we have, 
                                                 
34 We assume that the firm always benefits fully from the tax deductibility of coupon payments when it is 
solvent, as in Leland (1994a, b).  
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Since we assumed that the firm is financed by risky debt and equity, the value of the 
corresponding equity equals the total value of the firm minus the total value of the risky 
debt, which yields, 
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 (4.5) 
4.2 The endogenous bankruptcy trigger 
In the previous sections, we assumed that default happens when the state variable V 
drops below a default boundary, K. This default trigger value can be determined 
exogenously or endogenously. If a firm cannot choose its default boundary value, then 
this boundary can be determined by a zero-net worth trigger35 or by a zero cash flow 
trigger36. Under the zero-net worth trigger assumption, the default occurs when the net 
worth of the firm becomes negative for the first time, which implies that the default 
trigger value equals the total face value of the outstanding debt, namely K P . However, 
we often observe that firms are still alive even though their net worth is negative in the 
financial markets. Thus, in order to improve the simple zero net worth trigger, Moody’s 
KMV defines as trigger value 0.5*Short LongK P P  . Under zero cash-flow trigger, a firm 
claims default when the current net cash flow to the security holders cannot meet the 
                                                 
35 See Brennan & Schwartz (1978), and Longstaff & Schwartz (1995). 
36 See Kim, Ramaswamy, &Sundaresan (1993). 
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current coupon payments, which implies /K C G , where G  is the net cash flow to the 
security holders. The problem for this trigger value is that sometimes the equity value is 
still positive even though the current net cash flow is zero. In this case, a firm will prefer 
to issue more equity so as to meet the current coupon payment, instead of announcing 
default. On the other hand, if a firm is capable to choose its default boundary value, this 
default boundary value will be set endogenously by maximizing the total firm value. 
Following Leland (1994a) and LT, we may find the optimal endogenous default 
boundary by the smooth-pasting condition, 
 
( , ) | 0V K
E V K
V  
w  w  (4.6) 
This default boundary value maximizes the value of the equity at any asset level37. 
Applying (4.6) to (4.5), we get the following results, proven in the appendix. 
Proposition 3: According to the smooth pasting condition (4.6), the endogenous 
default value under the CEV diffusion process, denoted by eK , can be obtained by solving 
following equation for given parameter values T , E  and with the auxiliary variables 
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Where,  
                                                 

























K x W x xK
K K M x k m k x










­ ª º    ° « »« »w ° ¬ ¼ ®w ª º °    « »° « !»¬ ¼¯

 
Proposition 3 yields an endogenous default boundary by solving equation (4.7). 
Although there is no explicit solution for the endogenous default value, it is 
straightforward to find it from equation (4.7) by using a root finding algorithm, provided 
a positive root exists. We examine the properties of the solution, as well as the other 
variables of interest of the model in numerical examples in the following sections.  
We analyze the impact of state-dependent volatility on endogenous default triggers, 
debt values, optimal capital structure and term structure of credit spreads by considering 
their values in a base case with the following parameters: current asset value 100V  , 
risk-free rate 0.08r  , firm’s payout rate 0.06q  , tax rate 0.35w  , proportional 
bankruptcy cost 0.5D  , and initial volatility of assets 0 20%V  . Although some of 
these parameters may not reflect current conditions, they were chosen based on previous 
studies closely related to this paper, such as LT and Leland (2004), with which the results 
of this study need to be compared in order to assess the impact of the more general 
formulation. The remaining parameters will assume various values according to the 
studied topic.  
[Insert Figure I-4 about Here] 
Figure I-4 shows the values of endogenous default boundaries for the L model, 
which is a special case of the CEV structural model when E  equals zero, and four CEV 
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structural models with 1, 0.5,0.5,1E    . In all cases the endogenous default trigger 
declines as the average maturity of the bond increases. This is consistent with the 
findings in the L and LT models. The economic interpretation is that the equity holder 
would rather sell equity to finance the required cash flow for debt servicing than choose 
to go bankrupt, even though the net worth of the firm may be negative, provided the 
anticipated equity appreciation is greater than the contribution required from the equity 
holders to keep a firm alive. For long term debt structure, the endogenous default 
boundary is usually less than the face value of the debt, which implies that the expected 
appreciation of equity for such a debt structure should be relatively higher than for the 
short-term debt structure. After incorporating the CEV process, we find that the smaller 
E  is, the faster the endogenous default boundary declines. If E  is negative and large in 
absolute value, and the average maturity of the debt is long enough, the corresponding 
endogenous default boundary could be close to zero, which implies that this firm would 
never choose to go bankrupt endogenously even though the net worth of the firm may be 
negative.  On the other hand, if E  is positive and large in absolute value, the endogenous 
default trigger of the CEV model decreases slowly and is greater than that of the L model.  
These changes of endogenous default triggers under the CEV structural model can 
be understood economically from the point of view of the relationship between 
anticipated equity value and volatility. When E  is negative (positive), the volatility of 
the asset increases (decrease) when the asset value decreases. Recall that it is well known 
since Merton (1974) that the equity in a levered firm can be interpreted as a call option on 
the value of the assets. Similarly, Merton (1973) showed that in many cases of underlying 
asset dynamics, including those used in this paper, the value of the option is an increasing 
39 
 
function of the volatility. It follows that ceteris paribus the anticipated increase in the 
value of the equity will be inversely proportional to the value of E , while the default 
boundary will also vary inversely with this anticipated equity appreciation. In other 
words, at low values of V where the probability of default is high, the increase in 
volatility when E  is negative will counteract the fall in the value of equity because of the 
fall in V.  
[Insert Figure I-5 about Here] 
Next we examine the effect of the leverage ratio, ( , , ) / ( , , )D V K g v V K g , on the 
default boundary for two different values of maturity, or of its inverse g. The debt value 
at time 0 is set at par, implying that the RHS of equations (2.24) is set equal to P. The L 
model shows a strictly increasing function of this endogenous default boundary with 
respect to the leverage ratio, depicted by the solid lines in Figure I-5. As expected, the 
monotone increasing property of the default boundary as a function of the leverage ratio 
is preserved, but the speed of increase depends on the value of E . For the 20-year average 
debt maturity the shape of the function is convex for all E . The positive relationship 
between the value of E  and the default boundary is maintained for negative E ’s at all 
leverage ratios, but not for positive E ’s, where we see a reversal for low values of the 
leverage ratio. Again, this is consistent with the option interpretation of the equity, since 
a low leverage ratio corresponds to a deep in the money call option, for which the 
volatility effect is weak and may be swamped by other factors in solving equation (4.7).  
Note also that for the firms with a low leverage ratio and a negative E  there is a 
non-endogenous default zone in which a firm would never choose to go bankrupt 
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endogenously, especially for the lowest value of 1E   . In Figure I-5, this non-
endogenous default zone with 1E    starts from zero leverage and ends at 29% leverage 
for 5-year bonds and at 43% leverage for 20-year bonds. This shows a positive 
relationship between the range of the non-endogenous default zone and the average 
maturity of corporate bonds. By comparing the endogenous default triggers for CEV 
structural models with 1E    and 0.5E     we see the non-endogenous default zone 
becomes wider if E  decreases. Again, this lowering of the default boundary to about zero 
is consistent with the volatility effect that causes ceteris paribus an appreciation of the 
equity treated as an option whenever the underlying value V decreases. In the non-
endogenous default zone, the anticipated equity value is high enough to dominate the 
required cash outflow for debt required to keep the firm alive. Thus, the equity holders 
will choose to retire equity in order to fund the coupon payment for the debt holders until 
the equity value goes to zero. This behavior leads to lower recovery value for the bond 
holders, which increase the risk of corporate bonds.  
4.3 Optimal capital structure 
Under an endogenous default boundary and a pre-determined debt structure, the 
optimal capital structure that maximizes the total firm value can be achieved by altering 
the leverage ratio, the ratio of the total outstanding debt value over the total firm value, 
/D v . Figure I-6 examines the relationship between total firm value and leverage ratio 
for bonds with average maturities from 1 to 20 years, and Table I-1 reports the optimal 
leverage ratios and the values of key endogenous variables at optimal leverage. As the 
average maturity increases, the optimal leverage ratio increases and the optimal total firm 
value increases as well. For instance, for 1-year debt, the optimal leverage ratios are 
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32.88%, 28.44% and 27.20% for 0.5E   , 0E   and 0.5E   respectively, while for 
10-year debt, the corresponding optimal leverage ratios are 66.39%, 59.61% and 51.63%. 
This relationship was first reported by L and is still preserved under CEV volatility.  
[Insert Figure I-6 about Here] 
[Insert Table I-1 about Here] 
Based on the results Figure I-4 and Figure I-5, we anticipate that the optimal 
leverage ratios are affected by the value of E  for given debt characteristics. We also 
expect that negative values of E  are more leverage-friendly. These do indeed turn out to 
be the case. For intermediate or long term debt structures, the optimal leverage ratios 
increase (decrease) with the absolute value of E   when E  is negative (positive). For 
instance, the optimal leverage ratio increases from 51.43% to 67.06% when E   decreases 
from 0 to -1, and decreases to 40.79% when E   increases to 1 for the 5-year average 
maturity debt. For short-term debt structures, less than or equal to 1-year, the optimal 
leverage ratios decrease first and then start to increase when E   increases from 0 to 1.  
Similarly, the total firm value and the total debt value are both increasing functions 
while the total equity value is a decreasing function of the average maturity of the debt 
under each scenario considered in Table I-1. This effect is consistent with the trade-off 
theory, which balances the tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of the firm in order to 
maximize the total firm value. Given that the anticipated bankruptcy costs are invariant to 
debt maturity, in long term debt the anticipated tax benefits that accumulate over time 
should dominate the anticipated bankruptcy costs, thus increasing both optimal leverage 
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and firm value. Conversely, the anticipated bankruptcy costs should dominate the 
anticipated tax benefits for short-term debt.  
Under the CEV model the strong effect of E  on the optimal leverage also has 
predictable effects on total firm value. If E  is negative, the optimal leverage ratio and 
total firm value will increase compared to the L model in which E  is zero. The value 
effect is, however, small. For instance, for a 5-year average maturity the total firm value 
increases by about 5.5% when β changes from 0 to -1, a much smaller change than the 
respective changes in the debt and equity values. On the other hand, for positive values of 
β the effects of β on firm value do not have a consistent sign, with the effect dependent 
on debt maturity. Again, the effects on total value are small even though the shifts in the 
composition of capital structure are significant. 
Table I-1 also examines the risk characteristics of the optimally levered firm with 
the equity risk measured by equity volatility and the debt risk measured by debt volatility 
and credit spread. For a given debt maturity, both equity volatility and debt volatility 
monotonically increase when ߚ decreases; the same is true for the credit spread for all but 
the largest maturity. For all the debt maturities considered in Table I-1, the largest equity 
risk and debt risk measured by both risk metrics is always reached when ߚ equals -1, the 
smallest ߚ in our calibrations. On the other hand, for any given value of ߚ, the volatility 
of debt increases monotonically with the average debt maturity. The volatility of equity 
and the credit spread, however, first increase and then decrease with maturity for ߚ equal 
to -1,-0.5 and 1, while it increases with maturity for ߚ equal to 0.5 and 0. Apparently, the 
impact of the size of ߚ on optimal debt financing is major. 
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4.4 Credit spread and debt capacity 
We calculate the term structure of credit spreads ( /C D r ) of newly issued debt for 
alternative leverage ratios shown in Figure I-7. For a given maturity debt, a high leverage 
ratio implies a high credit spread. The humped term structure, which first increase and 
then decreases, can be observed clearly for moderate-to-high leverage ratios for all values 
of E . These patterns are consistent with the findings of the L and LT models. Under the 
CEV structural model credit spreads are higher for negative than for positive ߚ for all 
maturities and under all the leverage ratios considered in Figure I-7. The humped shapes 
of term structure for moderate-to-high leverage ratios are still preserved with state-
dependent volatility. This credit spread is inversely proportional to dp , the present value 
of one dollar paid to debt holders when default occurs, which is given by Lemmas 1 and 
2 for the risk neutral distribution. Since the default boundary is endogenously determined 
for given E , leverage ratio and debt maturity, these are also the variables that affect the 
credit spread. 
[Insert Figure I-7 about Here] 
Debt capacity is the maximum value of total debt under endogenous default 
boundary. L and LT found that debt capacity falls as the volatility of asset value increases 
under their constant volatility models. For the CEV model, debt capacity increases when 
E  is negative and decreases when E  is positive. Figure I-8 depicts the debt value as a 
function of the leverage ratio for debt with 5-year average maturity. For the three values 
of E  in the figure, the maximal debt value tends to be reached at approximately equal 
leverage ratios, which lie between 80% and 90%. Since a firm with a negative E  has a 
higher optimal leverage, such a firm would typically experience a high debt value and a 
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high total firm value compared to a firm with a positive E  with exactly the same 
leverage ratio. 
[Insert Figure I-8 about Here] 
4.5 Duration and convexity of corporate debt 
For the debt portfolio, the Macaulay duration, which measures the percentage 
change of bond value with respect to the change of the risk free interest rate, is one of the 
most popular and simple ways to measure interest rate risk for bonds with no default risk. 
For coupon-paying corporate bonds with default risk, L and LT studied the relationship 
between effective duration, which measures the real change of bond value with respect to 
the change in the risk free interest rate, and Macaulay duration. They found that the 
Macaulay duration is much longer than effective duration as the leverage ratio (or credit 
spread) increases, which implies that the traditional duration-matching methods for 
immunization should be adjusted when using corporate bonds. Following L, the 
Macaulay duration is given by 1/ ( / )g C D , while the effective duration is equal to 
 / *(1/ )D r Dw w . In Figure I-9, we fix the leverage ratio at 50% and show the 
relationship between Macaulay duration and effective duration for the CEV model under 
different values of E . For a constant volatility (solid line), the Macaulay duration is 
generally longer than the effective duration for all maturities, but under the CEV (dashed 
line for 1E    and dotted line for 1E  ), the Macaulay duration is much closer to the 
real effective duration for any given effective duration. This implies that the traditional 
duration-matching method should be more effective under state-dependent than under 
constant volatilities. 
[Insert Figure I-9 about Here] 
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For default-free debt, the debt value is a convex function of the interest rate, which 
is a critical property for the traditional duration matching method. However, L and LT 
found that this convexity does not necessarily hold any longer for corporate risky debt 
under the constant volatility assumption, a result confirmed in the scenarios considered in 
Figure I-10 (solid lines). Under the CEV model, the convexity relation may appear again 
depending on the value of E . In Panel A of Figure I-10, both the positive E  ( 1E  , 
dotted line) and the negative E  ( 1E   , dashed line) show a convex relationship for the 
debt with 5-year average maturity and 40% leverage ratio. When, however, the leverage 
ratio increases from 40% to 50% in Panel B, only the negative ߚ preserves the convexity 
relationship. Thus, a dynamic duration-convexity hedge strategy for a bond portfolio 
should be implemented differently for different asset volatility assumptions, debt 
maturity and leverage ratio. For instance, for 20-year average maturity and 50% leverage 
ratio constant volatility yields a bond value that is a concave function of the interest rate, 
while for a CEV process with 1E   ,  the traditional duration-convexity hedging 
strategy still works because the convexity relationship still holds.  
[Insert Figure I-10 about Here] 
4.6 Equity volatility  
Most structural models assume asset dynamics following a diffusion process for the 
unlevered firm value. Since this is a non-tradable asset and an unobservable variable, we 
need to estimate the drift and volatility of asset value from observable data of traded 
assets, such as the stock or bond price. For the model presented in this paper the 
parameters of the diffusion process may be estimated by a maximum likelihood method 
initially proposed by Duan (1994) that yields the asset value and volatility from observed 
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equity value. By using three different models of asset dynamics, Ericsson and Reneby 
(2005) show that this method has superior properties compared to other estimators.  
Once the parameters of the diffusion process have been estimated by the maximum 
likelihood method, it is straightforward to get the equity volatility and equity value. Since 
the analytical solution for the value of the equity has been derived under the CEV 
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[Insert Figure I-11 about Here] 
In Figure I-11, we assume that the firm is optimally levered under an endogenous 
default boundary and we examine the relationship between equity value and equity 
volatility for the L model and CEV structural models with varying E ’s. The L constant 
volatility model (solid line) indicates a negative correlation between equity value and 
equity volatility. As we use the whole US market’s average data for our calibrations, this 
negative correlation is consistent with the findings for the market index data, which is 
popularly known as the “leverage effect”. Under the CEV model, the correlation between 
equity value and equity volatility depends on the value of E . The smaller E  is, the 
stronger the negative correlation between equity value and equity volatility. For instance, 
the dotted line ( 0.5)E    is steeper than the solid line ( 0E  ) and the dashed line 
( 1E   ) is even steeper compared to the case 0.5E   . On the other hand, when E  is 
positive and large enough, it can also indicate a positive relationship between equity 
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value and equity volatility, as in the case that 1E   (plus-dashed line). While for the 
market index the leverage effect has been well documented, for an individual firm the 
correlation between equity value and equity volatility could be positive or negative, 
depending on the particular firm’s characteristics. Thus, the CEV model allows more 
flexibility and generalization than the constant volatility model, which is only a special 
case of CEV structural models.  
4.7 Agency effects: debt maturity and asset substitution 
We noted in Table I-1 that the total firm value increases when the maturity of the 
debt becomes longer under optimal capital structure. Rationally then all firms should use 
long-term debt to finance their projects in order to maximize total firm value. Why are 
short-term debts still traded in the bond market? Leland and Toft (1996) answer this 
question by studying the asset substitution effect for different debt maturities. The asset 
substitution originated from Jensen and Meckling (1976) and refers to the effect that 
equity holders will try to transfer value from debt to equity by increasing the riskiness of 
the firm’s activities. By analyzing the relationship between  E Vw w and /D Vw w  for 
different levels of asset value, LT find that  
“the existence of potential agency costs implies that firms with higher asset risk will 
shorten their optimal debt maturity as well as decrease their optimal amount of debt.”  
[Insert Figure I-12 about Here] 
We re-examine the asset substitution effect in the context of the CEV model in 
Figure I-12. This figure shows the sensitivity of equity value and debt value to the total 
asset risk, V EV T , respectively for the maturities of 1-year, 5-year, 10-year and 
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perpetual. When the signs of E Vw w and /D Vw w  are the same, the interests of equity 
and debt holders are positively correlated, indicating a zero asset substitution effect, and 
vice versa.  The constant volatility case ( 0E  ) is our benchmark for each scenario. As 
maturity increases from 1-year to perpetual, the asset substitution effect increases for all 
the scenarios being considered, which is consistent with LT’s findings. For 1E    the 
asset substitution effects are more severe, especially for intermediate- and long-term 
maturity, compared to those of the benchmark cases. On the other hand, for 1E  , most 
of the time the interests of equity holders are in line with those of the bond holders, 
provided the asset value is greater than the corresponding bankruptcy trigger for each 
maturity, indicating that increasing asset risk will decrease both equity value and debt 
value simultaneously. These observed stylized factors imply that firms would use short-
term debt and  suboptimal amounts when their asset value follows a CEV process with 
negative correlation between asset value and asset volatility, the most commonly 
assumed feature of asset dynamics. 
5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have presented a new structural model of the firm that 
generalizes the asset dynamics assumptions of Leland (1994a,b) and Leland and Toft 
(1996), among others. The generalizations are twofold. First, we introduce a state 
dependent volatility that varies with the underlying asset, the value of the unlevered firm, 
under the constant elasticity of variance form. We derive closed form expressions for 
almost all the variables of interest on the balance sheet, including corporate debt values, 
total levered firm values and equity values. By comparing the term structure and unit 
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price generated by CEV and stochastic volatility asset dynamics given an exogenous 
default boundary, we found that CEV is a simplified form of stochastic volatility and 
could mimic the term structure of CDP generated with stochastic volatility to a certain 
extent. Under the derived endogenous default trigger we study the impact of state 
dependent volatility on default probabilities, optimal leverage, credit spreads, debt 
capacity, duration and convexity of corporate debt, and the agency effects of debt. Most 
of the results are given implicitly, but efficient numerical methods allow us to reach the 
solutions easily. 
Second, we introduce jump components into both the simple, the state dependent 
and stochastic volatility diffusion dynamics. We derive quasi-analytically the asset value 
distribution under log-normal jumps with constant volatility, multinomial jumps with 
state dependent volatility and double jumps with stochastic volatility and derive an 
efficient discrete time algorithm for the first passage time distribution under restricted 
default times. Although the lack of analytical expressions prevents several important 
derivations, we nonetheless establish that the presence of even unsystematic jump risk 
increases significantly default probabilities and the term structure of default volatilities.    
An interesting question is whether the new structure model provides a better fitting 
for the cross section empirical data from equity, debt, option and CDS market. To answer 





A. The value of corporate debt under the CEV model and the LT debt assumptions 
In LT’s stationary debt structure the firm continuously sells a constant amount of 
new debt with maturity T  and redeems the same amount of matured debt in order to keep 
the total outstanding principal and coupon payment rate constant and equal to P  and C , 
respectively. Suppose ( , , )d V K t  denotes the price of one unit of outstanding debt with 
finite maturity t , continuous coupon payment C , and principal P , which can be 
expressed by 
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Given the first passage probability density function ( , , )f V KW  under the CEV 
process, we define, omitting arguments for notational simplicity 
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 ³  (A.2) 
The expected price of one dollar payment when default occurs during the period 
(0,t). From equation (3) in LT we find the price of this bond equals 
   > @ 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( )A t , the cumulative first passage default probability, was defined in Section 3.3. 
Under the CEV process analytical forms for ( )A t  and ( )B t  are given in the following 
Lemma. 
Lemma A1: When the state dependent volatility is given by the CEV process 
 V V EV T , the first passage cumulative default probability,) ( )A t  and the expected 
price of one dollar payment when first passage default occurs during the period from 
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 (A.4) 
Where ࣦିଵ denote the inverse of the Laplace transform evaluated at the appropriate 
debt maturity t and  ( )VOI  is defined in equation (3.7) 
Proof:  It suffices to prove the second part of (A.4) since the first part follows 
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By changing the order of integration (A.5) becomes 
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Since the RHS of (A.6) is a constant times the value of a $1 perpetual claim in the 
first passage time under the CEV distribution, (A.4) follows immediately from (A.6) by 
Lemmas 1 and 2, QED.  
By inserting equation (A.4) into (A.3), we arrive at the solution for the price of risky 
corporate debt with finite maturity ܶ under the CEV diffusion process. Thus, under the 
LT model’s stationary debt structure, the value of all outstanding debt with maturityT , 
the equivalent of (3.8)-(3.9) for 1g T    , is from (A.3),  
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An analytical expression for  I T   is  
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1 1( ) ( )
T
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Unfortunately there is no analytical solution for  J T  , which must be evaluated 
numerically from the function B(T) estimated by(A.4).  
Note that for debt with maturity t the first passage probability density function, 
( , , )f V KW  should be exactly the same for both L and LT stationary debt structures under 
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the CEV process. Hence, we may define the equivalent retirement rate ݃ᇱ as the one that 
makes the expected price of a one dollar payment when default occurs equal under both L 
and LT debt structures, or    &'L L TB g B t ǡfor t corresponding to aT  and g=g’ in (3.2). 
  '
0 0
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t
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 ³ ³  (A.8) 
Since the RHS of (A.8) is available analytically from the inversion of the Laplace 
transform in the second part of (A.4), the value of corporate debt under the LT stationary 
debt structure can be found for any t from (A.8) by applying the equivalent retirement 
rate 'g  and setting t=g’-1. 38 
B. Proof of Lemmas and Propositions 
Proof of Lemma 1 
The characteristic function (2.8) of a non-central 2F variable is a well-known 
result.39 (2.7) follows then immediately from (2.6) and the definitions of TZ  and Ty , QED. 
Proof of Lemma 3 
We have the bivariate diffusion Process (2.16) under risk neutral distribution. With 
correlated Brownian motions    , , ,v v Jt td W W dt d N N dtU U   and the auxiliary 
variables are given by, 
                                                 
38 Note, however, that the total debt (A.7) in the LT model is not equal to the total debt given by (3.9) for
1g T  , but, given T , we  can find the corresponding retirement rate g by setting the total debt value of 
(A.7) equal to that of (3.9).  



















H ª º « »¬ ¼ , (1,1)
0 0
0 0






ª º « »¬ ¼
 (B.2) 
 0l K , 1 0 00 0l
ª º « »¬ ¼  (B.3) 
We conjecture the structure of the bivariate characteristic function as follows, 
 > @1 2 1 2( , , , , ) expV v t A BV B vM I I     (B.4) 
Following Proposition 1 of Duffie, Pan and Singleton (2000) , we have to solve the 
following system of ordinary differential equations, 
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Subject to the boundary condition 1 1 2 2(0) 0, (0) , (0)A B i B iI I   . Define another 
set of auxiliary variables as, 
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We know that (B.7) is a standard Riccati equation and 1 2
b Dy
a
  is one of the 
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Insert (B.11) into (B.7) and rearrange the terms, 
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Thus, 
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Plug (B.9) and (B.17) into (B.5) and solve this first order ordinary differential 
equation, we have 
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 (B.18) 
As we assume that jumps in asset value lnV and jumps in asset variance v  are 
simultaneously correlated with common arrival intensity cK . The marginal distribution of 
the jump amplitude in asset variance is exponential with mean vcJP  conditional on a 
realization, vJz of the jump amplitude in asset variance, the jump amplitude in asset value 
is normally distributed with mean V vcJ J JzP U  and variance 2cJVV . 
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Where, 
    1 21, 12 2
v v
J Jm b D m b D
a a
P P       (B.21) 
 1 1 1 2 2 1,v vJ cJ J cJk m i k m iU P I U P I     (B.22) 
Therefore, the bivariate characteristic function of asset value and asset volatility is 
given by Lemma 3. 
 Proof of Proposition 1 
The characteristic function inversion (2.10) is well-known; see, for instance, Heston 
(1993, p. 331). (2.9) follows then immediately by noting that 
Pr ( ) Pr ( )T Tob V K ob Z ad  d  and that 
1Pr ( ) [Pr ( , )]i jT T T u dob V K E ob V K N j y l l
d  d   , QED.    
Proof of Proposition 3 
Under CEV diffusion process, the equity value can be found from equations (4.5), 
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Where,  
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Where, 
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Following Leland (1994a), the smooth pasting condition implies,  
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We define, 
    , ,' ' ', ,k m k mW x M x xW M x
x x V
w w w   w w w  
59 
 
From the Mupad notebook in Matlab software40, we have,  
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From (B.23) we have, 
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Applying the smooth pasting condition that sets the RHS of (B.27) to 0, we have 
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which corresponds to equation (4.7), QED. 
                                                 




Figure I-1: Convergence of Restricted Default 
This figure depicts the term structure of cumulative default probabilities for both restricted default and 
unrestricted default with constant volatility asset dynamics. It is assumed that the risk free rate, payout rate, 
initial asset volatility, initial asset value and exogenous default boundary are the same as in the base case. 
Under restricted default, weekly (dash line), monthly (dash-dot line) and quarterly (dot line) default is 
considered. Under continuous default, the cumulative default probabilities are calculated by the analytical 






Figure I-2: FPCD probabilities for CEV with jumps 
This figure depicts the CDPs for diffusion-jump model ( 0E  ) and CEV-jump models ( 1, 1E E   ) 
under varying calibrations of jump parameters. The dashed lines show the diffusion model and CEV model 
without jumps. The solid lines show the base case for the diffusion-jump and CEV-jump models. For the 
base case of jump calibration, 0.05, 0.2J JP V   and 1/10JK  . The dashed-dot lines show the case of 
1/ 2JK  ; the dot lines show the case of 0.1JP   ; the plus lines show the case of 0.4JV   with the other 
parameters same as in the base case. The initial asset value, 
0 $100V  , risk free rate, 0.08r  , payout ratio, 




Figure I-3: Term structure of IVs for CEV with jumps 
This figure depicts the term structure of IVs for diffusion-jump model ( 0E  ) and CEV-jump models 
( 1, 1E E   ) under varying calibrations of jump parameters. The dashed lines show the diffusion model 
and CEV model without jumps. The solid lines show the base case for diffusion-jump and CEV-jump 
models. For the base case of jump calibration, 0.05, 0.2J JP V   and 1/10JK  . The dashed-dot lines 
show the case of 1/ 2JK  ; the dot lines show the case of 0.1JP   ; the plus lines show the case of 0.4JV   
with the other parameters same as in the base case. The initial asset value, 
0 $100V  , risk free rate, 










 ³ . The exogenous default 
boundary equals $50 for all the scenarios.  
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Figure I-4: Endogenous Default Trigger as a function of average maturity  
This figure depicts the values of endogenous default triggers for the Leland (1994b) model (bold solid line) 
and CEV structural models with ߚ ൌ െͳ (dashed line),  ߚ ൌ െͲǤͷ (dotted line), ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ (Bold dotted line) 
and ߚ ൌ ͳ (bold dashed line). It is assumed that current asset value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ, current debt value ܦ ൌ ͷͲ, 
risk free rate ݎ ൌ ͲǤͲͺ, the firm’s payout rate ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and proportional bankruptcy 
cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The coupon rate is determined by making the debt issued at par value under the endogenous 
default boundary. The initial volatilities are the same for all these scenarios, and ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For each given 
ߚ under the CEV diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ .  
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Figure I-5: Endogenous default trigger as a function of leverage ratio  
This figure depicts the value of the endogenous default trigger with respect to the leverage ratio under the 
Leland (1994b) model (solid line) and CEV structural models with ߚ ൌ െͳ (Bolded dashed lines), ߚ ൌ
െͲǤͷ (Bolded dotted lines), ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ (dotted lines) and ߚ ൌ ͳ(dash lines). It is assumed that current asset 
value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ , risk free rate ݎ ൌ ͲǤͲͺ , the firm’s payout rate ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸ , tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ , and 
proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The coupon rate is determined by making the debt issued at par 
value under the endogenous default boundary. The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and 
ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For each given ߚ under the CEV diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ . 
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Figure I-6: Total firm value as a function of leverage ratio  
This figure depicts the total firm value with respect to the leverage ratio under the Leland (1994b) model 
(solid line) and CEV structure models with ߚ ൌ െͲǤͷ(dashed lines) and ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ (dotted lines). Three 
scenarios of average debt maturity are considered, ܶ ൌ ͳ, ܶ ൌ ͳͲ and ܶ ൌ ʹͲ. It is assumed that current 
asset value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ, risk free rate ݎ ൌ ͲǤͲͺ, the firm’s payout rate ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and 
proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The coupon rate is determined by making the debt issued at par 
value under the endogenous default boundary. The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and 
ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For the given ߚ under the CEV diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ .  
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Table I-1: Characteristics of optimally levered firms under different models 
This Table exhibits the characteristics of optimally levered firms under the Leland (1994b), Leland and Toft (1996) , and CEV structural models with 1-
year’s, 5-years’, and 10-years’ average maturity. It is assumed that current asset value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ dollars, risk free rate ݎ ൌ ͲǤͲͺ, the firm’s payout rate 
ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The leverage is chosen by maximizing total firm value and the coupon rate is 
determined by making the debt issued at par value under the endogenous default boundary. The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and 
ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For each given ߚ under the CEV diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ . 

























1-year Average Maturity 
ߚ ൌ െͳ 3.59 37.52 39.05 108.59 66.18 42.41 35.63 0.71 48.31 
ߚ ൌ െͲǤͷ 2.86 36.72 32.88 107.06 71.87 35.20 31.33 0.2 14.46 
ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ 2.35 36.25 27.20 108.19 78.76 29.42 26.26 3.04E-3 0.23 
ߚ ൌ ͳ 2.54 38.76 28.90 110.00 78.21 31.80 25.94 3.24E-4 0.03 
L(ߚ ൌ Ͳ) 2.44 35.67 28.44 107.06 76.61 30.45 27.99 3.12E-2 2.3 
5-year Average Maturity 
ߚ ൌ െͳ 8.70 51.83 67.06 119.44 39.34 80.10 58.40 8.90 286.30 
ߚ ൌ െͲǤͷ 7.11 50.98 61.00 115.44 45.02 70.42 51.37 6.09 210.31 
ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ 3.99 41.72 42.75 112.74 64.54 48.20 32.85 0.67 27.51 
ߚ ൌ ͳ 3.76 41.29 40.79 114.33 67.69 46.64 30.24 0.14 6.45 
L(ߚ ൌ Ͳ) 5.23 46.36 51.43 112.99 54.88 58.12 40.82 2.69 100.51 
10-years Average Maturity 
ߚ ൌ െͳ 9.09 46.95 70.43 123.37 36.49 86.89 55.50 9.93 245.62 
ߚ ൌ െͲǤͷ 8.07 49.51 66.39 119.38 40.12 79.26 52.70 8.06 218.09 
ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ 5.17 44.62 51.63 115.71 55.97 59.74 37.67 1.91 64.78 
ߚ ൌ ͳ 4.58 43.27 47.74 116.83 61.05 55.78 33.60 0.53 20.98 
L(ߚ ൌ Ͳ) 6.60 48.09 59.71 116.63 46.99 69.64 45.69 4.92 147.46 
Infinite Average Maturity 
ߚ ൌ െͳ 9.75 36.23 77.44 130.43 29.43 101.00 52.03 11.20 165.33 
ߚ ൌ െͲǤͷ 9.20 42.97 74.65 126.85 32.16 94.69 52.06 10.13 171.30 
ߚ ൌ ͲǤͷ 7.42 45.72 65.84 123.29 42.12 81.17 45.63 4.62 114.32 
ߚ ൌ ͳ 4.98 36.19 50.73 120.95 59.60 61.35 33.52 0.39 12.36 
L(ߚ ൌ Ͳ) 8.38 45.37 70.58 124.43 36.61 87.82 49.53 7.69 153.83 
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Figure I-7: The term structure of credit spreads under different leverage ratio 
This figure depicts the term structure of credit spreads for the Leland (1994b) model (solid line) and CEV 
structural models with ߚ ൌ െͳ (dashed lines), and ߚ ൌ ͳ (dotted lines) under 40% (Top), 50% (Middle) 
and 60% (Bottom) leverage ratios. It is assumed that current asset value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ dollars, risk free rate ݎ ൌ
ͲǤͲͺ, the firm’s payout rate ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The 
coupon rate is determined by making the debt issued at par value under the endogenous default boundary. 
The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For the given ߚ under the CEV 
diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ .  
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Figure I-8: Debt value as a function of leverage 
This figure depicts the value of debt for different leverage ratios under the Leland(1994b) model(solid line), 
CEV structural model with ߚ ൌ െͳ (dashed line), and ߚ ൌ ͳ (dotted line). It is assumed that current asset 
value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ dollars, risk free rate ݎ ൌ ͲǤͲͺ, the firm’s payout rate ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and 
proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The coupon rate is determined by making the debt issued at par 
value under the endogenous default boundary. The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and 
ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For the given ߚ under the CEV diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ . The average maturity of debt is 
assumed to be 5 years. 
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Figure I-9: Effective duration with respect to Macaulay duration  
This figure depicts the change of effective duration of bonds with respect to their Macaulay Duration for 
the Leland (1994b) model (solid line)and CEV structural models with ߚ ൌ െͳ(dashed line) and ߚ ൌ
ͳ(dotted line). It is assumed that current asset value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ dollars, risk free rate ݎ ൌ ͺΨ, the firm’s 
payout rate ݍ ൌ ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The coupon rate is 
determined by making the debt issued at par value under the endogenous default boundary. The leverage 
ratio is assumed to be 50%. The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For the 
given ߚ under the CEV diffusion process, ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ .  
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Figure I-10: Bond price as a function of the risk-free interest rate 
The graphs depict the bond price per $100 face value as a function of risk-free rate of interest for the 
Leland (1994b) structural model (solid lines) and CEV structural models with ߚ ൌ െͳ(dashed lines) and 
ߚ ൌ ͳ(dotted lines). Panel A shows the bonds with 5-year average maturity and 40% leverage ratio; Panel 
B shows the bonds with 5-year average maturity and 50% leverage ratio; Panel C shows the bonds with 20-
year average maturity with 40% leverage ratio; and Panel D shows the bonds with 20-year average maturity 
with 50% leverage ratio. It is assumed that current asset value ܸ ൌ ͳͲͲ dollars, the firm’s payout rate ݍ ൌ
ͲǤͲ͸, tax rate ݓ ൌ ͲǤ͵ͷ, and proportional bankruptcy cost ߙ ൌ ͲǤͷ. The coupon rate is determined by 
making the debt issued at par value under the endogenous default boundary when the interest rate is 8%. 
The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and ߪ଴ ൌ ʹͲΨ. For the given ߚ under the CEV 
diffusion process ߠ ൌ ߪ଴ ܸఉΤ .  
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Figure I-11: Volatility of equity with respect to the level of equity value  
This figure depicts the volatilities of equity under the Leland (1994b) model (solid line) and CEV structural 
models with ߚ ൌ െͳǡ ߚ ൌ െͳ (dashed line), 0.5E    (dotted line), 0.5E   (star-dashed line) and 1E   
(plus-dashed line). It is assumed that current asset value 100V   dollars, risk free rate 0.08r  , the firm’s 
payout rate 0.06q  , tax rate 0.35w  , and proportional bankruptcy cost 0.5D  . The average maturity 
of debt is 5 years. The leverage ratio is the optimal leverage ratio computed under the endogenous default 
boundary. The coupon rate is determined by making the debt issued at par value under the ndogenous 
default boundary. The initial volatilities are the same for these scenarios and 0 20%V  . For the given E  
under the CEV diffusion process 
0 /V
ET V .  
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Figure I-12: Sensitivity of equity and debt values to total asset risk  
This figure depicts the sensitivity of equity value and debt value to total asset risk measured by the 
volatility of assets, for 1-year, 5-year, 10-year and perpetual bonds, shown under the L model with solid 
(dashed) lines for the sensitivity of equity (debt), under the CEV structural model with β 1  with plus-
solid (plus-dashed) lines for the sensitivity of equity (debt), and the CEV model with β 1   with star-solid 
(star-dashed) lines for the sensitivity of equity (debt). The total coupon payment and face value of debt are 
determined such that the capital structure is optimal for firm value V 100 . The particular values for each 
bond refer to Table I-1. It is assumed that the risk free rate 0.08r  , the firm’s payout rate 0.06q  , tax 
rate 0.35w  , and proportional bankruptcy cost 0.5D  . 































































Table I-2: Characteristics of firms under different models with jumps 
This table reports the characteristics of firms for Leland’s model (L), Leland’s model with jump (L-J), CEV 
structural model (CEV) and CEV structural model with jump (CEV-J). The bonds pays continuous coupon 
and the coupon payment equals the continuous coupon in Table I-1 for each scenario. The default events 
only occur on the semi-annual basis and the default boundary is equal to the endogenous default boundary 
of the optimally levered firm in Table 1 for each scenario. The intensity of the jump is 1/10JK  . The 
jump amplitude for L-J follows a log-normal distribution and for CEV-J follows a binomial distribution 
with 0.05, 0.2J JP V   . It is assumed that current asset value 100V   dollars, the firm’s payout rate 
0.06q  , tax rate 0.35w  , and proportional bankruptcy cost 0.5D  . The initial volatilities are the same 
for these scenarios and 0 20%V  . For each given E  under the CEV diffusion process, 0 /V ET V . 














1-year maturity bond 
L( 0E  ) L 0.2829 107.63 77.18 30.45 1.29 L-J 0.2849 106.87 76.42 30.44 1.39 
 1E    CEV 0.3867 109.92 67.42 42.50 44.66 
CEV-J 0.3907 108.73 66.24 42.49 44.99 
0.5E    CEV 0.3263 107.93 72.71 35.22 12.09 
CEV-J 0.3293 106.92 71.71 35.21 12.26 
  0.5E   CEV 0.2709 108.58 79.16 29.42 0 
CEV-J 0.2737 107.48 78.07 29.41 0 
 1E   CEV 0.2923 108.76 76.96 31.80 0 
CEV-J 0.2965 107.22 75.43 31.79 0 
5-year maturity bond 
L( 0E  ) L 0.5125 114.58 55.86 58.72 90 L-J 0.5154 113.11 54.81 58.30 97 
1E    CEV 0.6718 123.00 40.38 82.63 253 
CEV-J 0.6792 120.42 38.63 81.79 264 
0.5E    CEV 0.6094 118.06 46.12 71.95 188 
CEV-J 0.6155 115.79 44.52 71.28 198 
 0.5E   CEV 0.4255 113.62 65.27 48.35 25 
CEV-J 0.4299 111.95 63.82 48.13 29 
 1E   CEV 0.4064 114.83 68.15 46.67 5.6 
CEV-J 0.4117 113.02 66.49 46.53 8 
10-year maturity bond 
L( 0E  ) L 0.5984 118.61 47.64 70.97 130 L-J 0.5989 116.90 46.88 70.02 143 
 1E    CEV 0.7112 126.52 36.54 89.98 210 
CEV-J 0.7138 124.04 35.50 88.54 227 
0.5E    CEV 0.6683 122.05 40.49 81.56 189 
CEV-J 0.6706 119.65 39.41 80.24 206 
 0.5E   CEV 0.5153 116.99 56.70 60.29 58 
CEV-J 0.5180 114.94 55.40 59.54 68 
 1E   CEV 0.4760 117.57 61.60 55.96 18 
CEV-J 0.4802 115.34 59.95 55.39 27 
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Table I-3: Characteristics of firms under different models with jumps 
This table reports the characteristics of firms for Leland’s model with jump (L-J) and CEV structural model 
with jump (CEV-J) under varying jump calibrations. The 5-year bond pays continuous coupon and the 
coupon payment equals the continuous coupon in Table I-1 for each scenario. The default events only occur 
on a semi-annual basis and the default boundary is equal to the endogenous default boundary of the 
optimally levered firm in Table I-1 for each scenario. For the base case, the intensity of the jump is 
1/10JK  . The jump amplitude for L-J follows a log-normal distribution, and for CEV-J follows a 
binomial distribution with 0.05, 0.2J JP V   . It is assumed that current asset value 100V   dollars, the 
firm’s payout rate 0.06q  , tax rate 0.35w  , and proportional bankruptcy cost 0.5D  . The initial 
volatilities are the same for these scenarios and 
0 20%V  . For each given E  under the CEV diffusion 
process, 
0 /V
ET V . 













L-J( 0E  ) 
Base Case 0.5154 113.11 54.81 58.30 97 
 1/ 5JK   0.5182 111.71 53.82 57.89 103 
 1/ 20JK   0.5140 113.84 55.33 58.51 94 
 0.25JV   0.5156 112.87 54.68 58.19 99 
 0.15JV   0.5153 113.33 54.93 58.40 95 
 0.1JP    0.5178 112.13 54.07 58.07 101 
 0.05JP   0.5109 114.84 56.17 58.67 91 
1E    
Base Case 0.6792 120.42 38.63 81.79 264 
 1/ 5JK   0.6866 117.87 36.94 80.93 275 
 1/ 20JK   0.6755 121.71 39.50 82.21 258 
 0.25JV   0.6799 120.09 38.44 81.64 266 
 0.15JV   0.6787 120.68 38.78 81.90 262 
 0.1JP    0.6858 118.33 37.18 81.15 272 
 0.05JP   0.6681 124.11 41.19 82.92 249 
1E   
Base Case 0.4117 113.02 66.49 46.53 8 
 1/ 5JK   0.4165 111.34 64.97 46.37 11 
 1/ 20JK   0.4093 113.82 67.23 46.59 7 
 0.25JV   0.4126 112.66 66.18 46.49 8.8 
 0.15JV   0.4110 113.29 66.73 46.56 7.5 
 0.1JP    0.4152 111.87 65.43 46.45 9.5 
 0.05JP   0.4065 114.72 68.09 46.64 6.2 
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Chapter II STATE DEPENDENT VOLATILITY, LIQUIDITY RISK AND 
CREDIT RISK 
1. Introduction 
The credit spread of a firm is defined as the yield increment of its bonds over the 
riskless rate. This spread is a key component of a firm’s financing cost, and reflects 
primarily its default risk, but also other essential factors, such as the liquidity risk of its 
bond market and general macroeconomic conditions. The default risk has been modeled 
theoretically, and measured empirically, in a large number of studies on corporate bond 
pricing and the risk structure of interest rates, following the pioneering work of Merton 
(1974) and Black and Cox (1976), which in turn were inspired by the seminal Black and 
Scholes (1973) model of option pricing. The resulting models came to be known as 
structural models of bond pricing, as distinct from another class of models known as 
reduced form models, in which there is no link between the bonds of a given risk class 
and the firm’s capital structure. 41  The liquidity of the firm’s bond markets was till 
recently studied independently of its default risk. Ericsson and Renault (2006) develop a 
structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk 
directly and find positive evidence between the illiquidity and default components of 
yield spreads. An important recent study by He and Xiong (2012)42 use structural model 
through the rollover channel to combine the effects of both default risk and liquidity risk. 
The framework followed the well-known Leland and Toft (1996) structural model of the 
firm, in which the basic stochastic process of the value of the unlevered firm’s assets was 
                                                 
41 For the reduced form models see Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), Duffie and Singleton (1999) and Duffie 
and Lando (2001). These models lie outside the topic of this paper. 
42 See also Ericsson and Renault (2006) , who found a positive correlation between bond market illiquidity 
and the default components of the yield spread. 
76 
 
constant volatility diffusion. They found that the market value of debt decreases and the 
endogenous default boundary increases in the presence of liquidity shocks in the bond 
market, which confirmed the positive relationship between liquidity risk and credit spread.  
The adoption of Leland and Toft (1996) framework provides analytical solutions for 
debt and equity values in the presence of liquidity risk, but has to inherit the limitation of 
the constant volatility assumption. This is a common feature of structural models, since 
the complexity of the valuation expressions places a major emphasis on the derivation of 
closed form expressions, rather than numerical results based on approximations 43  or 
simulations.44 Such a focus allowed relatively easy estimations of numerical values given 
the parameters of the model, but at the cost of maintaining simple formulations of the 
mathematical structure of the asset value dynamics, in which a univariate diffusion 
process still follows the original Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) assumption 
of a lognormal diffusion with constant volatility.45 This is all the more surprising, in view 
of the fact that the option pricing literature has long recognized that such an assumption 
is no longer adequate to represent underlying assets in option markets, and has introduced 
factors such as rare events, stochastic volatility and transaction costs. Note also that 
empirical evidence shows that this assumption does not hold. Choi and Richardson (2009) 
studied the conditional volatility of the firm’s assets by a weighted average of equity, 
bond and loan prices and found that asset volatility is time varying. In their study of the 
                                                 
43 Zhou (2001) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). 
44 Brennan and Schwartz (1978), and more recently Titman and Tsyplakov (2007) are examples of studies 
that rely on numerical simulations. 
45 Most structural models are univariate and assume a constant riskless rate of interest. Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), Briys and de Varenne (1997), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) use bivariate 
diffusion models, in which the term structure of interest rates follows the Vacisek (1977) model and the 
asset value is a constant volatility diffusion. As the empirical work in Chan et al (1992) shows, the Vacisek 
model does not fit actual term structure data. Further, Leland and Toft (1996) note that this bivariate 
diffusion refinement plays a very small role in the yield spreads of corporate bonds.  
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term structure of credit default swaps (CDS), Huang and Zhou (2008) similarly note that 
time varying asset volatility should potentially play a role in structural models in order to 
fit into the empirical credit default spread data.  
In this Chapter we revisit the combined effects of default risk and liquidity risk in a 
generalized model of the dynamics of the asset value by assuming that the diffusion 
volatility is state-dependent, varying with the asset value according to the constant 
elasticity of variance (CEV) model. Compared to constant volatility diffusion, the CEV 
model has an extra parameter and includes constant volatility as a special case. This 
model has had several applications in the realm of option pricing, and has even been 
mentioned in the context of structural models of the firm as early as 1976.46 The fact that 
it has not attracted more attention is probably due to its analytical and computational 
complexity at a time when computational technology was relatively undeveloped.   
In spite of the significant additional computational complexity of CEV we manage 
to derive closed form expressions for all the variables of interest, including corporate debt 
value and equity value. Other variables of interest such as the endogenous boundary and 
the optimal leverage under endogenous default boundary can be estimated numerically, 
as they are in several constant volatility models.  As a result of the flexibility provided by 
the extra parameter, our structural model under the CEV process is able to produce 
numerical results that are considerably closer to the historical record of yield spreads, 
liquidity risk and default probabilities than the earlier constant volatility structural models.  
                                                 
46 See Cox and Ross (1976, pp. 163-165). This article examines the CEV model in two special cases, 
discussed further on in this paper. 
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The main economic justification for introducing state dependent asset volatility in 
credit default models of the firm is that volatility risk has increasingly been recognized as 
an important factor in the pricing of financial assets.  Although the inverse variation of 
firm equity volatility with firm value can be justified theoretically because of the well-
known leverage effect, the empirically documented index volatility fluctuations cannot be 
similarly justified, and it transmits itself to individual firms through capital market 
equilibrium.47 An advantage of the CEV model is that it can approximate more complex 
stochastic volatility situations while remaining theoretically and empirically tractable.    
Our main building block is the structural model of Leland (1994b), itself an 
extension of that author’s seminal contribution published that same year. This model has 
some minor computational advantages in the derivation of closed form expressions, while 
retaining most of the attractive features of the subsequent Leland and Toft (1996). Leland 
(1994b) is similar to Leland (1994a) insofar as it uses infinite maturity debt financing, but 
it does achieve a debt structure with a finite average maturity by continuously retiring and 
refinancing the debt at a fixed rate with perpetual bonds. As a result, the debt maturity 
effect can be studied by focusing on the rollover rate, while the equivalence of this 
model’s results with Leland and Toft (1996) can be easily demonstrated by an 
appropriate choice of parameters.48 Further, the continuous debt rollover allows the study 
of the illiquidity effects of the bond markets on both equity and debt, while the default 
boundary is chosen endogenously by maximizing the value of the equity, as in Leland 
and Toft (1996).  
                                                 
47 See the empirical results for both market index and individual firms in Driessen et al (2009). 




Our approach has certain advantages vis-à-vis other attempts to generalize the asset 
dynamics of structural models. Hilberink and Rogers (2002) and Chen and Kou (2009) 
extend the Leland (1994b) model by incorporating a Levy process with only upward 
jumps and with two-sided double exponential jumps, 49  respectively. Apart from the 
highly stylized nature of the jump component model, which was chosen for its 
mathematical convenience, their diffusion component has constant volatility. Zhang, 
Zhou and Zhu (2008) incorporate stochastic volatility and jumps into the Merton (1974) 
model, but by necessity assume that default occurs only at maturity; they find that 
incorporating jumps and stochastic volatility may help to improve the matching of the top 
quality credit spreads. Elkamhi, Ericssion, Wang and Du (2012) introduce stochastic 
volatility into the asset value diffusion process and study the impact of volatility risk 
premium on the credit spread. Their results can be obtained only by numerically solving 
the two-dimensional Fortet equation approximation method for the first passage time 
distribution.50  
In this Chapter we present generalized expressions for both equity and debt values 
in the presence of rollover risk under CEV that include constant volatility as a special 
case. We show theoretically and for all elasticity values that increases in the rollover risk 
parameters reduce the values of both debt and equity. In the numerical estimations with 
simulated data we find that the sign and magnitude of the elasticity parameter are major 
determinants of the model’s results, on their own or in their interaction with other 
features of the model like leverage and debt maturity. As with constant volatility, the 
                                                 
49 Zhou (2001) was the first to introduce jumps into structural models under the first passage default 
assumption, but no analytical solution is presented and he did not study optimal capital structure with 
endogenous default boundary. Huang and Huang (2003) also incorporate double exponential jumps into a 
structural model, but they only focus on corporate debt valuation and credit spread.   
50 See Colin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).  
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endogenous default boundary increases with the size of the rollover risk parameter, while 
a positive (negative) elasticity raises (lowers) the endogenous default boundary for all 
cases. Similarly, the elasticity parameter emerges as a major determinant of the optimal 
leverage in all cases, with the size of its effect depending on the maturity of the debt. 
Our theoretical results on the effects of liquidity risk in the CEV model parallel 
those of He and Xiong (2012) for the constant volatility case in the Leland and Toft 
(1996) model. Specifically, the liquidity premium reduces the value of both debt and 
equity and increases the level of the endogenously chosen default boundary. Comparing 
fixed and state dependent volatilities, the CEV model reduces the value of equity more 
than the constant volatility case, especially for the shorter maturities, while it reduces the 
value of debt for negative elasticity and leaves it approximately equal to the constant 
volatility case for positive elasticity. On the other hand, the effect on the endogenous 
boundary depends crucially on the sign of the elasticity, resulting in almost all cases in a 
lower boundary for negative and higher for positive elasticity than for constant volatility. 
2. Economic Setup and Debt Valuation 
2.1 The CEV diffusion model distribution for the unlevered asset 
Following Leland (1994a,b), we consider a firm whose assets are financed by equity 
and infinite maturity debt with a tax-deductible coupon. As in all previous related 
literature, the values of the components of the firm’s balance sheet are estimated as 
contingent claims of the state variable V, the value of the unlevered firm’s assets 
representing its economics activities. If r  denotes the riskless rate, q  the payout rate to 
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the stockholders, and 1 ( )tV VET V  the state-dependent volatility, we have under the risk 
neutral distribution: 
 






dV r q dt V dW t T
V
V K t T
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­      °®°   d ¯
 (2.1) 
In (2.1) it is assumed that the diffusion process continues until the asset value hits or 
falls below a threshold value, denoted by K, for the first timeW . In such a case, a default 
event will be triggered and liquidation comes in immediately. Assuming the absolute 
priority is respected, the bond holders will then receive (1 )KD , while the equity holders 
receive nothing. The remaining of asset value that equals to KD  is considered a 
bankruptcy cost.  
The parameter E , the elasticity of the local volatility, is a key feature of the CEV 
model. For 0E   the model becomes a geometric Brownian motion with constant 
volatility. For 0E !  ( 0E  ) (the state-dependent volatility is positively (negatively) 
correlated with the asset price.51 In equity markets, the well-known “leverage effect” 
shows generally a negative relationship between volatility and equity price. There are 
also some suggestions that the economically appropriate range is 0 1E! !  ,52 even 
though empirical evidence in the case of the implied risk neutral distribution of index 
options finds negative values significantly below this range. Jackwerth and Rubinstein 
                                                 
51 As Emmanuel and Macbeth (1982, p. 536) were the first to point out, for 0E !  the local volatility 
becomes unbounded for very large values of V, and there are technical issues concerning the mean of the 
process under both the physical and the risk neutral distribution. This problem is solved by assuming that 
the volatility is bounded and becomes constant for V exceeding an upper bound; see Davydov and Linetsky 
(2001, p. 963), A similar lower bound when E  is < 0 prevents the formation of an absorbing state at 0.    
52 See Cox (1996), and also Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1999), who term this model the restricted CEV. The 
arguments in favor of the restricted CEV model are mostly applicable to index options and will not affect 
our formulation.  
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(1999) find that the unrestricted CEV model when applied to the risk neutral distribution 
extracted from S&P 500 index options is able to generate as good out-of-sample option 
prices as the better known stochastic volatility model of Heston (1993). Most of the 




E    and the constant volatility model with 1E   , since these generate more 
tractable option pricing expressions.53 Hereafter we will present our numerical results for 
both positive and negative values of the elasticity without any restrictions in our 
theoretical results.  
The distribution of the asset value TV  conditional on the initial value 0V  has the form 
of a non-central chi-square 2( , , )z u vF , denoting the probability that a chi-square-
distributed variable with u degrees of freedom and non-centrality parameter v would be 
less than z. This distribution is given analytically most often in terms of its 
complementary form 1- 2( , , )z u vF , denoting in our case the probability T TV vt . For 
0E  this probability is54   
 2 2Pr ( ) 1 ( , , ) ( ,2 , ),T Tob V v c b a a b cF Ft      (2.2) 
Where  
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 (2.3) 
This distribution becomes the lognormal when the volatility is constant. It has been 
tabulated and is easily available numerically. Several additional results hold about the
                                                 
53 See Beckers (1980) and Cox and Ross (1976).  
54 See Schroder (1989, p. 213-214). 
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2 ( , , )z u vF distribution when the parameter u is an even integer that can simplify the 
computations. Nonetheless, the main result necessary for the extension to the mixed jump 
diffusion process by using the chi-square distribution’s characteristic function holds even 
for non-integral degrees of freedom.55 
2.2 Stationary debt structure, rollover risk and debt value  
The values of contingent claims on the value of a firm whose assets’ dynamics 
follow an equation such as (2.1) are given by the solution of a partial differential equation 
(PDE), which expresses the notion that in the risk neutral world the instantaneous return 
on the value of the claim should be equal to the riskless rate. Merton (1974) and Black 
and Cox (1976) derived closed form solutions of the equation for the case of pure 
discount bonds. A time dependence term in this PDE prevents the derivation of a closed 
form solution for the pde when the claim is a conventional finite maturity coupon bond, 
even when the volatility is constant. Leland (1994a,b) and Leland and Toft (1996) 
adopted particular debt maturity, coupon and repayment structures, termed stationary 
debt structures, under which the firm continuously issues and retires debt simultaneously 
in order to keep the total value of outstanding debt time-independent and eliminate the 
corresponding term in the PDE.  
In this Chapter we adopt the Leland (1994b) model as our base case, since this 
model, with its exponential stationary debt structure, preserves all the merits of Leland 
and Toft (1996)’s stationary debt structure, and also generates the most elegant analytical 
                                                 
55 See Johnson et al (1995, p. 433). 
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results with both constant and state dependent volatility.56 We assume that the infinite 
maturity debt has a total principal value P  at time 0 when it is issued with coupon rate C . 
As time goes by, the firm retires this debt at a proportional rate g. Thus, the remaining 
principal value of this debt value at time t is gte P , and the debt holders receive a cash 
flow ( )gte C gP   at time t, provided the firm remains solvent. Hence, the average 




aT gte dt g
f
   ³  (2.4) 
Thus, the average maturity under this model is the reciprocal of the proportional 
retirement rate. In order to get a stationary debt structure we assume that the firm replaces 
the retired debt with newly issued debt having the same principal and coupon so as to 
keep the total principal and total coupon payments independent of time. We denote the 
total value of all outstanding debt by ܦ (V). Since all the outstanding debts are 
homogenous, the initial total principal P, the coupon rate C, and the retirement rate g (or 
equivalently, the average maturity ௔ܶ ) define the debt characteristics and can be used at 
time 0 as control parameters to value all the outstanding debt. 
The rollover risk follows the specification pioneered by He and Xiong (2012). In 
their model bond markets are occasionally subjected to Poisson-type liquidity shocks, 
during which a bondholder must sell her holdings at an exogenously given proportional 
cost 1k . In the presence of those shocks this proportional cost times the intensity[  of the 
                                                 
56 Compared to Leland and Toft (1996), the Leland (1994b) model yields a purely analytical solution in the 
CEV case. The debt service rate is C+gP under Leland (1994b), while it is C+P/T under Leland and Toft 




shock induce a premium that must be paid by the firm when it refinances its debts 
through rollover. While He and Xiong (2012) focused on the effects of the bond market’s 
liquidity parameters on credit risk, we concentrate in this paper on the interaction 
between the state-varying volatility of our CEV model with the liquidity risk in defining 
the firm’s credit spreads and optimal capital structure.  
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denoting respectively the cumulative default probability from time 0 to t, omitting for 
simplicity its arguments and the value of an instrument paying $1 at the first passage time 
when the riskless rate is r. The functions  A t and ( , )rB V K are the key building blocks of 
the closed form expressions for the values of the firm’s financial instruments. Let also 
( , )D V g denote the value of the debt at time 0 in the Leland (1994b) model. In the 
presence of liquidity risk as defined above and for a general state-dependent volatility
( )VV , the value ( , )D V g is given by the following equation, the counterpart of equation (5) 
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 (2.6) 
The solution of (2.6) is available in closed form if we know the functions  A t and
( , )rB V K . It is given by the following result, proven in the appendix. 
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(2.7) can also be written in the following more intuitive form 
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The first part of above equation is the cash flow till default, while the last one is the 
payoff upon default. From these results we can now provide closed form solutions for the 
debt under both fixed volatility57 and CEV. 
Proposition 1: Under constant asset volatility the  debt is given by the following 
expression 
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With 
                                                 
57 Hereafter we set ( )VV V for all fixed volatility cases. 
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Where,  
   22 1 , , 4r qx V sign r q mE ET E E     
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௞ܹǡ௠ሺݔሻ and ܯ௞ǡ௠ሺݔሻ are the Whittaker functions.  
Proof: (2.8) is a well-known result for the first passage time of a constant volatility 
diffusion process. See, for instance, Leland (1994b, p. 12) or Ingersoll (1987,p. 372). (2.9) 
is an auxiliary general result (Proposition 1) in the derivation of barrier options under 
state-dependent volatility underlying asset dynamics of Davydov and Linetsky (2001), 
while (2.10) is a similar result stated in Proposition 5 of that same paper, QED. 
The Whittaker functions  ,k mW x and  ,k mM x in (2.10) are the fundamental solutions 
for the Whittaker equation and are available in the Matlab (or Mathematica) software; 
they are described in more detail in the appendix.58 Since the sign and value ofE affect 
the probability of default by increasing (decreasing) the volatility in “bad” states when
0E  ( 0E ! ), the shape of  r VI is also strongly affected by that parameter. It is a 
monotonic decreasing (increasing) function with respect to asset value V when
                                                 
58 See Whittaker and Watson (1990, pp. 339-351). 
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0 ( 0)E E ! . In addition, the slope of the function increases with the absolute value of
E .59 
3. Equity Valuation, Default Boundary and Leverage 
3.1 Equity valuation under simple and CEV diffusion models 
Let ( , )E V g denote the value of the equity and w denote the corporate tax rate. 
Omitting the arguments in the partial derivatives the value ( , )E V g in the presence of 
rollover risk and for a general state-dependent volatility ( )VV  satisfies the following 
equation, similar to equation (11) of He and Xiong (2012) 
     2 21( , ) ( ) 1 ( , )
2V VV
rE V g r q VE V V E qV w C gD V g gPV         (2.11) 
In (2.11) the first two terms reflect the change in equity value because of the 
dynamic change in the unlevered firm’s assets, the third and fourth terms are cash inflows 
from dividends and the after tax cost of the debt coupon, while the last two terms 
represent the change in equity value by the debt issuance cost absorption, with debt 
retired at face value but refinanced at market value. This absorption is affected by 
liquidity cost through the market value of debt. The boundary conditions are 
 , 0,  for all E K g g , and ( , )E V g increases linearly with respect to V whenV of . 
The following general result, proven in the appendix, gives the value of ( , )E V g for 
both fixed and state-dependent volatility diffusions. This value is expressed in terms of 
the Unit Price (UP) function defined in Chapter 1 if this UP function is known 
analytically, as it is for both cases covered in this essay. In the appendix we also present 
                                                 
59 The relevant figures are available from the authors on request. 
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the Laplace transform method proposed by He and Xiong (2012) to solve equation (2.11) 
when the volatility is constant and find exactly the same solution for the equity value 
(2.12). Unfortunately, this method cannot be used directly under CEV asset dynamics. 
 
Proposition 2: Under both constant and state-dependent asset volatility the  equity 








( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ,
( , ) 1
(1 ) ) ( , )
r r r g k
r r g k
wCE V g V K A A
r
k C gP C gP
B
K A A
g k r r
V K B V K B V K







ª º     ¬ ¼




( , )r g kB V K[  is given by the same expressions as in (2.8) and (2.9) for the  
constant volatility  and CEV cases respectively, while 
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It can be readily verified by using the terminal conditions 
1
( , ) ( , ) 1r r g kB K K B K K[   that  , 0.E K g  For V of  we have 
1
( , ) and ( , ) 0r r g kB V K B V K[  o , yielding 
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For 1 0k[  and constant volatility expression (2.12) coincides with equation (17) of 
Leland (1994b). A direct comparison of the limit of this last equation for V ofwith the 
corresponding limit of (2.12) shows that at the limit the liquidity costs reduce the limiting 
value of the equity by an amount equal to 1
1
( ) k gC gP
r g k r g
[
[    , implying that the 
effect of liquidity costs varies with g , the rollover rate and the inverse of the average debt 
maturity.   
A more intuitive understanding of the role of liquidity risk in the debt and equity 
values can be obtained by rewriting equation (2.12). Define three type of bonds, denoted 
by 0 1 2, ,D D D , where 0D  is the value of  a perpetual bond with coupon payment 
0C C gP  , 1D  is the total value of perpetual bonds which are continuously issued and 
retired at a proportional rate g  with coupon payment 1C C  and face value of total 
outstanding debt 1P P  in the absence of liquidity risk, and 2D  is the total value of 
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From (2.7) it can be easily seen that 0 1 2D D D! ! ; observe also that each
,  0,1,2iD i  can also be written under the form of (2.7). Substituting into equation 
(2.12), the equity value can be expressed by, 
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 (2.15) 
Where > @1 1( , ) ( , )1 r rB V KwCE V K DBr V KD      is the equity value with 1D in 
the absence of the liquidity risk given the default boundary K . Let  
 > @12 1 0 2
1
E




ª º   « »¬ ¼
 
 1 2DLC D D   
If the default boundary K is exogenously determined and does not change in the 
presence of the liquidity risk then ELC  and DLC represent the liquidity costs absorbed by 
the equity holders and debt holders, respectively. Observe that the losses of equity are 
always positive, since60 
 > @1 0 2
1
0E D
kLC D D LC
g k
[
[   !  
provided the average maturity of total outstanding debts is finite ( 0g ! ). Specifically, for 
the debt with infinite maturity ( 0g  ), the liquidity cost becomes zero since the rollover 
channel is closed.  
Note that the total liquidity cost to both debt and equity holders can also be written 
as, 
                                                 
60 This inequality can be proven very simply by noting from (2.7) that  ,D V g is strictly convex with 
respect to the discount rate 1r g k[  , which obviously implies 12 0 1
1 1
kg D D D
g k g k
[
[ [ !  .   
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g k g k
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[ [       (2.16) 
Where > @1 2D D represents the “Liquidity Effect”, the decrease of debt value 
because of the presence of liquidity shocks, and > @0 1D D  is the “Rollover Effect”, the 
decrease of debt value because of the presence of the retirement. The total liquidity cost 





[ . Further, as the 
liquidity risk of bond markets affects the value of equity through rollover channel, the 
liquidity cost to equity can also be decomposed into the weighted difference of rollover 
and liquidity effects as follows, 
> @ > @1 10 1 1 2 0 2 1
1 1 1 1
E
RolloverEffect LiquidityEffect
k kg gLC D D D D D D D
g k g k g k g k
[ [
[ [ [ [           (2.17) 
In the second form of (2.17) the strict convexity of the function  ,D V g  implies 
that the equity losses increase with the rollover cost parameters 1k[ , just like the debt 
losses. Compared to the constant asset volatility, the state dependent volatility affects 
0 1,D D  and 2D through the probability density function of the first-passage default time. 
Thus, the total liquidity costs of equity are affected by the state dependent volatility 
through both the liquidity effect and rollover effect channels.   
As already noted, the constant volatility case solution of (2.12) can also be derived 
by the Laplace transform technique used by He and Xiong (2012).61 The derivation 
                                                 
61 See appendix. 
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presented here, in addition to being computationally much simpler, is also more intuitive 
economically. 
3.2 The endogenous default boundary 
A firm’s default trigger can be determined exogenously or endogenously. Generally, 
the exogenous default triggers such as the zero-net worth trigger62 and the zero cash flow 
trigger63are not determined by the equity holders but rather by the creditors.  Under the 
zero-net worth trigger assumption the default occurs when the net worth of the firm 
becomes negative for the first time, which implies that the default trigger value equals the 
total face value of the outstanding debt, namely K P . However, we often observe that 
firms are still alive even though their net worth is negative in the financial markets. Thus, 
in order to improve the simple zero net worth trigger, Moody’s KMV defines as trigger 
value 0.5*Short LongK P P  . Under zero cash-flow trigger, a firm claims default when the 
current net cash flow to the security holders cannot meet the current coupon payments, 
which implies /K C G , where G  is the net cash flow to the security holders. The 
problem with this trigger value is that sometimes the equity value is still positive even 
though the current net cash flow is zero. In this case, a firm will prefer to issue more 
equity so as to meet the current coupon payment, instead of announcing default.  
On the other hand, the endogenous default trigger determined by the equity holders 
is the optimal default boundary which can maximize the total asset value. The equity 
holders may receive the anticipated equity value and service the coupon payments and 
rolling costs even when the firm is insolvent. The equity holders will lower the default 
                                                 
62 See Brennan & Schwartz (1978), and Longstaff & Schwartz (1995). 
63 See Kim, Ramaswamy, &Sundaresan (1993). 
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boundary to keep the firm alive if the anticipated equity value is no less than the 
anticipated value of debt service. Even though the net worth of the firm may be negative, 
the equity holders may still be able to raise funds to service the debt cash flow by issuing 
new equity. 
Following Leland and Toft (1996), and Chen and Kou (2009), we determine 
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 (2.18) 
The solution of this equation depends on the asset dynamics. For both cases it is 
given by the following result, proven in the appendix. 








(1 )( )1 (1 )
C gP kC gP wCy y zz
r g k r g k r r g k




[ DD D [
§ ·   ¨ ¸    © ¹      
 (2.19) 
Under the CEV model there is no closed form expression for the default boundary. 
The solution of (2.18) is found numerically, by replacing the expressions for the 
derivatives of ( , )rB V K and 1 ( , )r g kB V K[   from the quantities given in the appendix.  
                                                 
64 See Chen and Kou (2009).  
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From (2.19) it is clear that for 1 0k[  our boundary coincides with expression (19) 
of Leland (1994b). We also prove in the appendix the following result, the counterpart of 
the He and Xiong Proposition 2, with essentially the same proof as the one used in that 
paper. 
Proposition 4: Under both constant and state dependent asset volatility an increase 
in the liquidity premium 1k[ decreases the debt value and increases the default boundary
K . 
The impact of the liquidity premium on the default boundary is illustrated in 
numerical results in the next section. In the CEV case it depends on the sign of the 
coefficient E , with the average debt maturity (the inverse of the parameter g by (2.4)), 
also playing a role in the relationship between fixed and state dependent volatilities. 
From equation (2.19) it is also possible to derive the impact of g on the default 
boundary, which increases with g under some restrictions on the parameter values, as in 
He and Xiong (2012). Unfortunately no similar closed form results exist for the CEV 
case, due to the complexity of the Whittaker functions in (2.18). For this reason this 
average maturity effect is examined numerically in the next section.   
3.3 Optimal leverage  
At 0t   the firm chooses its initial leverage by choosing the debt parameters, the 
coupon C and the principal P . Let 0V denote the initial asset value and 0( , , )v C P V the total 
value of the firm. To focus on the effects of liquidity risk on leverage we assume that 
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debt is issued at par, in which case 0( , , ; ( , ))P D V C P K C P ; this equality defines an 
implicit relation 0( , )P C V , which we substitute into the equation of the value of the firm 
 0 0 0( , , ) ( , , ; ( , ) ( , , ; ( , ))v C P V E V C P K C P D V C P K C P   (2.20) 
(2.19) can now be maximized with respect to the optimal coupon *C in order to find 
the optimal leverage. Setting * * 0( , )P P C V , we measured the optimal leverage by the 
ratio 




( , , ; ( , ))
( , , )
D V C P K C P
v C P V
. The numerical results are shown in the next section. 
4. Model Calibration and Numerical Results 
In this section we present simulation results for the variables of interest, based on 
base case parameter values extracted from earlier empirical studies.65 For the empirical 
work in the next Chapter we calibrate the model to individual firm data. Here, we set the 
riskless and payout rates 8%r   and 2%q  , the tax and bankruptcy cost rates 27%w   
and 40%D  , and the bond market illiquidity parameters at 1[   and 1 1%k  . We also 
normalize the initial asset value at 0 100$V  . For the asset value volatility we set the 
initial volatility at 0 23%V  for both constant volatility and the CEV model, and we 
adjust the CEV parameter 0 0V ET V  accordingly. We present results for 1E  , 0E  
(constant volatility) and 1E   , with intermediate values yielding similar results. Last, 
we use three values of the debt rollover parameter g , corresponding by (2.4) to average 
                                                 
65 For instance Bao, Pan and Wang (2011), Chen et al (2007), He and Xiong (2012) and Zhang, Zhou and 
Zhu (2009).  
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maturities 1T  , 5T  , and 10T  . The face value of total outstanding debt in the base 
case is 50P  . 
4.1 Debt and equity values and endogenous default boundary 
 Figure II-1 presents the endogenous default boundary for various values of the 
illiquidity parameter[  ranging from 0 to 2, two benchmark maturities of 1T   and 10T  , 
and two exogenously given leverages, with 50P  and 70P  . The coupon rates have 
been chosen to make the debt issued at par for the benchmark case of constant volatility 
at 23% and 0[  .  
[Insert Figure II-1 about here] 
The figure illustrates clearly the importance of the state dependence of the volatility, 
whose contribution to the rise or fall of the default boundary can be at least as large as 
that of the liquidity shock. The sign of the elasticity determines, in all but the lowest 
values of[ , the relationship of the CEV boundary relative to the fixed volatility case, 
with a positive (negative) sign corresponding to a higher (lower) boundary at equal[ ‘s. 
Not surprisingly, leverage increases the boundary at equal maturities in all cases, while 
the boundary increases with[ and is uniformly higher for equal leverage for the shorter 
maturity, as in He and Xiong (2012, Figure 3).  
These observed results can be understood from the relationship between the 
anticipated equity value appreciation and the anticipated debt costs to keep the firm alive, 
including both the rollover costs and the continuous coupon payment. For both constant 
and state dependent volatility cases, the presence of liquidity shocks in the debt market 
reduces the value of anticipated equity appreciation through the rollover channel while 
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the coupon payments are the same. Hence, the default boundary is higher compared to 
that in the absence of liquidity shocks. In contrast to the constant volatility, the state 
dependent volatility, in this case the CEV, changes the first passage default probability 
density function, which has a direct impact on the market values of debt and equity. 
Specifically, a negative E , reflecting a negative relationship between asset value and 
asset volatility, increases the value of anticipated equity appreciation when the asset 
value decreases since the equity can be considered as an option on the firm’s asset and, 
thus, rises in value with the volatility. The impact on the debt value is more complicated 
and depends on the debt structure, including maturity, coupon policy and firm leverage 
ratio. However, given the calibration in the base case, we note that the impact of state 
dependent volatility on the value of anticipated equity appreciation dominates that on the 
debt costs. Hence, we observe significantly lower endogenous default boundaries when 
E  is negative compared to constant volatility. Note that we assume that the liquidity cost 
is proportional to the market value of debt. Hence, the magnitude of the endogenous 
default boundary increases as the intensity of liquidity shocks increases depending on the 
debt structure, including maturity, face value, coupon payment, etc., as well as the value 
of volatility elasticity.      
Given the endogenous default boundaries under different volatility assumptions, 
Figure II-2 and Figure II-3 present the rollover losses for debt and equity respectively for 
50P   and 70P  as functions of the parameter[  ranging from 0 to 2, for two different 
average maturity values and for an endogenous default boundary. The coupon payment 
was chosen to make the debt issue at par in the absence of liquidity shocks when the 
volatility is constant. The results are presented as differences from the respective values 
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oD and oE for debt and equity in the absence of liquidity shocks,   oD D[   and
  oE E[  . 
[Insert Figure II-2 about here] 
[Insert Figure II-3 about here] 
As the figures show, the effect of the state dependent volatility on the rollover losses 
is significant in many cases but its size and direction differ depending on the maturity of 
the debt and the sign of the elasticity parameter. In general, a negative (positive) 
relationship between the asset value and asset volatility results in relatively smaller 
(greater) losses of debt value compared to those of constant volatility. For debt the 
volatility effect is weak for low face value in all cases and moderately significant for high 
face value for both maturities. It is much more pronounced for equity in all cases, and it 
is especially strong for positive elasticity, high face value, and the shortest maturity of 
1T  , where the loss of equity value from the volatility effect is approximately 25% 
lower in magnitude than the loss of value of the constant volatility when the liquidity 
parameter is equal to 2. 
Of particular interest is the effect of compression or expansion of the optimal 
default boundary in the state dependent volatility cases. We study it by equalizing the 
default boundaries in all three elasticity parameter cases. From Figure II-1 it follows that 
the boundary is forced up (down) in most cases for negative (positive) elasticity, making 
default easier (harder). The consequences of this appear most clearly in the next set of 
figures, Figure II-4 and Figure II-5, showing the quantities   oD D[   and   oE E[   
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with an exogenous default boundary set equal to the endogenous boundary of the 
constant volatility case for each[ . 
[Insert Figure II-4 about here] 
[Insert Figure II-5 about here] 
A comparison of Figure II-2 with Figure II-4 shows clearly that equalizing the 
default boundary in all three elasticity cases also brings the corresponding debt values 
closer together than in the endogenous boundary cases. In equation (2.7) the raising 
(lowering) of the boundary K results in an increase (decrease) in the default probability
( )A t and in the term
1
( , )r g kB V K[  , increasing (decreasing) the second term and 
decreasing (increasing) the first term. Hence, the optimal choice of the boundary may 
result in higher or lower rollover losses for debt, depending on maturity and face value. 
In the negative elasticity case the differences between Figure II-2 and Figure II-4 are very 
small in all cases, except for the case 1T  and 70P  , where raising the boundary 
increases the rollover debt losses. In the positive elasticity case, on the other hand, 
lowering the boundary in Figure II-3 yields lower rollover losses for both maturities 
when 70P  , and has an insignificant effect on the losses in the other two cases. 
The situation is somewhat different in the comparison of the equity rollover losses 
in Figure II-3 and Figure II-5, since the losses are by definition lower in all Figure II-3 
cases than the corresponding cases of Figure II-5. Most affected by the suboptimal choice 
of the boundary is again the positive elasticity case when 1T  and 70P  , where the 
losses now exceed those of the constant volatility case, implying a rise in losses of more 
than 25% by the decrease in the default boundary. In all the other cases the boundary 
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changes bring relatively small changes in equity losses. There is also some evidence of 
small, but measurable agency effects in the case 10T  and 70P  , since the sum of the 
losses of equity and debt holders is higher for the optimally chosen rather than the fixed 
boundary, given that the former was chosen to represent the interests only of the equity 
holders.66 
4.2 Optimal capital structure 
Table II-1 presents various cases of the choice of the optimal initial leverage by 
maximizing the total firm value given in equation (2.20). As noted in Section 3.3, the 
coupon was first selected in order to make the debt issued at par, and then chosen 
optimally by maximizing (2.20). The table shows the optimal coupon, leverage, debt and 
equity values, as well as the endogenous default boundary for three values of[ and three 
maturities, 1T  , 5T  and 10T  . 
[Insert Table II-1 about here] 
The table illustrates several effects already expected from the earlier results of He 
and Xiong (2012). Specifically, the optimal leverage decreases as the rollover costs 
increase and increases with maturity in all cases. The strong negative volatility effect on 
leverage found in the earlier study becomes even more important when the volatility is 
state dependent, and its impact tends at times to swamp the maturity and even the rollover 
parameter effects. For instance, the leverage of the negative elasticity case with 
                                                 
66 Observe from (3.6) that the total value loss because of the liquidity and rollover effects is strictly 
dependent on the parameter set 
1( , , )r g k[ and not on parameters such as the payout ratioG . Hence, the 
endogenous choice of the default boundary does not necessarily maximize the value of the firm. See also 
the comments in Leland (1998, pp. 1224-1226) and Chen and Kou (2009, p. 353).    
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maximum rollover risk ( 2[  ) and 5T  is higher than that of the positive elasticity case 
for 0[  and 10T  .  
In Table II-1 a negative elasticity always results in a higher leverage and a positive 
elasticity mostly in a lower leverage, with the exception of the low maturity and high 
rollover cost parameters. We also saw from Figure II-1 that at equal leverages the 
negative (positive) elasticity is also associated with a lower (higher) endogenous default 
boundary. In Table II-1, by contrast, the endogenous default boundary at optimal 
leverage varies inversely with the elasticity for all but the highest value of[ , where the 
dependence reverses sign, or even results in a lowest boundary for the 0E   case. We 
conclude that the volatility effects are predominant when it comes to the determination of 
the key endogenous variables of the firm, except for the extremes of the maturity and 
rollover cost ranges. 
The strong volatility effect on leverage appears even more clearly in Figure II-6, 
which plots the optimal leverage as a function of the bond trading proportional cost 
parameter 1k that varies from 0 to 150 basis points, corresponding to a change in the 
rollover cost parameter[  from 1 to 1.5 if 1k is kept equal to its base case value of 100 
since the two appear always together. Here we vary the initial volatility and set it at two 
alternative values, 0 20%V    and 0 25%V  , bracketing our base case of 0 23%V  .   
[Insert Figure II-6 about here] 
This more detailed result confirms the conclusions derived from Table II-1. At low 
maturity and high trading costs the constant volatility case achieves the lowest optimal 
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leverage, while at higher maturity it always lies between the two other cases. Further, a 
higher initial volatility results in a lower leverage in constant volatility and positive 
elasticity cases everywhere, while for negative elasticity leverage may perversely 
increase with initial volatility in the low maturity and low to moderate trading cost range. 
Note also that at the higher maturity the optimal leverage for both state dependent 
volatility cases is much less sensitive to trading costs than the constant volatility case. 
4.3 Rollover cost and credit spreads 
Figure II-7 plots the credit spreads ( )C gP g r
D
   of the newly issued debt against 
the rollover risk parameter[ for two different leverages and debt maturities. In all cases 
the spread increases almost linearly with [ , but the slopes differ according to debt 
maturity, elasticity of the volatility and (especially) leverage. It is highest for all three 
elasticity cases in the high leverage, low maturity panel, in which its slope varies from 
approximately 150 to 250 basis points as [  rises from 0 to 2. All three slopes are 
approximately equal to 100 basis points for both maturities when leverage is low.  
[Insert Figure II-7 about here] 
When the leverage is chosen optimally the change in [ will affect the optimal 
leverage as well as the credit spread, in which case the change in spread will then include 
a default component, as well as a rollover cost component. The results in Table II-2 
illustrate the contributions of these two components to the change in spread in a number 
of cases, covering two bond maturities, three different values of [ , and two starting 
volatilities 0 21%V   and 0 23%V  , coupled with corresponding bond trading 
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proportional cost parameters 1 50k   and 1 100k  basis points respectively. The lower 
volatility and cost correspond to A-rated and the lower to B-rated bonds.  
[Insert Table II-2 about here] 
In the Table II-2 entries as [  increases the default portion is defined as the amount 
 1Spread k['  ' . It is clear from the corresponding entries that the value and the share 
of the default portion in the total spread are increasing functions of the elasticity in all but 
one case. The default share also varies inversely with the maturity of the debt in all cases, 
even though the differences are proportionately smaller at the higher values of [ . Last, 
we note the strong starting volatility effect on credit spread changes, which implies that 
for all maturities and elasticity values the low volatility A-rated bonds respond much less 
to a given change in[ than the B-rated bonds. As He and Xiong (2012) note, this is a 
manifestation of the well-known flight to quality phenomenon associated with severe 
disruptions in the financial markets, in which the prices of lower rated bonds decrease 
much more than those of higher rated ones. 
5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we re-examine the impact of liquidity shocks of bond market on the 
credit risk through the rollover channel under the exponential stationary debt structure. 
We develop an innovative derivation methodology to obtain the analytical solution for 
the equity value in the presence of rollover risk. This approach provides a much intuitive 
expression for the equity value. Further, this methodology can be easily applied into CEV 
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and stochastic volatility asset dynamic process provided the expression for the first 
passage CDP and unit price are available.  
Taking advantage of the analytical expression of first passage CDP and unit prices 
derived in Chapter I, we analyze the impact of rollover risk on endogenous default 
boundary, credit risk and optimal capital structure under CEV asset dynamics. We show 
theoretically and for all elasticity values that increases in the rollover risk parameters 
reduce the values of both debt and equity. In the numerical estimations with simulated 
data we find that the sign and magnitude of the elasticity parameter are major 
determinants of the model’s results, on their own or in their interaction with other 
features of the model like leverage and debt maturity. As with constant volatility, the 
endogenous default boundary increases with the size of the rollover risk parameter, while 
a positive (negative) elasticity raises (lowers) the endogenous default boundary for all 
cases. Similarly, the elasticity parameter emerges as a major determinant of the optimal 




The following result, whose proof is obvious and will be omitted, will be used in 
several of the proofs of this appendix. 
Lmma A.1 
Let the risk neutral dynamic equation of an underlying asset with state-dependent 
volatility diffusion be 
 ( )dV dt V dW
V
P V   (A.1) 
Then the current value of a derivative asset that pays off $1 when the underlying 
asset becomes equal to K for the first time and 0 otherwise is given by ( , )rB V K in (2.5), 
with limiting values lim ( , ) 0V rB V Kof   and ( , ) 1,rB K K  which satisfies the equation 
 2 2
1 ( ( )) 0
2 VV V
V V F VF rFV P    (A.2) 
Proof of Lemma 1 
Replacing from (2.7) into (2.6) and taking into account that 
1
( , )r g kB V K[   satisfies 
(A.2) with 1r g k[  instead of r and r q instead of P , and setting the constant term 
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(A.3) obviously holds by the definitions of 0A and 1A and the terminal conditions of 
1
( , )r g kB V K[   and the debt value, QED.  
The Whittaker functions 
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 (A.4) 
where  1 1 , ,F a b z and  , ,U a b z are, respectively, the first kind and second kind 
confluent hypergeometric functions. Mathematically, they can be expressed as follows, 
with  .* denoting the gamma function. 
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Thus, the second kind confluent hypergeometric function can be expressed as,
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Replacing into the expression for ( , )rB V K , we get 
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 (A.8) 
The rest of the proof follows the same steps as in Lemma 1: replacing (2.12), (A.7) 
and (A.8) into (2.11) and collecting terms we find that the equation holds, since ( , )rB V K
satisfies (A.2) with r qP   and 
1
( , )r g kB V K[   similarly satisfies (A.3) as in the proof of 
Lemma 1, QED. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
We use the definitions of ( , )rB V K and 1 ( , )r g kB V K[  from (2.12) and (2.7)-(2.8) 
respectively. (2.15) follows then directly from (2.14) by replacing and collecting terms, 
QED. Observe that in (2.15) the result is the same as expression (19) in Leland (1994b) if 
we set the rollover term 1k[ equal to 0. 
For the state dependent case, we concentrate on the case 0E  , with 0E ! treated 
as an extension. In such a case 
1 0
2
k m  ! and the Whittaker function in (2.10) is given 
by 
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We note from (2.10) that  r VI and  1r g k V[I   differ only as to their key parameter
k , which has the respective values rk as in (2.10) and 
11 1
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Further, set from (2.10) the expression 2 (2 1)22 ,  2
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( , )r g k V V KB V K[   is then found from the same expression, by replacing rk by k[ . A 
similar computation takes place for the case 0E !  .  
The terms ( , )r VB V K and 1 ( , )r g k VB V K[  , instead of (A.9)-(A.10), can also be 
derived from (A.7)-(A.8), by using the following expressions 
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For 0E   we have  
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1
 (A.11) 
Similar results also hold for 
1
( , )r g k V V KB V K[   . 
Proof of Proposition 4 
For ( , )D V g the result follows immediately from (2.7), since both terms in the right-
hand-side are decreasing functions of 1k[ , QED. For the equity, we note from (2.11) that 
we can write it as an expectation at time 0, 0( , of its discounted cash flows along the path 
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of the value V till the default time t , writing explicitly the dependence of equity and debt 
on the important parameters. 
  0
0
( , ; ) ( 1 [ ( , ; ) ])
t
rS
s sE V K e qV w C g D V K P ds[ [ª º (    « »¬ ¼³  (A.12) 
It is clear from (A.12) that for a fixed default boundary K  the equity value decreases 
with 1k[ , given that the debt decreases.  
Consider now two different values 1 2[ [ and let 1K  and 2K denote the 
corresponding endogenous default boundaries. Assume that 1 2K Kt . By definition, 
1 1 1 2 2 2( , ; ) ( , ; ) 0.E K K E K K[ [  Since the default boundaries were chosen optimally, we 
have 1 1 1 1 2 10 ( , ; ) ( , ; )E K K E K K[ [ ! . On the other hand, since the equity decreases as [  
increases, 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2( , ; ) ( , ; ) ( , ; ) 0E K K E K K E K K[ [ [!   . This is, however, not 
compatible with the definition of equity, which is non-negative whenever the starting 
asset value exceeds the default boundary, implying 1 2 2( , ; ) 0E K K [ t  whenever 1 2K Kt . 
Thus, the latter assumption is false, and 1 2K K , QED. 
Laplace Transform Method for Equity Value with Constant Volatility 
The Laplace transform method can be used to solve equation (2.11) only when the 
volatility is constant. Under constant volatility, equation (2.11) can be written as, 
    2 21 1 ( )
2V VV
rE r q VE V E qV w C gD V gPV        , (A.13) 
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with the boundary condition,   0E K   and  VE K l . The equity value is linear in 
asset value when it approaches the default boundary K. 
Define ln Vm
K
§ · ¨ ¸© ¹ , and substitute into the above differential equation. We then 
have,  
  2 21 1 1 ( )
2 2
m
m mmrE r q E E qKe w C gD m gPV V§ ·        ¨ ¸© ¹ , (A.14) 
with the boundary conditions, (0) 0E  and (0)ME l . 
Define the Laplace transform of ( )E M  as 
 > @  
0
( ) ( ) smF s L E m e E m dm
f
{  ³  (A.15) 
Then, applying the Laplace transform to both sides of  (A.14), we have 
> @ > @   > @2 2 11 1( ) ( )
2 2 1m mm
w C gPqKrF s r q L E L E gL D m
s s
V V  § ·      ¨ ¸ © ¹  (A.16) 
Note that, 
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Thus, we have 
  > @2 2 2 211 1 1( ) ( )
2 2 1 2
w C gPqKr r q s s F s gL D m l
s s
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Define 0K ! and 0J   to be the two roots of the following equation with respect 
to s , 
 2 2 21 1 0
2 2
r r q s sV V§ ·     ¨ ¸© ¹  (A.19) 
Then we have,   21 0
2
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 (A.20) 
As we have seen, 
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Under constant volatility assumption, we have, 
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The Laplace inverse can be derived as, 
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Figure II-1: Endogenous Default Boundaries 
This figure depicts the endogenous default boundaries in the presence of liquidity shocks for the different 
asset volatility assumption, including constant volatility ( 0E  ) and CEV processes ( 1, 1E E   ). T is 
the average maturity of total outstanding debts. P is the face value of total outstanding debts. It is assumed 
endogenous default and the coupon payment makes the debt issue at par in the absence of liquidity shocks 
with constant asset volatility. The rest of calibrations are same as the base case. To make the picture look 
more condense, we shift the endogenous default boundary of 1E   up 20 units in Panel B and D, and 5 
units in Panel A. 
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Figure II-2: Rollover Loss of Debt Holder with Endogenous Default Boundary 
This figure depicts the rollover loss of debt with endogenous default boundary. The coupon payment is set 
to make the bond be issued at par in the absence of liquidity shocks with constant volatility. The rollover 
losses of debts holders equal  D P[  , where  D [ and P denote the value of total outstanding debt in 




Figure II-3: Rollover Loss of Equity Holders with Endogenous Default Boundary 
This figure depicts the rollover loss of equity with endogenous default boundary. The coupon payment is 
set to make the bond be issued at par in the absence of liquidity shocks with constant volatility. The 
rollover losses of equity holders equal   oE E[  , where  E [ and oE denote the value of total equity in 




Figure II-4: Rollover Loss of Debts with Exogenous Default Boundary 
This figure depicts the rollover loss of debt with exogenous default boundary. The coupon payment is set to 
make the bond be issued at par in the absence of liquidity shocks with constant volatility. The rollover 
losses of debts holders equal  D P[  , where  D [ and P denote the value of total outstanding debt in 
the presence and in the absence of liquidity shocks, respectively.  
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Figure II-5: Rollover Loss of Equity Holders with Exogenous Default Boundary 
This figure depicts the rollover loss of equity with endogenous default boundary. The coupon payment is 
set to make the bond be issued at par in the absence of liquidity shocks with constant volatility. The 
rollover losses of equity holders equal   oE E[  , where  E [ and oE denote the value of total equity in 




Table II-1: Characteristics of the Optimally Levered Firms  
This table depicts the characteristics of the optimally levered firms. T is the average maturity of the total outstanding debts. C is the optimal coupon 
payment which made the debt issued at par. Lev, ' Lev, DV, EV and K denote the optimal leverage, percentage of leverage compared to the case 0[  , 
debt value, equity value and endogenous default boundary, respectively. The rest of the calibrations are same as the base case. 
Panel A: T=1 
 0[    1[    2[   
 C Lev DV EV K  C Lev ' Lev DV EV K  C Lev ' Lev DV EV K 
1E    6.04 55.42% 60.99 49.06 55.91  5.04 48.37% -12.72% 51.08 54.53 44.68  3.72 35.47% -35.99% 36.17 65.81 26.40 
0E   3.43 39.17% 42.49 65.68 43.34  3.24 34.28% -12.48% 35.83 68.68 38.00  2.72 26.71% -31.81% 27.16 74.53 29.78 
1E   3.41 38.45% 42.59 68.17 43.14  3.57 37.15% -3.38% 39.61 67.01 41.99  3.60 34.99% -8.99% 36.02 66.93 39.80 
Panel B: T=5 
 0[    1[    2[   
 C Lev DV EV K  C Lev ' Lev DV EV K  C Lev ' Lev DV EV K 
1E    9.98 75.91% 90.74 28.80 57.11  9.51 74.25% -2.18% 82.97 28.78 53.06  8.38 68.30% -10.03% 71.75 33.30 44.18 
0E   6.35 60.56% 68.35 44.52 52.50  5.60 53.66% -11.39% 57.49 49.65 46.67  4.40 41.79% -30.99% 42.88 59.73 36.68 
1E   4.48 48.73% 55.42 58.32 45.24  4.51 46.13% -5.3% 49.91 58.27 43.99  4.38 42.21% -13.38% 43.70 59.84 41.40 
Panel C: T=10 
 0[    1[    2[   
 C Lev DV EV K  C Lev ' Lev DV EV K  C Lev ' Lev DV EV K 
1E    10.57 82.62% 101.43 21.34 53.53  10.10 80.50% -2.57% 91.43 22.14 49.38  9.03 74.11% -10.3% 78.47 27.42 40.82 
0E   6.89 64.50% 74.03 40.75 51.63  6.25 58.44% -9.4% 63.25 44.99 47.01  5.11 47.63% -26.16% 49.10 53.98 38.62 
1E   4.98 53.05% 60.98 53.97 46.43  4.94 49.87% -5.9% 54.26 54.54 45.12  4.71 45.16% -14.87% 46.86 56.90 42.37 
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Figure II-6: Optimal Capital Structure 
This figure depicts the relationship between firm’s optimal capital structure and the bond proportional 
trading cost for the different scenarios.  The calibrations, except the average debt maturity and initial 






Figure II-7: Effect of liquidity demand intensity on credit spreads 
This figure depicts the effect of liquidity demand intensity on the newly issued corporate debt’s credit 
spreads. T is the average maturity of the total outstanding debts and P is the face value of total outstanding 
debts.  It is assumed endogenous default and the coupon payment makes the debt issue at par in the absence 




Table II-2: Response of Credit Spreads 
This table reports the responses of different firm’s credit spread to a liquidity shock and state dependent 
volatilities. It is assumed risk free interest rate 8%r  , tax rate 27%w  , proportional bankruptcy cost 
40%D  , firm’s payout rate 2%q  , and the current asset value $100V  . For A-rated firms, the initial 
volatility 
0 21%V  , proportional liquidity cost 1 50k    basis points (bps). For BB-rated firm, the initial 
volatility 
0 23%V  , proportional liquidity cost 1 100k    basis points. We find the coupon payment and 
face value of debt such that its newly issued par bonds with the specified maturity have an initial credit 
spread of 100 bps for A-rated firms and 330 bps for BB-rated firms with constant volatility.  
Panel A (A-Rated, T=1) 
  1[    2[    4[   
Model  Spread  Spread ' Spread Default part  Spread ' Spread Default part 
  (bps)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent) 
1E     136.07  189.53 53.46 3.46 6.47%  296.48 160.41 60.41 37.66% 
0E    100.00  155.88 55.88 5.88 10.52%  268.70 168.7 68.7 40.72% 
1E    69.86  126.86 57 7 12.28%  242.83 172.97 72.97 42.19% 
Panel B (A-Rated, T=5) 
  1[    2[    4[   
Model  Spread  Spread ' Spread Default part  Spread ' Spread Default part 
  (bps)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent) 
1E     114.85  166.17 51.32 1.32 2.57%  268.59 153.74 53.74 34.96% 
0E    100.00  153.65 53.65 3.65 6.80%  260.60 160.6 60.6 37.73% 
1E    63.52  118.99 55.47 5.47 9.86%  230.67 167.15 67.15 40.17% 
Panel C (BB-Rated, T=1) 
  1[    2[    4[   
Model  Spread  Spread ' Spread Default part  Spread ' Spread Default part 
  (bps)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent) 
1E     350.88  474.40 123.52 23.52 19.04%  722.73 371.85 171.85 46.21% 
0E    330.00  475.05 145.05 45.05 31.06%  773.58 443.58 243.58 54.91% 
1E    392.77  551.10 158.33 58.33 36.84%  850.20 457.43 257.43 56.28% 
Panel D (BB-Rated, T=5) 
  1[    2[    4[   
Model  Spread  Spread ' Spread Default part  Spread ' Spread Default part 
  (bps)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent)  (bps) (bps) (bps) (Percent) 
1E     261.80  372.58 110.78 10.78 9.73%  592.12 330.32 130.32 39.45% 
0E    330.00  459.05 129.05 29.05 22.51%  709.44 379.44 179.44 47.29% 
1E    410.10  544.79 134.69 34.69 25.76%  784.02 373.92 173.92 46.51% 
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Chapter III EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE: CEV AND CONSTANT 
VOLATILITY 
 
In this chapter we compare the empirical performance of the two alternative 
volatility assumptions that we used in our study within the context of the Leland (1994b) 
model. Using time series data at both the macro and firm levels, respectively, we use two 
different estimation methods for the competing models’ parameters for each firm (each 
rating class) in our sample. Given the estimates, we then compare the out-of-sample 
performance of the two models with respect to the endogenously generated variables of 
each model when compared to data that was not used for the parameter estimation.  
In the first estimation we use the historical record of observed default probabilities 
for the bonds of each maturity and risk class in order to extract the volatility parameters 
of the two models. This is an area in which the constant volatility assumption does not 
perform very well, especially for short maturities in all risk classes, as shown in Leland 
(2004). This estimation is, however, flawed, insofar as it forces every firm in the sample 
to follow the observed default probabilities of the “average” firm of the corresponding 
rating class. Thus, although the CEV model outperforms the constant volatility in better 
approximating the historical record, the extracted values of the elasticity of variance are 
not considered reliable and are not consistent with the values extracted from the other two 
methods.  
The second estimation is based on the observed leverage ratio, equity value and 
equity volatilities, extracted from either the intraday historical volatilities or from the 
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implied volatilities as observed in the option market. Here the estimated parameters are 
extracted from firm-specific data and vary widely across the firms in our sample. We find 
that the constant volatility and CEV structural models have similar performances when 
using only these three variables for the parameter estimation. 
Last, we estimate the parameters by fitting the two competing models to all the 
available historical data for our sample of firms. This data includes not only the equity 
volatilities but also the credit default swap (CDS) data for five different maturities. The 
parameters are extracted using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method. We 
find that the CEV structural model, with its extra parameter, exhibits a much better in-
sample fitting in the CDS spreads across all the maturities. In additional, we find a 
negative relationship between the value of E   and the firm specific measures of default 
risk, such as leverage ratios, CDS spreads and current ratio etc. Last, we compare the 
estimates of the average cumulative default probabilities across all the bonds of a similar 
maturity and rating to the comparable historical record of bonds of the same maturity and 
risk class. In this out-of-sample comparison we find that the CEV model average 
probabilities are much closer to the historical record than the constant volatility model.    
1. Empirical Evidence from Moody’s Historical Cumulative Default 
Probabilities 
1.1 Moody’s historical default data 
In this section we evaluate the capacity of the CEV structure to approximate 
available bond risk structure historical data. Such data can be under the form of corporate 
bond prices or yields, as in the empirical studies of Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) and 
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Eom, Helwege and Huang (2004), or default probabilities as in Leland (2004). The 
advantage of focusing on default probabilities rather than bond prices is that the 
cumulative default probabilities (CDP) are not affected by additional factors, such as 
illiquidity, state tax, etc. The physical asset dynamics of the underlying asset value are 
the main driver of the cumulative default probability. By contrast, the risk neutral process 
is the one that enters into corporate bond pricing. Although the two processes yield 
different results, the volatilities should be exactly the same under both risk-neutral and 
physical distributions for the diffusion and jump-diffusion models with diversifiable jump 
risk.67  
[Insert Figure III-1 about Here] 
The data for the cumulative default probability (CDP) of bonds of various risk 
classes and maturities is given in Moody’s.68 Figure III-1 exhibits the CDPs for Aa, A, 
Baa and Ba rated corporate bonds for the periods 1983-2008 and 1983-2010. Since the 
sub-prime financial crisis starts in 2008, these two data sets show the CDPs pre and post 
crisis. We only consider these four middle ratings because the default probabilities are 
rather low for Aaa bonds, while bond ratings lower than Ba are too risky. As the figure 
shows, the CDP term structure after the sub-prime financial crisis shifts upward and 
becomes much steeper relative to that before the crisis.  
                                                 
67 When the jump risk is systematic the market is incomplete, the physical and risk neutral jump process 
parameters are different, there are infinitely many possible transformations corresponding to the same 
physical distribution, and total volatility may be affected. For an analysis of this case see Oancea and 
Perrakis (2010).  




1.2 Term structure of implied volatilities of historical CDPs under the L and LT 
models 
In order to examine the consistency of the L and LT models with the above data we 
examine the volatilities implied by the CDPs under the assumption that the CDP data 
represents an “average” firm for each rating class with characteristics corresponding to 
the averages reported by Moody’s. Under both L and LT it is assumed that a firm’s value 
follows a diffusion process with constant volatility under the risk-neutral distribution, as 
in equation (2.2) with a constant V and jump intensity 0QK  . Then the cumulative 
default probability till time T is, 69 
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 (1.1) 
The corresponding CDP under the physical distribution is found by replacing r q  
by the drift qP   of the physical distribution. Thus given an observed CDP for a 
particular maturity, risk free rate, payout rate, current asset value and exogenous default 
boundary, K, the volatility DimV implied by the simple diffusion is given by, 
 1( ) ( ; , , )Dim T F T b qV P  (1.2) 
[Insert Table III-1 about Here] 
We show in Table III-1 the information from Moody’s used to find the implied 
volatility (IV) in (1.2). The risk premium, risk free rate, payout rate and average leverage 
for Aa, A, Baa and Ba rated corporate bonds are shown in Panel A, with the average 
                                                 
69 See equation (4) in LT or equation (21) in L. 
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leverage ratio found from Moody’s special comment in 2006.70 The average leverage 
ratio increases when the corporate debt rating decreases. We use a constant payout rate 
6%, risk free rate 8% and tax rate 35% for all the corporate bonds. In addition, we assume 
that the current asset values are the same and equal to 100 and that the risk premium is 
4%71 implying a 12% rate of return of underlying asset value for all the bonds. Leland 
(2004) shows that an exogenous or endogenous default boundary fits the observed default 
probabilities equally well provided default costs and recovery rates are matched. In this 
study exogenous default boundaries which equal the value of debt for the “average” firm 
of each rating are used to calculate the IVs. The debt value is set according to the 
historical average leverage ratio for each rating.  
[Insert Figure III-2 about Here] 
We compute the simple diffusion IVs for our samples and plot them in Figure III-2, 
while the average IVs for all the scenarios considered are shown in Panel B of Table I-2. 
As expected, the IVs after the sub-prime financial crisis are relatively higher than those 
before the crisis for all the ratings because of the higher CDPs after the crisis. The figure 
shows clearly that the term structure of IVs is not flat for all rating categories, which 
conflicts with the constant volatility assumption of both the L and LT diffusion models. 
Compared to the average IV for each rating category, the IVs are significantly higher for 
short-term corporate debt for all rating classes and occasionally higher for longer-term 
debt as well. As functions of maturity, the IVs are sharply decreasing initially and then 
become flat, with a slight increase when maturity is long enough. Under this asymmetric 
                                                 
70 Moody’s special comments: “The Distribution of Common Financial Ratios by Rating and Industry for 
North American Non-Financial Corporations: July 2006”. 
71 A 4% asset risk premium is consistent with an asset beta of about 0.6, as used in Leland (2004). 
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“U” shape term structure of IV the IVs for medium-term debt, around 10 to 15 years, are 
the lowest for each rating category. This indicates that the risk of short-term and long-
term debt issued by a firm is higher than the risk of medium-term debt. Comparing the 
average of IVs in Table III-1, we find that the sub-prime financial crisis does increase the 
volatility of asset value for all debt categories. As expected, the average IV increases with 
the average maturity of debt for all rating categories, since the risk of a firm is generally 
higher when it chooses to finance itself with longer term debt. On the other hand, the 
volatility does not always increase when the debt rating deteriorates, although the lowest 
rating has a much higher average volatility than the highest one; the slight drops in 
average volatility in intermediate ratings may be due to the composition of the sample. 
The U-shaped curve implies that if we use the average IV to predict the cumulative 
default probabilities of corporate debt for each rating, we will sharply under-estimate the 
default probability for short term and maybe slightly under-estimate the default 
probability for long-term. This is consistent with the Leland (2004) findings.72 As most 
curvature of the IV appears in the short term CDPs, we only focus on the short term 
CDPs in the following analysis, ranging from 1-year to 10-year CDPs.  
1.3 Term structure of implied volatilities under the CEV structural model 
Compared to the L and LT models, the CEV structural model has one extra 
parameter E  to capture the state-dependent volatility of asset value. Can the CEV 
structural model generate the downward sloping term structure of IV? In order to answer 
this question, we first try to fit the historical term structure of IVs by varying E  and T  
                                                 
72 Note, however, that the evidence for the LT model from the sample of 182 firms used by Eom, Helwege 
and Huang (2004) to test the predictions of five structural models finds that LT overpredicts the yield 
spread for low maturity bonds.   
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and keeping the rest of the calibrations the same as in the LT model, which is used in 
most empirical work .73  
[Insert Table III-2 about Here] 
[Insert Figure III-3 about Here] 
Table III-2 reports the values of E  and T  which minimize the sum of absolute 
deviations between IVs from the CEV structural models and IVs of historical CDPs for 
Aa, A, Baa and Ba rated bonds during the periods of 1983-2008 and 1983-2010. To keep 
the optimization problem simple, we only consider integer values of E . Compared to the 
LT model with flat term structure of IVs, the CEV structural model can generate a 
downward sloping term structure of IV, which can be visualized in Figure III-3 for 
different rating categories during the periods we considered. At the same time, the sums 
of absolute differences between CEV IVs and Moody’s historical IVs are small compared 
to those between LT IVs and Moody’s historical IVs, especially for higher rated debt. For 
instance, the sum of the absolute errors of Aa bonds decreases by 85%, from 0.3146 to 
0.0498 after incorporating the state-dependent volatility. Even for the Ba bond which has 
the highest ߚ in our sample, the sum of the absolute errors still decreases by 25%, from 
0.1208 to 0.0884. Therefore, the prediction of CDPs could be improved dramatically after 
introducing state-dependent volatilities to the asset value diffusion process, especially for 
higher rated bonds. Across different rating categories, E  increases and the initial 
                                                 
73 Since Leland (2004) shows that an exogenous or endogenous default boundary fits the observed default 
probabilities equally well provided default costs and recovery rates are matched, the exogenous default 
boundary is used here to keep the exercise simple. 
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volatility, 0 S EV T , increases when the bond rating decreases.74 This indicates a higher 
volatility increase of higher rated bonds per unit decrease of asset value compared to that 
of lower rated bonds. Although the absolute scale of CDPs of higher rated debt is small, 
especially for short term maturities, the change of the IVs is relatively greater across 
different maturities. This evidence is consistent with Coval, Jurek and Stafford (2008)’s 
findings that although default risk is less important in an absolute sense for senior CDO 
tranches, systematic risk is extremely important as a proportion of total spreads for these 
tranches. In additional, by comparing the E  and 0V with the period of 1983-2010, we 
found that the sub-prime financial crisis makes the term structure of IVs of Aa and A 
bonds much steeper and has relatively little impact on the term structure of IVs of Baa 
and Ba bonds. 
On the other hand, the elasticity estimates extracted from the CDP data for the CEV 
model are all negative and implausibly high in absolute value, varying from -2 to -5 or 
even to -6 for the period that includes the financial crisis. These values were estimated by 
ignoring individual firm information and are radically different from those extracted in 
the following two sections. Their only advantage lies in demonstrating the ability of the 
extra parameter to achieve a much better approximation to the historical record.  
2. Data Description of Individual Firms 
In the following sections, we recognize the characteristics of individual firms and 
conduct two exercises with the firm-level information from the financial statements, 
                                                 
74 As we assume the exogenous default boundary equals the face value of the debt so as to keep the 
calculation simple, it makes the initial volatilities relatively small. The values of the implied initial 
volatilities increase and the values of E  do not change when the exogenous default boundary decreases.   
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equity market, debt market, option market and Credit Default Swap (CDS) markets, both 
separately and simultaneously. 
The credit spread data is obtained from the Markit database during the period from 
January, 2001 to December, 2011. We limited our sample only to United States firms for 
contracts denominated in US dollars. We select single name contracts with senior 
unsecured debts and modified restructure (MR) clause. We only keep the single name 
contracts which have at least 60 consecutive months’ observations. As the reported 
frequency of CDS database is daily, the CDS spread on the last Wednesday in each 
month is extracted as the CDS spread in that month. 
The accounting and equity information are extracted from the COMPUSTAT and 
CRSP data bases respectively. We calculate the total assets as the sum of book value of 
debt and market value of equity. The firms’ payout ratio is represented by the sum of 
cash dividend and interest payment divided by the total asset. As the accounting 
information frequency is quarterly, we convert it into monthly by assuming that the 
values are constant within each quarter. The at the money call option implied volatilities 
are extracted from the Optionmetrics database. The risk free rates are interpolated from 
the observed 6month Libor rates and 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10 years interest rate swap rates.  
[Insert Table III-3 about Here] 
[Insert Table III-4 about Here] 
The final sample consists of 103 firms whose detailed characteristics are reported in 
Table III-3. Table III-4 reports the distribution of individual firms in term of industries 
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and ratings75. Approximately half of the firms belong to consumer goods and industrials. 
There are only four firms in technology and telecommunication services, while the rest of 
the firms are almost equally distributed in basic materials, energy, healthcare and 
consumer services. The average payout ratios are equal in all the industries, about 1%, 
which is much lower than the calibration values used in Leland and Toft (1996). The 
average leverage ratio across all the industries is around 38%. In term of the individual 
industries, healthcare has the lowest leverage, about 25%, while the other industries are 
more or less around 40%, with the highest leverage of 43% in industrials. The highest 
implied volatility from the option markets occurs in energy, around 31%, while the 
average implied volatility in the full sample is around 27%.76  In term of credit default 
swap spreads, consumer services have the highest spreads and healthcare has the lowest 
spreads across all the maturities. We also note that the highest credit spreads do not 
coincide with the highest leverage ratios, indicating that industry is potentially an 
important factor in the determination of credit spreads, most probably because of the 
recovery rates in case of default, that enter into the CDS spread determination.77   
Panel B reports the rating distribution of individual firms. Most of the sample firms 
are rated as A and BBB, approximately 82%, while the numbers of firms in the highest 
and lowest ratings are relatively small. Generally, as ratings decrease from AAA to BB, 
the leverage, implied volatility and credit spreads across all the maturities increase. As 
there is only 1 firm in the B and CCC ratings respectively, we attribute the abnormal 
                                                 
75 Both industries and ratings classifications are extracted from the Markit database. 
76 The implied volatility of Telecommunication services is only 22%. As there is only one firm in this 
industry which is not enough to represent the whole industry, we leave this outside our discussion. 
77 Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007) studied the impact of the industry factor on credit spreads 
through the recovery channel and documented that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower 
amounts in present-value terms when the industry of the defaulted firms is itself in distress. 
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behaviour of leverage, implied volatility and credit spreads in these ratings to firm 
specific characteristics. 
In the subsequent two sections we will use the information of our sample firms to 
test whether the CEV model is a better structural model of the firm in terms of 
representing the observable characteristics of debt and equity instruments, as well as CDS 
spreads. 
3. Empirical Evidence from Leverage, Equity value and Volatilities 
3.1 Methodology 
There are three types of equity volatilities: historical volatility, realized volatility and 
option implied volatilities, which contain the different information sets. The historical 
and realized volatility reflect the past and current information in the equity market, 
respectively, while the option implied volatility reflects the information in the option 
market. Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010) show that the option implied volatility is a more 
efficient forecast for future realized volatility compared to the historical volatility. By 
studying the co-movement among CDS, equity and option markets, Berndt and 
Ostrovnaya (2008) find that option prices reveal information about forthcoming adverse 
events at least as early as do credit spreads. In other words, the implied volatility from 
option markets contains certain future information compared to historical and realized 
volatilities. Since the current and future information sets are more interesting for our 
study purposes, we are going to use implied volatility from option markets for our base 
case results and realized volatility from the intraday dataset for robustness checks.  
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Denote the observed and model implied equity volatility by ObsEV  and ImEV ,  equity 
value by ObsE  and ImE , leverage ratio by ObsLev  and ImLev , respectively.  For the 
parameter estimation we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) method. 
Denote the estimation parameter set as  1 0= ,\ V E . This approach obviously nests the 
constant volatility case by setting 0E   . 
At each time point 1,...,t  7of our data base we have the following vector  1 1,f t\ , 
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The model implied debt value Im( )D t  , equity value Im( )E t  and volatility ImEV , can 
be computed from equations (2.24), (4.5) and (4.8) in Chapter 1, respectively. The 
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In order to determine the model implied moments numerically, we need both 
accounting and equity information. It is assumed that the time-varying exogenous default 
boundary equals the value of current debt plus one-half of the long term debt78 for both 
candidate models. The asset values are the sum of book value of debt plus the market 
value of equity; the latter equals the product of stock price and outstanding shares. The 
firm’s total payouts are the sum of cash dividends to shareholders and interest payments 
                                                 
78 This exogenous default boundary was introduced by the KMV group and is widely known. 
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to debtholders. The corporate tax rate is assumed to be 35% and the recovery rate is equal 
to the estimated recovery rate in the Markit database. Under these assumptions, the 
Leland model has only one variable, asset volatility, to estimate, while the CEV structural 
model has one extra parameter, the elasticity of variance, besides the volatility level. 
Since the GMM estimates\ by minimizing  1 1[ , ]E f t\ , we set  
    1 1 1 111, ,G f t\ \77  7¦   (3.3) 
and estimate 1\ by the relation, 
    1 1 1 1 1 1arg min , ,G T W G T\ \ \c  (3.4) 
In (3.4) 1W is a matrix of weights that is computed by successive approximations.79 
3.2 Results 
[Insert Table III-5 about Here] 
Table III-5 presents the average values of the parameters under the CEV structural 
model estimated as described in Section 3.1, with leverage ratios, equity values and 
implied equity volatilities. In Panel A, we observe that the value of E  decreases from 
1.19 to -1.08 as the rating class decreases from AAA to CCC, even though the E ’s  in 
some rating classes are not significantly different from zero at conventional levels. We 
also note that for the whole sample, the average value of E  is around 0.095 which is not 
significant from zero either, and the average value of initial volatility is around 15% and 
                                                 
79 We choose 1W  by setting 11W  as the covariance matrix of moments. See pages 443-447 in Greene’s 
Econometric Analysis  (Sixth Edition). 
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significant different from zero. For the industry distribution of parameters reported in 
Panel B, the Industrials and Technology sectors have the relatively lowest E ’s , around -
0.21 and -0.4, respectively, while Consumer Services and Healthcare have the highest E  
among all the sectors. However, none of these E ’s are significant different from zero 
conventional levels.   
As we only fit the equity and account information in this exercise, it appears that the 
CEV structural model, which introduces skewness into the asset value distribution, does 
not outperform the Leland model with constant asset volatility.  
4. Empirical Evidence From Equity, Debt and CDS Markets 
4.1 Econometric methodology 
In this section, we incorporate the observed information from the Credit Default 
Swap (CDS) market. For each firm in our data base we use 1, 3, 5, 7,10j  different 
maturities for the CDS spreads in our parameter estimation. Setting 1jg T
 everywhere 
the CDS spreads jc  are given by the following expression in our continuous time notation, 
with R  denoting the estimated recovery rates, whose estimates are also available in the 
CDS data base.  
  






















³  (4.1) 
Discretizing this expression in terms of quarters ,  1,...,4i ji TW  , and setting  0, iD W  
and  0, iQ W  for the discount factor and survival probabilities respectively in the time 
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interval > @0, iW , we have for  0, jCDS T , the total spread paid by the default protection 
buyers in[0, ]jT  , 
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The first passage time to default probability distribution for the state dependent 
volatility processes is given in terms of its Laplace transform by the following 
expression80 
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 (4.3) 
with the expressions in braces given by (3.6) in Chapter I in the case of the CEV 
distribution.  
For the parameter estimation we use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
method. At each time point 1,...,t  7 of our data base we have the following vector
 2 2 ,f t\ , a function of the parameter set 
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 (4.4) 
In (4.4) Im ( , ),  1, 2, 3, 5, 7,10jCDS t T j  represent the CDS spreads estimated from 
(4.1)-(4.3) given the parameter set  2 0= ,\ V E , while  ,Obs jCDS t T  is the corresponding 
                                                 
80 See equations (3.6) in Chapter 1, based on Davydov and Linetsky (2001, Proposition 2). 
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observed CDS spread. Similarly,  ImE tV is the model-based equity volatility estimated 
from (4.8) in Chapter I given 2\ , while  E tV is the observed equity volatility from the 
option market. Similar to section 3, we set  
    2 2 2 211, ,G f t\ \77  7¦   (4.5) 
and estimate 2\ by the relation 
    2 2 2 2 2 2arg min , ,G T W G T\ \ \c  (4.6) 
In (4.6) 2W is a positive definite weighting matrix. We set this matrix equal to the 
variance matrix of the moment conditions81 and compute by successive approximations.  
4.2 Results 
Following the procedure described in the previous section, we conduct the GMM 
estimation with seven moments including the information from financial statements, 
equity, option and CDS markets and report the average values of parameters in Table III-
6. For the entire sample, the average values of E  and 0V   are around -0.67 and 21%, 
respectively, and both of them are significant different from zero at the highest 
conventional confidence level. Over 85% of the firms in the sample have negative E ’s,  
indicating a negative relationship between asset value and asset volatility. In other words, 
we document a significant skewness in the asset value distribution after incorporating the 
information from the CDS market. 
[Insert Figure III-4 about Here] 
                                                 
81 See “Econometric Analysis (6th Edition)” edited by William H. Green, on page 444.  
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[Insert Figure III-5 about Here] 
Compared to the Leland structural model with constant volatility, the CEV structural 
model shows a clearly superior fitting of its estimates to the observed data, especially 
with respect to the CDS spreads. According to Figure III-4, the structural model with 
constant volatility consistently underestimates the CDS spreads with 1-year, 5-year and 
10-year maturities, while the CEV model estimates lie much closer to the observed 
values. Since we fixed the default boundary to the one based on the KMV method, there 
is only one extra parameter, the elasticity of variance E , under the CEV structural model 
compared to the structural model with constant volatility. This extra parameter improves 
dramatically the fitting of the time series of CDS spreads across all the maturities while 
maintaining the fitting of the implied equity volatilities time series at comparable levels 
of accuracy to the constant volatility, as shown in Figure III-5.  
[Insert Table III-6 about Here] 
Table III-6 shows the distribution of the estimates of E across rating classes and 
industries. For the different rating classes, we observe a decrease of E  as the rating 
decreases from AA to BB, while the value of the initial volatility oV  first decreases and 
then increases. The observations in other rating classes are too few to arrive at a reliable 
conclusion. For the different industries, all the average values of E  are negative and 
significantly different from zero, with the lowest values in Telecom Services, Technology 
and Consumer Goods. All the average value of oV  are significant, with the highest value, 
around 28%, in the Energy sector. We also note that most of the positive E ’s fall into the 
Consumer Services, Industrials and Basic Materials sectors. 
142 
 
[Insert Table III-7 about Here] 
As individual firms have their own specific characteristics which lead to different 
asset value distributions, we document a wide range of values ofE  from -2.34 to 1 for the 
whole sample. To assess the relationship between E  and firm specific characteristics, we 
break down the whole sample into five sub-samples in ascending values of E . We pick 
the first and last 20 firms and put them into the first and last quantiles respectively, and 
split the rest into three quantiles evenly. Table III-7 reports the firm characteristics of the 
quantiles in term of both mean and median. Generally we observe that as the value of E  
increases, there is a tendency for both asset values and current ratios which are equal to 
current assets over current liabilities, to increase, while the leverage ratios and CDS 
spreads decrease. Nonetheless, the relationship is neither monotone nor very strong, and 
the ratios and spreads fluctuate in the intermediate quantiles, probably reflecting firm 
specific factors.  It is well known that high leverage and CDS spreads are associated with 
high default risk while a high current ratio is associated with low default risk. Hence, the 
firms with higher default risk have a higher probability to have a negative E  compared to 
those with a lower default risk. Since the sign of E  shows the relationship between asset 
value and asset volatility, the firms with a high default risk have a higher probability to 
have a more skewed distribution of asset value compared to those with a relatively lower 
default risk. In addition, we did not see a clear relationship between the value of E  and 
the firm’s payout ratio and implied volatility.  
4.3 Out of Sample Fitting of CDP 
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We observe from Table III-4 that we have fairly large sample firms in the A and 
BBB classes, with average values of leverages around 31% and 44%, respectively. 
Compared to the Moody’s risk class information reported in Table III-1 in section 1, the 
leverage ratio of BBB firms is very similar to that of Baa firms, approximately 44%. 82 
Thus, our samples of firms in the BBB class should be good proxies for Moody’s Baa 
class. Since we have already calibrated the value of initial volatilities and elasticity 
parameters for each individual firm in the previous section with equity, option and CDS 
information, we may now verify the out of sample fitting for the historical term structure 
of cumulative default probabilities for the BBB class.  
[Insert Figure III-6 about Here] 
From Table III-6, we know that the average values of the initial volatility and the 
elasticity parameter E  are 18.67% and -0.7037, respectively, under the CEV structural 
model, while the average asset volatility is around 15.29% under the Leland structural 
model with constant volatility. We assume 4% asset risk premium.83  The exogenous 
default boundary, risk free rates and payout rates are the same as in the empirical data for 
all the firms in the BBB class of our sample.  As we see in Figure III-6, the term structure 
of physical cumulative default probabilities generated by the CEV structural model can 
almost capture the level and trend of the observed information, while that generated by 
the structural model with constant volatility dramatically underestimates the CDP. Thus, 
                                                 
82 We assume the S&P’s BBB is equivalent to Moody’s Baa class.  The equivalence of the S&P A class 
with Moody’s Aa is less clear, and for this reason we don’t present the comparative CDP results for that 
class. In these results the observed CDP for the Aa class lies between the CEV and constant volatility cases.   
83 Leland (2004) assume 4% asset risk premium for the calibration. This number is consistent with 6% 
equity premium when the average firm has about 35% leverage. 
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the CEV structural model with its extra elasticity parameter shows significant flexibility 
to fit into the cross sectional information from major financial markets.   
5. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we use real data from the equity, option and CDS markets for a 
sample of firms to compare the performance of structural models with constant volatility 
and CEV, using three alternative information sets. 
First, using Moody’s historical cumulative default probabilities, we show that the 
term structure of implied volatilities is not constant, especially for the short-term 
maturities. We show that the extra parameter of the CEV model achieves a much better 
approximation to the historical record than constant volatility. Further, we find that the 
elasticity estimates extracted from the CDP data for the CEV model are all negative and 
implausibly high in absolute value, varying from -2 to -5 or even to -6 for the period that 
includes the financial crisis. 
Second, we use firm level information limited to the accounting data and equity and 
option market observations. With such an information set, we note that the CEV 
structural model has a performance similar to the structural model with constant 
volatility.  
Third, we incorporate the information from CDS markets into the data set used in the 
second exercise and re-examine the performance of both models. We document that the 
CEV structural model exhibits a much better fitting to the CDS spreads across all 
maturities. In addition, we find that the estimated values of E are overwhelmingly and 
significantly negative for most of the firms in our sample across all industries and rating 
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classes. The relationship between the sign and value of E and the firm specific measures 
of default risk, such as leverage ratios, CDS spreads and current ratios indicates that there 
is a tendency for E  to increase as the risk of the firm decreases, but that the tendency is 
weak and fluctuates. 
Last, we compared the estimated average cumulative default probabilities to the 
Moody’s data for the BBB rating class in our sample for which there were sufficient 
numbers of firms for reliable inferences. We note that the CDP term structure generated 
by the CEV structural model can fit the observed data much better than the one estimated 
with constant asset volatility.  
Overall, the elasticity parameter under the CEV structural model provides a 
significant degree of flexibility to fit the cross sectional information from financial 
statements, equity, option and CDS markets simultaneously compared to the competing 
structural model with constant volatility. More complex asset dynamics that include jump 
and/or stochastic volatility components may perhaps improve the fit compared to the 
CEV. Nonetheless, the theoretical and computational drawbacks of these dynamics, 
documented at length in Chapter I of this thesis, preclude their use in empirical research 
at this point in time.  
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Table III-1: Calibration of Model Parameters 
Panel A 
 Aa A Baa Ba 
Average leverage(D/v) 31.6% 41.7% 44.8% 49.8% 
Payout Rate 6% 6% 6% 6% 
Risk Free Rate 8% 8% 8% 8% 
Recovery Rate 50% 50% 50% 50% 
Tax Rate 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Risk Premium 4% 4% 4% 4% 
Panel B 
0V  100 100 100 100 
K 31.6 41.7 44.8 49.8 
Average Implied 
volatility(1983-2008) 18.97% 17.69% 19.11% 23.36% 
Average Implied 




Table III-2: CEV structural model parameter estimation by fitting Moody’s historical CDPs  
This table reports the estimation of E  and 0V  in the CEV structural model by minimizing the sum of absolute deviations from Moody’s historical CDPs for 
terms from 1-year to 10-years. 
,
I I
CEV MMINE T V V¦  
The average leverage, payout rate, risk free rate, recovery rate, tax rate and risk premium are assumed to be the same as in Panel A in Table III-1 for different 
rating categories of debt. We assume the initial asset value is 100 and the exogenous default boundary equals the face value of the debt. 
I
MV is the average 
implied volatility by the LT model.  
 Period of 1983-2008  Period of 1983-2010 
Rating E  0V  I ICEV MV V¦  II MMV V¦   E  0V  I ICEV MV V¦  II MMV V¦  
Aa -5 6.5% 0.0498 0.3146  -6 6.3% 0.0530 0.3128 
A -4 8% 0.0621 0.1832  -5 7.6% 0.0778 0.2036 
Baa -4 9.5% 0.0747 0.1914  -4 9.8% 0.0836 0.1866 
Ba -2 16% 0.0884 0.1208  -2 16.5% 0.1010 0.1075 
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Figure III-1: Cumulative Default Probabilities of Aa, A, Baa and Ba rated corporate 
bonds  
The dashed lines show the cumulative default probability (CDP) of corporate debt during 1983-2010. The 
solid lines show the cumulative default probabilities of corporate debt during 1983-2008. 
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Figure III-2: Implied volatility of historical cumulative default probabilities  
The dashed lines show the implied volatilities of the cumulative default probabilities during 1983-2010 by 
LT model, while the solid lines show the implied volatilities during 1983-2008. The initial asset value 
equals 100 and the debt value is chosen from the empirical leverage ratio for the different ratings. The 
coupon is calculated by making the debt issued at par value. Tax rate is 35% and recovery rate is 50% for 
all the debts. The average maturity of debt is 10 years. The exogenous default boundaries are equal to the 
value of debt for each scenario. 
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Figure III-3: Term structures of Implied Volatilities (IV) of CEV structure model 
This figure depicts the term structure of IV for Moody’s historical CDPs (solid lines) and CEV structural 
model (dashed lines). The LT model with exogenous default boundary is used to calculate the IVs. The 
average IVs for Moody’s historical CDPs are shown by dashed-dot lines for Aa, A, Ba, B rated debt during 
the periods 1983-2008 and 1983-2010. The average leverage, payout rate, risk free rate, recovery rate, tax 
rate and risk premium are assumed to be the same as in Panel A in Table III-1 for different rating categories 
of debt. We assume the initial asset value is 100 and the exogenous default boundary equals the face value 
of the debt. The values of E  and 0V  in CEV structural model are calculated by minimizing the sum of 






Table III-3: Summary Statistics of Individual Firms 
This table reports the summary statistics of individual firms. Note that in sector column, BM, CG, CS, EN, 
HC, IN, TE, TS are abbreviations of  Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, Energy, 
Healthcare, Industrials, Technology and Telecommunications Services, respectively. The payout ratio is 
the sum of cash dividend and interest expense divided by the total asset. The recovery rates are the 
estimated recovery rates reported in Markit datasets. The implied volatilities are extracted from 
Optionmetric for the at the money call options. 














3M Co IN AA 04/2003 12/2011 69.56 0.01 0.18 0.40 0.22 
Abbott Labs HC AA 10/2003 12/2011 98.95 0.01 0.23 0.40 0.21 
Air Prods & Chems Inc BM A 04/2003 09/2008 20.78 0.01 0.30 0.40 0.22 
Alcoa Inc. BM BBB 08/2001 09/2008 45.79 0.01 0.42 0.40 0.34 
AmerisourceBergen Corp CS BBB 02/2004 12/2011 17.37 0.00 0.55 0.40 0.27 
Anadarko Pete Corp EN BBB 01/2003 09/2008 40.52 0.01 0.48 0.40 0.31 
Anheuser Busch Cos Inc CG A 06/2003 10/2008 51.64 0.01 0.25 0.40 0.18 
APACHE CORP EN A 03/2003 09/2008 31.58 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.31 
Archer Daniels Midland  CG A 06/2003 09/2008 31.83 0.01 0.44 0.40 0.30 
Arrow Electrs Inc CG BBB 11/2001 12/2011 7.43 0.00 0.57 0.40 0.38 
Autozone Inc CS BBB 03/2003 07/2011 12.58 0.00 0.35 0.40 0.27 
Avon Prods Inc CG BBB 01/2003 12/2011 19.04 0.01 0.25 0.40 0.31 
Baker Hughes Inc EN A 11/2001 09/2008 20.82 0.01 0.17 0.40 0.34 
Baxter Intl Inc HC A 02/2002 12/2011 36.91 0.01 0.26 0.40 0.26 
Black & Decker Corp CG BBB 05/2002 01/2010 8.50 0.01 0.47 0.41 0.32 
Boeing Co IN A 04/2001 09/2008 92.46 0.01 0.50 0.40 0.28 
BorgWarner Inc CG BBB 11/2001 09/2008 5.21 0.01 0.43 0.40 0.31 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co HC A 04/2003 12/2011 64.12 0.02 0.26 0.40 0.25 
Campbell Soup Co CG A 06/2002 10/2011 17.43 0.01 0.32 0.40 0.21 
Caterpillar Inc IN A 04/2001 09/2008 67.27 0.01 0.54 0.40 0.28 
CenturyTel Inc TS BBB 03/2003 04/2008 8.99 0.01 0.50 0.40 0.22 
Clorox Co CG BBB 07/2004 07/2009 13.16 0.01 0.32 0.40 0.21 
Coca Cola Entpers Inc CG A 06/2003 09/2008 30.04 0.01 0.66 0.40 0.23 
Colgate Palmolive Co CG AA 08/2003 12/2011 41.92 0.01 0.19 0.40 0.20 
ConAgra Foods Inc CG BBB 08/2001 07/2011 20.08 0.03 0.42 0.40 0.22 
ConocoPhillips EN A 01/2003 09/2008 152.40 0.01 0.45 0.39 0.25 
Costco Whsl Corp CS A 07/2004 07/2011 35.93 0.00 0.29 0.40 0.25 
CSX Corp IN BBB 01/2003 09/2008 29.17 0.01 0.58 0.40 0.29 
Cytec Inds Inc BM BBB 02/2004 12/2011 4.30 0.00 0.49 0.40 0.36 
Danaher Corp IN A 01/2004 12/2011 29.13 0.00 0.23 0.40 0.25 
Diamond Offshore 
Drilling EN A 07/2003 09/2008 10.89 0.02 0.19 0.40 0.37 
Dover Corp IN A 12/2004 12/2011 12.74 0.01 0.31 0.40 0.29 
Dow Chem Co BM BBB 01/2002 09/2008 65.87 0.02 0.44 0.40 0.28 
Eastman Chem Co BM BBB 01/2003 09/2008 8.57 0.01 0.52 0.40 0.25 
FedEx Corp IN BBB 08/2002 07/2011 36.34 0.00 0.30 0.40 0.28 
Gen Dynamics Corp IN A 11/2004 12/2011 41.54 0.01 0.36 0.40 0.24 
Gen Mls Inc CG BBB 04/2002 07/2011 31.57 0.02 0.39 0.40 0.19 
Goodrich Corp IN BBB 09/2001 09/2008 9.19 0.01 0.52 0.40 0.33 
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Halliburton Co EN A 02/2003 09/2008 34.94 0.01 0.30 0.40 0.33 
H J HEINZ CO CG BBB 04/2001 10/2011 21.96 0.02 0.38 0.41 0.21 
Home Depot Inc CS A 02/2002 09/2008 95.07 0.01 0.22 0.41 0.28 
Honeywell Intl Inc IN A 11/2001 12/2011 54.86 0.01 0.41 0.40 0.30 
Intl Business Machs Corp TE AA 04/2001 12/2011 233.09 0.01 0.34 0.40 0.25 
Intl Paper Co BM BBB 04/2001 09/2008 39.13 0.01 0.56 0.40 0.27 
Johnson & Johnson HC AAA 03/2003 12/2011 207.15 0.01 0.15 0.40 0.17 
Kellogg Co CG BBB 03/2003 12/2011 27.45 0.01 0.33 0.40 0.18 
Kimberly Clark Corp CG A 02/2004 12/2011 38.91 0.02 0.29 0.40 0.18 
The Kroger Co. CS BBB 08/2006 10/2011 33.61 0.01 0.53 0.40 0.29 
Eli Lilly & Co HC A 06/2003 12/2011 70.15 0.02 0.22 0.40 0.24 
Ltd Brands Inc CS BB 03/2003 09/2008 12.76 0.01 0.29 0.40 0.32 
Lockheed Martin Corp IN A 04/2001 12/2011 52.81 0.01 0.45 0.40 0.26 
Lowes Cos Inc CS A 01/2003 09/2008 54.34 0.00 0.22 0.40 0.28 
Marriott Intl Inc CS BBB 05/2002 09/2008 18.00 0.00 0.31 0.40 0.30 
Masco Corp CG BB 07/2002 09/2008 18.45 0.01 0.39 0.41 0.31 
Medtronic Inc HC A 09/2003 10/2011 62.35 0.01 0.16 0.40 0.24 
Merck & Co Inc HC AA 03/2004 10/2009 105.48 0.02 0.23 0.40 0.27 
Mohawk Inds Inc CG BBB 12/2004 12/2011 7.91 0.00 0.44 0.40 0.38 
Molson Coors Brewing CG BBB 10/2005 12/2011 12.93 0.01 0.41 0.40 0.27 
Monsanto Co BM A 04/2003 09/2008 31.34 0.01 0.22 0.40 0.32 
Motorola Inc TE BBB 08/2002 09/2008 57.09 0.01 0.35 0.39 0.38 
Newell Rubbermaid Inc CG BBB 05/2001 02/2009 11.75 0.02 0.43 0.41 0.30 
Nordstrom Inc CS A 11/2001 09/2008 10.30 0.01 0.35 0.41 0.37 
Norfolk Sthn Corp IN BBB 04/2001 09/2008 29.32 0.01 0.54 0.39 0.32 
Northrop Grumman Corp IN BBB 04/2003 03/2011 36.98 0.01 0.46 0.40 0.22 
OCCIDENTAL PETRO EN A 09/2002 09/2008 45.32 0.01 0.29 0.40 0.29 
Omnicare Inc CS BB 11/2004 02/2011 7.65 0.01 0.50 0.26 0.40 
Omnicom Gp Inc CS BBB 05/2002 12/2011 25.77 0.01 0.47 0.40 0.29 
ONEOK Partners LP EN BBB 05/2006 12/2011 7.79 0.04 0.53 0.40 0.22 
J C Penney Co Inc CS BB 06/2001 09/2008 20.37 0.01 0.51 0.38 0.39 
Pepsico Inc CG A 06/2004 12/2011 124.03 0.01 0.19 0.40 0.18 
Pfizer Inc HC AA 10/2003 12/2011 234.37 0.02 0.28 0.40 0.24 
Pitney Bowes Inc TE BBB 11/2003 12/2011 15.76 0.02 0.53 0.40 0.24 
PPG Inds Inc BM BBB 07/2001 12/2011 17.96 0.01 0.42 0.40 0.27 
Praxair Inc BM A 10/2003 09/2008 25.16 0.01 0.26 0.40 0.23 
Pride Intl Inc EN BBB 06/2003 09/2008 6.49 0.00 0.35 0.40 0.38 
Procter & Gamble Co CG AA 04/2001 12/2011 213.09 0.01 0.25 0.40 0.19 
Quest Diagnostics Inc HC BBB 09/2005 12/2011 14.15 0.01 0.30 0.40 0.24 
Raytheon Co IN A 06/2003 12/2011 32.39 0.01 0.42 0.40 0.22 
Rep Svcs Inc IN BBB 09/2004 12/2011 14.30 0.01 0.43 0.40 0.27 
Reynolds Amern Inc CG BBB 11/2004 12/2011 26.53 0.02 0.39 0.40 0.23 
Rohm & Haas Co BM BBB 05/2001 11/2008 15.81 0.01 0.39 0.41 0.27 
Ryder Sys Inc IN BBB 01/2003 09/2008 7.26 0.01 0.62 0.39 0.29 
Safeway Inc CS BBB 07/2005 12/2011 20.99 0.01 0.50 0.40 0.31 
Schering Plough Corp HC A 04/2003 09/2008 40.65 0.01 0.23 0.40 0.28 
Sealed Air Corp US IN B 02/2006 12/2011 7.05 0.01 0.47 0.40 0.31 
Sherwin Williams Co CG A 06/2002 12/2011 9.60 0.01 0.31 0.40 0.29 
Smithfield Foods Inc CG BB 07/2003 08/2008 7.53 0.01 0.57 0.39 0.29 
Southwest Airls Co IN BBB 06/2003 12/2011 18.62 0.00 0.45 0.39 0.35 
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Sunoco Inc EN BB 07/2003 09/2008 14.55 0.01 0.51 0.40 0.34 
SUPERVALU INC CS CCC 03/2003 09/2008 15.13 0.01 0.60 0.40 0.28 
Sysco Corp CS A 03/2005 12/2011 24.48 0.01 0.26 0.40 0.23 
Target Corp CS A 04/2002 09/2008 64.06 0.00 0.35 0.40 0.30 
Textron Inc IN BBB 10/2002 09/2008 23.69 0.01 0.58 0.39 0.28 
Un Pac Corp IN BBB 09/2003 09/2008 45.93 0.01 0.49 0.39 0.24 
Utd Parcel Svc Inc IN AA 08/2004 12/2011 68.52 0.02 0.32 0.40 0.23 
Utd Tech Corp IN A 06/2003 09/2008 85.24 0.01 0.33 0.40 0.20 
Unvl Health Svcs Inc HC BB 03/2004 12/2011 5.10 0.01 0.42 0.40 0.31 
UST Inc. CG BBB 04/2003 10/2008 8.99 0.03 0.17 0.40 0.22 
V F Corp CG A 09/2004 12/2011 11.07 0.01 0.26 0.40 0.28 
Wal Mart Stores Inc CS AA 01/2001 10/2011 296.93 0.01 0.28 0.40 0.23 
Waste Mgmt Inc IN BBB 01/2004 08/2009 31.50 0.01 0.46 0.40 0.24 
Whirlpool Corp CG BBB 04/2001 09/2008 12.73 0.01 0.59 0.40 0.33 
Wyeth HC A 02/2003 07/2009 81.20 0.01 0.28 0.40 0.26 
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Table III-4: Distribution of Individuals Firms 
This table reports the industry and rating distribution in Panel A and B, respectively. The average values of all the variables are reported. The 1, 3, 5, 7, 10 
years credit default swap spreads are reported as basis points (bps). 
Panel A: Industry Distribution 













Basic Materials 10 0.40 0.01 26.85 39.11 51.92 59.30 68.51 0.28 
Consumer Goods 27 0.37 0.01 33.53 48.82 63.90 71.57 79.79 0.26 
Consumer Services 17 0.39 0.01 43.87 64.65 84.10 92.76 102.56 0.30 
Energy 10 0.36 0.01 30.21 44.73 58.86 66.96 76.00 0.31 
Healthcare 12 0.25 0.01 20.89 32.54 44.76 51.22 58.01 0.25 
Industrials 23 0.43 0.01 26.79 39.48 52.73 59.99 67.94 0.27 
Technology 3 0.41 0.01 37.66 54.12 68.55 76.46 85.50 0.29 
Telecom Services 1 0.50 0.01 24.76 46.52 71.38 86.84 102.93 0.22 
Panel B: Rating Distribution 
AAA 1 0.15 0.01 11.51 16.57 22.33 26.19 30.76 0.17 
AA 9 0.26 0.01 15.68 23.18 30.89 35.72 41.42 0.23 
A 38 0.31 0.01 17.32 26.50 35.91 41.95 49.11 0.26 
BBB 46 0.44 0.01 37.10 53.84 71.12 79.88 89.44 0.28 
BB 7 0.46 0.01 83.09 121.94 154.16 166.00 177.62 0.34 
B 1 0.47 0.01 72.47 111.10 150.17 163.88 176.62 0.31 
CCC 1 0.60 0.01 54.54 89.48 124.22 140.64 157.33 0.28 
All Firms 103 0.38 0.01 31.32 46.24 61.07 68.76 77.29 0.27 
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Table III-5: Distribution of Parameters with Leverage and Equity 
This table reports the average value of parameters by fitting leverage, equity value and equity implied volatility. The 
average p-values for each parameter are reported in the parentheses.  
Panel A: Rating Distribution 
 ALL  Negative Betas  Positive Betas 
N beta sigma N beta sigma N beta sigma 
AAA 1 1.1901 0.1700    1 1.1901 0.1700 
(0.3319) (0.0008)    (0.3319) (0.0008) 
AA 9 0.5275 0.1505 4 -0.1005 0.1496 5 1.0299 0.1513 
(0.2657) (0.0120) (0.3290) (<.0001) (0.2150) (0.0216) 
A 38 0.1091 0.1703 20 -0.6523 0.1651 18 0.9550 0.1760 
(0.0992) (0.0033) (0.1052) (0.0002) (0.0925) (0.0068) 
BBB 46 0.0334 0.1393 27 -0.6962 0.1396 19 1.0701 0.1388 
(0.1303) (0.0227) (0.1137) (0.0002) (0.1538) (0.0547) 
BB 7 0.0463 0.1736 4 -0.5174 0.1704 3 0.7978 0.1778 
(0.1630) (0.0216) (0.1667) (0.0010) (0.1580) (0.0490) 
B 1 -1.0766 0.1213 1 -1.0766 0.1213    
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)    
CCC 1 -1.0801 0.1678 1 -1.0801 0.1678    
(0.0556) (0.0054) (0.0556) (0.0054)    
total 103 0.0950 0.1544 57 -0.6398 0.1516 46 1.0056 0.1580 
(0.1328) (0.0139) (0.1265) (0.0003) (0.1406) (0.0308) 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 
 ALL  Negative Betas  Positive Betas 
N beta sigma N beta sigma N beta sigma 
Basic 
Materials 
10 0.2166 0.1545 4 -0.7157 0.1450 6 0.8382 0.1609 
(0.0614) (0.0322) (0.0019) (<.0001) (0.1010) (0.0536) 
Consumer 
Goods 
27 0.0852 0.1425 16 -0.5375 0.1423 11 0.9910 0.1429 
(0.1138) (<.0001) (0.1211) (<.0001) (0.1032) (0.0003) 
Consumer 
Services 
17 0.5064 0.1869 8 -0.6178 0.1744 9 1.5056 0.1981 
(0.1208) (0.0248) (0.1498) (0.0007) (0.0949) (0.0462) 
Energy 10 -0.0236 0.1847 6 -0.3307 0.2074 4 0.4370 0.1506 
(0.1928) (0.0405) (0.1550) (0.0013) (0.2493) (0.0994) 
Healthcare 12 0.4163 0.1671 6 -0.3509 0.1613 6 1.1834 0.1729 
(0.2207) (0.0211) (0.2664) (<.0001) (0.1750) (0.0422) 
Industrials 23 -0.2159 0.1306 13 -0.9918 0.1306 10 0.7927 0.1306 
(0.1090) (0.0013) (0.0525) (0.0005) (0.1826) (0.0024) 
Technology 3 -0.4047 0.1097 3 -0.4047 0.1097 
(0.2855) (<.0001) (0.2855) (<.0001) 
Telecom 
Services 
1 -1.8688 0.1487 1 -1.8688 0.1487 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table III-6: Distribution of Parameters with Equity and CDS Spreads 
This table reports the average value of parameters by fitting equity implied volatility and CDS spreads. The average 
p-values for each parameter are reported in the parentheses.  
Panel A: Rating Distribution 
 ALL  Negative Betas  Positive Betas 
N beta sigma N beta sigma N beta sigma 
AAA 1 -0.9971 0.1604 1 -0.9971 0.1604 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0005) 
AA 9 -0.4186 0.2511 7 -0.5862 0.1812 2 0.1679 0.4958 (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0009) (<.0001) 
A 38 -0.6627 0.2307 33 -0.8087 0.2272 5 0.3006 0.2543 (0.0002) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.0012) (<.0001) 
BBB 46 -0.7037 0.1867 40 -0.9133 0.1908 6 0.6939 0.1590 (0.0069) (<.0001) 0.0009 (<.0001) (0.0474) (<.0001) 
BB 7 -0.8919 0.2303 6 -1.1181 0.2349 1 0.4651 0.2028 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
B 1 0.5274 0.1562 1 0.5274 0.1562 (-0.0062) (<.0001) (0.0062) (<.0001) 
CCC 1 -1.0721 0.2736 1 -1.0721 0.2736 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
total 103 -0.6709 0.2118 88 -0.8648 0.2073 15 0.4663 0.2384 (0.0032) (<.0001) (0.0004) (<.0001) (0.0199) (<.0001) 
Panel B: Industry Distribution 
 ALL  Negative Betas  Positive Betas 
N beta sigma N beta sigma N beta sigma 
Basic 
Materials 
10 -0.4853 0.1822 7 -0.9851 0.1908 3 0.6809 0.1623 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Consumer 
Goods 
27 -0.8375 0.1997 25 -0.9455 0.1888 2 0.5111 0.3358 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Consumer 
Services 
17 -0.4826 0.2213 12 -0.8904 0.2392 5 0.4960 0.1782 
(0.0018) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0061) (<0.0001) 
Energy 10 -0.5919 0.2871 9 -0.6950 0.2966 1 0.3357 0.2008 (0.0035) (<0.0001) (0.0039) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Healthcare 12 -0.6231 0.1969 12 -0.6231 0.19692 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Industrials 23 -0.6847 0.2159 19 -0.8875 0.1916 4 0.2786 0.3315 (0.0116) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0669) (<0.0001) 
Technology 3 -1.0540 0.1686 3 -1.0540 0.1686 (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
Telecom 
Services 
1 -1.1286 0.1382 1 -1.1286 0.1382 
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) 
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Table III-7: Characteristics of Firms with Different Betas 
This table reports the characteristics of firms within different beta quantiles. Leverage equals total debt over total 
assets. Current ratio equals current asset over current liability. Payout ratio equals the sum of cash dividend and 
interest expense divided by the total assets. Implied volatilities are the call option implied volatilities from option 
market. 
Beta Quantiles Total 0-20% 21%-40% 41%-60% 61%-80% 81%-100% 
Beta values -2.34 ~ 1 -2.34 ~ -1.04 -1.04 ~ -0.98 -0.98 ~-0.81 -0.81 ~ -0.28 -0.22 ~ 1 
N 103 20 21 21 21 20 
Panel A: Means 
Leverage 0.3786 0.4133 0.3896 0.4068 0.3573 0.3249 
Total Assets 4.34E+10 2.88E+10 4.17E+10 4.17E+10 3.69E+10 6.83E+10 
Current ratio 1.4533 1.2913 1.3540 1.4734 1.5876 1.5577 
Payout ratio 0.0104 0.0108 0.0079 0.0081 0.0136 0.0120 
1Y CDS Spreads 31.3216 35.9334 33.8354 38.5367 22.2912 25.9762 
3Y CDS Spreads 46.2438 55.7609 48.3903 54.8282 33.5563 38.7813 
5Y CDS Spreads 61.0658 75.2904 63.3211 69.8178 45.1666 51.9776 
7Y CDS Spreads 68.7625 84.8468 71.0693 77.1313 52.0681 58.9980 
10Y CDS Spreads 77.2913 94.6554 79.5323 85.4650 60.1437 66.9970 
Implied Volatility 0.2733 0.2440 0.2814 0.2984 0.2675 0.2737 
Panel B: Medians 
Leverage 0.3784 0.4187 0.3620 0.4301 0.3784 0.2946 
Total Assets 2.74E+10 1.69E+10 2.08E+10 2.91E+10 2.45E+10 4.87E+10 
Current ratio 1.3024 1.1594 1.1604 1.2889 1.3927 1.4940 
Payout ratio 0.0095 0.0112 0.0073 0.0084 0.0114 0.0114 
1Y CDS Spreads 22.7694 26.2025 18.5574 23.8004 18.1137 20.1085 
3Y CDS Spreads 32.1538 45.7060 30.5065 32.9205 27.7378 29.1998 
5Y CDS Spreads 43.2735 61.0262 40.0791 43.2819 37.6122 38.6436 
7Y CDS Spreads 49.4273 68.6341 47.6000 51.0469 43.8566 44.6378 
10Y CDS Spreads 57.8791 78.6446 57.0330 59.8140 52.7728 52.5273 
Implied Volatility 0.2737 0.2438 0.2858 0.2848 0.2737 0.2795 
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Figure III-4: Time Series of CDS Spreads 
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Figure III-6: Out of Sample Fitting for Historical Term Structure of CDP 
This figure depicts the out of sample fitting for historical term structure of cumulative default probabilities 
(CDP) of Moody’s Baa class. The value of V  and E  come from the GMM estimation in Section 4.2. It is 
assumed that Moody’s Baa equivalent to S&P’s BBB. The average value of V  are equal to 15.29% and 
18.67% for Leland and CEV structural models, respectively. The average value of E  is -0.7037 for BBB 
class. The asset risk premium is assumed to be 4%. The exogenous default boundaries, risk free rates and 
payout rates are exactly same as the empirical data used in GMM estimation in Section 4.2 for BBB class.     
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Chapter IV  MARKET EFFICIENCY AND DEFAULT RISK: EVIDENCE 
FROM THE CDS AND LOAN CDS 
1. Introduction 
The market for Loan Credit Default Swaps (LCDS), which are credit derivatives on 
syndicated secured loans, has grown rapidly since its 2006 launch until the recent Great 
Recession. Compared to traditional Credit Default Swap (CDS) contracts, LCDS 
contracts have higher recovery rates and cancellability options. Unlike non-cancellable 
LCDS (or US LCDS) that are generally used for trading purposes,84 the protection buyer 
of a European LCDS stops paying a premium to the protection sellers once the loan is 
cancelled by a refinancing activity. Thus, the refinance rate and the LCDS spread are 
usually negatively correlated. Compared to selling the loan directly, banks can keep the 
loans on their balance sheets while transferring the credit risks of loans to third parties, 
usually large financial institutions. As the banks have no incentive to keep monitoring the 
loan actively after buying a LCDS contract, this causes what is referred to as the “Empty 
Creditor Problem”.85 
In this paper we take advantage of the fact that both CDS and LCDS contracts 
depend on the same credit event in order to examine the efficiency of their markets as 
reflected by the co-movement of their time series. Assuming market efficiency, we 
identify a model-free parity relation and we construct a zero-net-cost portfolio that trades 
simultaneously in both markets and uses observed CDS and LCDS spreads, as well as 
reported recovery rates in case of default from both types of contracts, We identify 
                                                 
84 Merrill Lynch, Credit derivative strategy, Feb. 14, 2007. 
85 See Bolton and Oehmke (2011). 
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persistent and positive arbitrage profits from that portfolio over the data period, which 
imply that the observed CDS and LCDS data violates the parity relation. The arbitrage 
profits are large and exist for all rating classes of bonds in our data base. 
We show that these profits cannot be justified by transaction costs or by imperfect 
information with respect to the recovery rates. Further, we identify a subset of firms that 
present persistent evidence of market failure in the form of extreme and persistent 
violations of the market efficiency condition. We analyze the determinants of both profits 
and market failure in terms of macroeconomic and firm-level variables. We find that 
firm-level effects, especially those related to informational asymmetry and difficulty of 
loan recovery in case of default, are much more important than macroeconomic factors in 
accounting for arbitrage profits and market failure. 
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on violations of market efficiency in 
financial markets, which has been noted in several different venues. Since both CDS and 
LCDS contracts are derivatives that depend on the default risk of the borrowing firm, 
their spreads should be determined simultaneously with the valuation of the entire set of 
financial instruments that lay claim to the firm’s cash flows. The theoretical models that 
value the firm’s financial claims are known as structural models of the firm, pioneered by 
Merton (1974), with important contributions by Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft 
(1996). Nonetheless, the complexity of the structural models and the uncertainty of their 
parameters have limited their empirical applications to CDS valuation.86 For this reason 
most violations of market efficiency have been documented in other derivatives markets, 
in equity option markets, in the pair of index and equity option markets, or in index 
                                                 
86 Zhang, Zhou and Zu (2008) is one of the few studies that has adopted this approach. 
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futures options markets.87 To our knowledge, this paper is the first one to document 
efficiency violations in credit default swap markets.  
Most previous integrated studies of stock, bond, option and CDS markets have been 
purely empirical. Acharya and Johnson (2007) study the information flow between the 
CDS market and the stock market from the perspective of insider trading. They find that 
information revelation in the CDS market occurs only for negative credit news and for 
entities that subsequently experience adverse shocks, and increases with the number of a 
firm’s relationship banks. Berndt and Ostrovnaya (2008) extend the work of Acharya and 
Johnson (2007) by incorporating the option market and find that prices of options reveal 
information about forthcoming adverse events at least as early as do credit spreads. 
Norden and Weber (2009) and Forte and Pena (2009) analyze the co-movements of credit 
default swap, bond and stock markets from real observed prices and implied CDS spreads, 
respectively. The main advantage of our study is that although it is consistent with 
structural models of the firm, it is completely model-free and depends only on market 
efficiency and the quality of the data. 
If both CDS and LCDS contracts are written on the same firm, the claims are 
triggered by the same default events which are defined by the International Swap and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA). Thus, the default and survival probabilities of these 
credit derivatives should be exactly the same given the same maturities, restructuring 
clauses and denominated currencies. However, the claim sequences of CDS and LCDS 
are different, which leads to different recovery rates, for which estimates are provided in 
the respective data bases. Generally speaking, the syndicated secured loans which are the 
                                                 
87 See for instance Goyal and Saretto (2009), Driessen et al (2009), and Constantinides et al (2011).  
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underlying assets of the LCDS have higher priority during the bankruptcy process 
compared to senior unsecured debts which are the underlying assets of CDS. Therefore, 
relatively higher recovery rate estimates of LCDS contracts are observed in the data bases 
(approximately 70% on average) compared to similar estimates for recovery rates on 
CDS contracts (around 40% on average). Further, the LCDS recovery rates are contingent 
on the values of the collateral assets, which are independent of the value of the borrowing 
firm, unlike the CDS rates. 
Based on these observations, we construct CDS and LCDS parity under the no 
arbitrage assumption, which should hold in the absence of market frictions. With single 
name CDS and LCDS daily observations during the period from April 2008 to March 
2012, we document a time-varying and significantly positive arbitrage profit generated by 
an artificial default risk-free portfolio that simultaneously longs the undervalued and 
shorts the overvalued contract based on CDS and LCDS parity. We also identify a subset 
of firms (hereafter termed “market failure set”) for which the only recovery rate in the 
CDS market consistent with the parity relation is negative for continuous time intervals 
of at least ten days’ length. In order to understand these observed parity deviations, we 
then address several follow-up research questions. First, do the observed arbitrage profits 
persist in the presence of transaction costs?  Second, are the reported data on recovery 
rates in the data base reliable as estimates of “true” recovery rates upon default for both 
CDS and LCDS markets? Third, what is the impact on deviations in spreads from their 
parity relation of firm-specific and also macroeconomic variables, and the set of 
publications on North American LCDS released simultaneously by the ISDA? Last, to 
165 
 
the extent that the deviations from parity cannot be explained from the above factors, 
what do these violations say about the efficiency of the CDS and LCDS markets? 
To address the first two questions, we first compute the arbitrage portfolio by 
including transaction costs in the form of bid-ask spreads of the CDS market as reported 
in earlier studies and in the Bloomberg database. We find that the profits survive this 
inclusion, since the spreads are much lower than the estimated profits. To address the 
second question, we examine the real default data from a number of firms within our data 
base that failed as well as all the default events on the senior unsecured debts documented 
by Moody’s default and recovery database during the study period. We find that the 
realized recovery rates vary widely between firms and the default types. We also compare 
the estimated recovery rates to other reported estimates from earlier studies for senior 
unsecured debt like the ones traded in the CDS market and find that the estimates in our 
data base are, if anything, rather conservative with respect to the existence of the 
arbitrage profits. 
To address the third research question, we run panel regressions on arbitrage profits 
from violations of the parity relation on firm-specific and macroeconomic variables for 
the entire sample of firms, for several subsamples differentiated by rating class, and 
separately for the market failure set of firms. We include in the independent variables 
standard firm-specific variables like firm size, leverage, current asset ratio and tangible 
assets ratio. We also include the idiosyncratic volatilities calculated from the residuals of 
a Fama-French three-factor model. In the macroeconomic variables we include an 
important event during our sample period that would affect CDS and LCDS spreads and 
their deviations. The event consists of the positive news associated with the simultaneous 
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release of a set of publications to regulate and standardize North American LCDS by 
ISDA on April 5, 2010. The results for the firm-specific variables are consistent with 
prior expectations on the basis of earlier studies about the determinants of the level and 
changes in CDS spreads88 and their effects on information asymmetry, one of the most 
probable sources of the arbitrage profits. Specifically, we find that leverage turns out to 
be always positively correlated with profits, again an expected result since its effect on 
the default event is symmetric for both CDS and LCDS markets, while its effect on 
recovery rates is going to affect primarily the CDS market. The a priori effects of firm 
size and current asset ratio are less clear, since they impact both credit spreads and 
recovery rates. On the other hand, the idiosyncratic risk of firms turns out to be strongly 
positively associated with profits, an expected result given the fact that such risk is an 
indicator of information asymmetry. Equally interesting is the impact of the 
macroeconomic variables. The ISDA, by establishing global standards for LCDS 
contracts from the aspects of definition, qualification, settlements, continuity and 
documents, increased market efficiency in term of reducing the deviations between the 
two spreads in all the samples, but the effect is statistically significant at the conventional 
level only for the not-rated firms. On the other hand, variables associated with market 
downturns have a strongly positive effect on arbitrage profits for almost all samples. 
These findings provide some further indirect understanding of the dislocations caused in 
various markets by the collapse of Lehman Brothers89 and adds some new insights to a 
                                                 
88 Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Ericsson, Jacobs and Oviedo (2009) and Cao, Yu and 
Zhong (2010). 
89 Some of the published studies include Baba and Packer (2009) who examine dislocations in the foreign 
exchange swap market;  De Haas and Van Horen (2012) on the impact on cross-border bank participation 
in the syndicated loan market; and Aragon and Strahan (2012) on the impact on the provision of liquidity 
by hedge funds.  
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growing literature on the adverse (beneficial) effects of asset complexity (standardization) 
on price volatility and trade efficiency (e.g., Carlin, Kogan and Lowery, forthcoming).90 
Last, we find that the failure firm subset has significant differences in the size of all 
firm-specific variables from the remaining firms in our sample, as well as in the levels of 
their respective CDS and LCDS spreads and recovery rates. On the other hand, the results 
of the panel regressions have much lower explanatory power for this subset, while not 
being noticeably different as to the size and significance of the coefficients. We conclude 
that the failure firm subset consists of small, heavily indebted firms with high 
idiosyncratic risk and, hence, likely to be subject to a significant degree of information 
asymmetry. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the CDS and 
LCDS parity and construct the trading strategy. In Section 3 we describe our sample 
datasets. In Section 4 we report and analyze the empirical evidence for the co-movement 
of CDS and LCDS markets for both the short and long runs and examine its robustness 
with respect to transaction costs and recovery rate estimates. In Section 5 we present the 
results of the panel regressions of the realized profits from our parity violations arbitrage 
strategy on the macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. Section 6 concludes.  
2. EMPRICAL METHODOLOGY: THE TRADING STRATEGY 
We construct a model-free trading strategy to detect whether an arbitrage 91 
opportunity exists in the CDS and LCDS markets. According to the definition of a CDS 
                                                 
90 Carlin, Kogan and Lowery (forthcoming) conclude that their experimental results imply that regulation 
requiring asset standardization should decrease price volatility and increase liquidity. Carlin and Manso 
(2011) explore the dynamic relationship between obfuscation and sophistication in retail financial markets 
accounting for the important role played by learning mechanisms within the investor population. 
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contract, the premium of a CDS contract (denoted by c ) received by the protection seller 
(or paid by the protection buyer) has to make the present value of the expected premium 
leg equal to the present value of the expected default leg in order to rule out an arbitrage 
opportunity. This can be expressed mathematically as follows under continuous time, 
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R denotes the recovery rate; ( | )DP tW denotes the probability that a default event 
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and integrating by parts, we find that the denominator of (2.1) is given by 
 
( )  
( | ) [1 ( )]
rt rTT S r
t




    ³  (2.3) 
The expressions in (2.2) and (2.3) are given in particular structural models of the 
firm in terms of the parameters of the asset dynamics process.92 The estimation of the 
parameters is done by calibrating the particular model to the observed spreads and to 
other observable variables of the model, as shown in the appendix.  Nonetheless, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
91 In this chapter, “arbitrage” means the violation of parity which may or may not lead to profitable trading 
in the financial markets. 
92 See, for instance, Leland and Toft (1996, p. 990). 
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availability of the CDS and LCDS data sets allows the model-free examination of the two 
markets. Following the underlying logic of a structural model, the first passage default 
probability and the survival probability should only be driven by the distance between the 
firm’s asset level and default boundary so that default risk and distance are inversely 
related. Thus, the US LCDS and traditional CDS issued on the same firm with the same 
default clause and maturity should share exactly the same first passage default probability 
and survival probability. If we denote the traditional CDS and US LCDS premiums by 
,CDS LCDSc c  and recovery rates by ,CDS LCDSR R , respectively, it follows that, 
(1 ) ( | ) (1 ) ( | )
,
( | ) ( | )
T TD r D r
CDS LCDSt t
CDS LCDST TS r S r
t t
R P t e d R P t e d
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Thus, the following equality must be satisfied in order to rule out arbitrage 
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Thus, in the absence of transaction costs, the arbitrage payoffs of the portfolio 
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In the presence of the one-way proportional transaction costs which are proportional 
to the nominal amount of contracts, 93  denoted by k , there is a non-trading zone 
> @,CDS CDSc c , where, 
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If the observed CDS spreads fall in the non-trading zone , there is no arbitrage 
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Specifically, when the observed CDS spread CDS CDSc c , we buy one share CDS 
contract with $1 notional amount and pay CDSc premium continuously given that no 







  shares of the US LCDS 
contract with $1 notional amount per contract. If a default event occurs, we receive 
 1 CDSR  dollars from the CDS leg contract and pay    1 * 1 11 CDS LCDS CDSLCDS
R R R
R
     
dollars to the holder of the US LCDS leg. Given no estimation risk of recovery rates, this 
                                                 
93 Given a CDS contract with 1$ notional value and premium c , we have to pay  c k  when we buy and 
receive  c k  when we sell it. 
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portfolio can be considered as default risk free. It can, however, generate a positive profit 
at the initial time. When the observed CDS spread CDS CDSc c!  positive arbitrage profits 
can be generated by selling CDS contracts and buying corresponding LCDS contracts. In 
the following sections, we will test the violation of this equality by the observed CDS and 
LCDS spread and estimated recovery data. 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
The CDS market has existed for a long time but the LCDS market was launched in 
2006 in both US and Europe. We obtain our CDS and LCDS data from Markit who 
collects the quotes on LCDS spreads from large financial institutions and other high 
quality data sources and produces the LCDS spread database on a daily basis starting 
from April 11, 2008. Our sample is from April 11th, 2008 to March 30th, 2012, which 
encompasses the credit crisis and the Great Recession. Since the LCDS contracts can be 
divided into US LCDS and Euro LCDS based on the embedded cancellable feature, we 
only use US LCDS to construct the portfolio in order to keep our analysis model free. 
In the CDS market, the contracts on senior unsecured debts are selected since this 
type of contract is the most liquid and is used frequently in the literature.  In the LCDS 
market, the contracts on the first-lien syndicated loans are selected since the claims on 
collateral for the first-lien loans are senior to those of the second-lien loans, which 
indicate more reliable estimated recovery rates. In addition, the LCDS contracts on first-
lien loans are the majority and more liquid compared to those on the second-lien loans. 
We restrict our CDS and LCDS contracts to those in the United States and denominated 
in US dollars. To ensure that the first-passage default and survival probabilities of the 
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CDS contracts are exactly the same as those of the corresponding LCDS, we match the 
daily LCDS and CDS data based on company name, denominated currency, restructure 
clauses and time to maturity. We only study the contracts with a 5-year maturity since 
they are the most liquid contracts and the most studied in the previous literature.94 Markit 
also reports the estimated recovery rates obtained from their clients. These recovery rate 
expectations at time of issue may differ from subsequent recovery-rate expectations and 
actual recovery rates, especially during bad economic times.95 Nevertheless, these data 
represent the only available proxy for the real recovery rates96 (especially for LCDS 
contracts) and have been used in previous studies.97 Table IV-1 reports the summary 
statistics for our full sample and sub-samples. We eliminate the observations whose CDS 
spreads (or LCDS spreads) are greater than 1 and the single name contracts which have 
less than 120 consecutive daily observations. In addition, we obtain the accounting 
variables from COMPUSTAT, economic macro variables from Federal Reserve H.15 
database and equity information from Bloomberg. After merging all these datasets and 
removing the missing observations and private firms, the full sample contains 68,147 
firm-clause-daily cross-sectional observations for 120 single names during the sample 
period from April 11, 2008 to March 30, 2012. 
[Insert Table IV-1 about Here] 
                                                 
94 See Jorion and Zhang (2007), Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010, 2011), Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2011), 
Qiu and Yu (2012) and Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009). 
95 Jokivuolle and Peura (2003), Altman, Brady, Resti and Sironi (2005), Hu and Perraudin (2002) and 
Chava, Stefanescu and Turnbull (2006) report that the recovery and default rates are negatively correlated. 
96 The real recovery rates are collected from Moody’s Default and Recovery Database and discussed in 
section 4. 
97 See Huang and Zhu (2008), Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2008), and Elkamhi, Ericsson and Jiang (2012). 
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In the full sample, the mean LCDS and CDS spreads are around 3.7% and 4.6%, 
respectively. Both medians are smaller than their corresponding means which indicate 
asymmetric distributions and fat tails, especially on the right side. These style factors are 
also verified by positive skewness and high kurtosis for the CDS and LCDS spreads. The 
distributions of recovery rates for the LCDS and CDS contracts are close to a Gaussian 
distribution with slightly negative skewness. Both the mean and median of the LCDS 
recovery rates, around 65% and 70% respectively, are greater than the corresponding 
statistics for the CDS contracts, around 38% and 40% respectively. Intuitively, the 
syndicated secured loans which are the underlying asset of LCDS are usually backed up 
with collateral and have claim priority compared to the senior unsecured debts which are 
the underlying asset that backs the CDS once the default event occurs. The sub-sample of 
investment grades (includes firms rated greater than or equal to BBB), accounts for more 
than 60% of the total observations, while junk rated contracts and not rated contracts 
share almost equally the rest of the observations, approximately 20% each. As expected, 
both the mean and median of the CDS and LCDS spreads in the investment grade sub-
sample are relatively lower, while the mean and median of the recovery rates are 
relatively higher compared to the junk subsample. In terms of the accounting variables, 
the average values in the full sample are around 25 million for total assets, 61% leverage 
ratio, 54% tangible asset ratio and 1.54 current ratio. Compared to the statistics of the 
investment grade firms, the means for the junk firms are higher for the leverage ratio and 
lower for total assets, tangible asset ratios and current ratios. The not rated firms are 
mostly relatively small firms in terms of their total assets. Their leverage ratios, tangible 
asset ratios and current ratios are diverse.  
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The daily idiosyncratic volatilities98 of the full sample have a mean around 2.4% 
with positive skewness and extremely high kurtosis. As expected, both the mean and 
median of daily idiosyncratic volatilities of the investment grade firms are relatively 
lower than those of junk rated firms. For the not rated firms, the daily idiosyncratic 
volatilities are more volatile compared to the other sub-samples.  
4. THE EFFICIENCY OF THE CDS AND LCDS MARKETS 
In this section we examine the violation of CDS and LCDS parity constructed in 
Section 2 at the index and firm levels, respectively. The results are first presented in the 
absence of both transaction costs and uncertainty of recovery rates, and then subsequently 
extended by the inclusion of these two missing items.   
4.1 Trading Strategies 
Following the CDS and LCDS parity in the presence and in the absence of 
transaction costs discussed in Section 2, we first examine the relationship in (2.6) and 
(2.8) with the observed CDS and LCDS data. Figure IV-1 reports the distribution of 
trading strategies with and without transaction costs in Panel A and Panel B, respectively.  
[Insert Figure IV-1 about Here] 
Interestingly, without transaction costs the CDS and LCDS parity in (2.5) does not 
hold at all, which implies huge arbitrage profits in these markets in the absence of 
recovery rate risk. Generally, buying CDS contracts and selling corresponding LCDS 
contracts can generate positive arbitrage profits, which indicates that the LCDS spreads 
are overpriced compared to the corresponding CDS spreads, especially for the not-rated 
                                                 
98 The calculation details are provided in Section 5. 
175 
 
single name contracts. But there is still around a 23% percent chance to make positive 
profits by selling the CDS contracts and buying corresponding LCDS contracts in the full 
sample. 
In the presence of transaction costs, we observe that only approximately 19% of the 
cross-sectional observations in the full sample cannot generate positive arbitrage profits. 
There are still a large number of opportunities to make positive arbitrage profits, 
especially for the not-rated single name contracts. Similar to the case without transaction 
costs, buying CDS contracts and selling the corresponding LCDS contracts dominates the 
opposite trading strategy.  
4.2 Portfolio Results without Transaction Costs and Uncertainty of Recovery 
Rates 
In this subsection it is assumed that the CDS and LCDS markets are frictionless and 
that the recovery rates reported by the Markit database are the “real recovery rates” once 
the default events occur. As noted earlier, we construct the default-free portfolio by 
checking the equality of equation (2.5). There is arbitrage opportunity if the equality does 
not hold. Particularly, we simultaneously buy the CDS contract and sell the weighted 







   and vice versa.  
Relying on the CDS and LCDS parity with the no-arbitrage assumption, we build 
the portfolio for each single name contract on a daily basis and analyze the payoff based 
on the cross sectional observations. The summary statistics are presented in Panel A of 
Table IV-2. The average trading profit across all observations is approximately a daily 
3.75% indicating that the portfolios constructed by the contracts which violate the CDS 
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and LCDS parity are able to generate a 3.75% arbitrage profit per day per single name 
contract on average over the whole sample period. This is incredibly large compared to 
the average daily returns in the traditional equity and bond markets.  Note that the high 
standard deviation, 7.5%, and high kurtosis, 117.53, confirm that the mean may be driven 
by some outliers. Nevertheless, the 1.6% median return which is not affected by extreme 
values is still noticeable large and positive on a daily basis. 
[Insert Table IV-2 about Here] 
We now divide the full sample into three sub-samples based on rating status. The 
junk-rated contracts generate relatively lower returns in terms of both mean and median 
compared to the investment-grade contracts, while the not-rated contracts generate the 
highest profits among all the sub-samples. This can be interpreted intuitively from the 
perspective of asymmetric information. Compared to the rated firms, the not-rated firms 
likely have higher asymmetric information effects since they release less information to 
the markets. In turn, this can be expected to reduce the market efficiency between the 
CDS and LCDS markets and increase the deviations from the parity relation between 
these two markets, resulting in the large arbitrage profits for the arbitrage portfolio for 
these firms. 
As the time span of the single name contracts varies, the cross-sectional average 
puts more weight on the firms with a longer life. In order to remove this bias, we first 
calculate the daily average profit for each single name across the life of the contract and 
then present the statistical properties of the sample reported as “Firm Daily Average 
Profits” in Panel A. The distribution is much closer to the Gaussian with 4.5% mean and 
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2.5% median daily return, which are even greater than those based on the cross-sectional 
observations.  
In order to check the time trend of the arbitrage profits, we aggregate the trading 
profits per day across all the available paired single name contracts and then divide by the 
total number of single name contracts per day to construct a payoff index. Suppose there 
are tN pairs of single name contracts on day t . The payoff of each pair i  on day t  is 







 ¦  (3.1) 
As expected, the distribution of index returns is almost Gaussian for all the samples. 
Similar to the cross-sectional results, the average profit for the not-rated sub-sample 
dominates in terms of the mean and median the rated sub-samples but also has the highest 
standard deviation, 3.3%. The investment grade single names generate lower profits than 
the junk-rated single names. The time trend of daily average profits of the different 
samples can be observed visually in Figure IV-2.  In the full and Investment grade 
samples we note that the arbitrage profits are relatively higher during the great recession 
period from mid-2008 to late 2009, compared to the rest of the periods, and gradually 
decrease in recent years. The junk-rated and not-rated samples have significantly higher 
volatilities than the investment grade firms. As mentioned before, both junk-rated firms 
and not-rated firms are small firms in terms of total assets. They have relatively lower 
tangible ratios which make them more vulnerable, especially under turbulent financial 
market environments. This style factor turns into the higher volatilities for these two sub-
samples compared to the investment grade firms. 
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4.3 Portfolio Profits Given Transaction Costs 
The liquidity problem in the CDS market has been studied from different 
perspectives in the literature. Acharya and Johnson (2007) document that the median 
CDS bid-ask spread is around 20 basis points using CDS quotes for the most widely 
traded North American entities for the period from January 1, 2001 to October 20, 
2004.99 With the CDS data from 1997 to 2006, Tang and Yan (2007) report that the bid-
ask spread is approximately 22 basis points on average.100 Note that the time spans in 
these studies do not overlap with our sample period, which covers the Great Recession 
and afterwards. The Great Recession starting from 2008 affected the CDS market 
dramatically and may have adversely affected its liquidity. Since the Markit database 
only provides the composite quotes for the CDS and LCDS spreads, we match the single 
names in our sample with the Bloomberg database and find that 66 out of 120 firms are 
quoted in the Bloomberg historical CDS dataset.101 The bid-ask quote information is 
retrieved during the period from January 2nd, 2008 to November 23rd, 2012, which covers 
the time span in our study. Table IV-3 reports the summary statistics of both firm average 
and daily average bid-ask spreads. The median of the daily average bid-ask spread at 
around 18 basis points is a little lower but close to the numbers documented by Acharya 
and Johnson (2007) and Tang and Yan (2007). The positive skewness and extremely high 
kurtosis imply fat tails, especially on the right. This turns into a relatively high mean of 
around 35 basis points in contrast to the median.  
                                                 
99 Cite from Table 1 on page 117 in Acharya and Johnson (2007). 
100 The bid-ask spread is computed by combining the summary statistics results in Table 1 and Table 3 in 
Tang and Yang (2007).   
101 As Bloomberg does not provide the information about restructuring clauses, we can only match with 
firm name and we need to assume that the restructure clauses are the same as the single name contracts in 
the Markit database. 
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[Insert Table IV-3 about Here] 
Intuitively, the one way transaction cost represented by one-half of the quoted bid-
ask spread in the LCDS market should be greater than its counterpart in the CDS market 
since the LCDS market is relatively smaller and less liquid. However, we are unable to 
identify the real bid-ask spread in the LCDS market.  
Panel B of Table IV-2 reports the numerical results in the presence of time-varying 
bid-ask spreads for both the firm and index levels. Compared to the scenarios in the 
absence of transaction costs (Panel A in Table IV-2), both mean and median of the profits 
decrease for all samples but are still significantly positive. Specifically, the full cross-
sectional sample generates 3.38% in average profits. In terms of time trend, the profits in 
the presence of transaction cost are very similar to those in the absence of transaction 
costs, which can be observed visually in Figure IV-2. Therefore, the significantly positive 
arbitrage profits survive the introduction of transaction costs.  
[Insert Table IV-4 about Here] 
If we now assume that all the arbitrage profits are caused by relatively less liquidity, 
we can calculate the value of transaction costs which make the arbitrage profits equal to 
zero. The computation is straightforward and can be expressed as, 
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The summary statistics for the implied round-trip transaction cost ˆ2 itk , are reported 
in Table IV-4. The average implied transaction cost for the cross-sectional observations 
of around 200 basis points is more than ten times the realized bid-ask spreads 
documented for the same sample period. These results show that transaction costs can 
only explain a small portion (approximately 10%) of the observed abnormal positive 
profits generated by the portfolio. 
4.4 Uncertainty of Recovery Rates and Market Failure 
After the introduction of transaction costs, there are still about 90% of the abnormal 
positive profits that remain unexplained. Note that we have assumed that the estimated 
recovery rates reported in the Markit datasets are reasonable proxies for the “real 
recovery rates” in the presence of default events. Generally, the real recovery rates 
depend on the type of default events and can only be observed once the default events 
occur. For instance, if a default event is triggered by missing an interest payment, the real 
recovery rate is usually higher than if the default event is triggered by the filing of 
Chapter 11 or Chapter 7. Hence, the uncertainty of the real recovery rates should be a 
source of risk that may explain the observed abnormal profits from an arbitrage portfolio 
between the CDS and LCDS markets. 
i Real recovery rates versus estimated recovery rates 
In the LCDS market, the underlying assets are the Line 1 syndicated secured loans 
with collateral. The value of the collateral is easier to estimate and incorporate into the 
estimation of the LCDS recovery rates. In addition, syndicated secured loans have claim 
priority compared to the senior unsecured debts which are the underlying assets of the 
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CDS markets in bankruptcy. Thus, the estimated recovery rates should be a good proxy 
for the “real recovery rates” of LCDS contracts.  
In order to check the quality of the estimated recovery rates in the CDS markets 
obtained from Markit, we try to match the single names in our sample with those in the 
Moody’s Default and Recovery Database which documents almost all the historical 
default events and their corresponding real recovery rates. We find that four firms have 
default events on senior unsecured debts during the period from April 11, 2008 to March 
30, 2012. The detailed firm list and statistics of real recovery rates are reported in Table 
IV-5.  The mean and median estimated recovery rates are calculated for all days prior to 
the default event, and the real recovery rate is calculated as the percentage of debt market 
value one month after the default event divided by the face value of the debt. The real 
recovery rates are much higher than the estimated recovery rates in term of both mean 
and median. 
[Insert Table IV-5 about Here] 
As the real recovery rate sample is too small to make conclusive conclusions, we 
collect all the observed default events on the senior unsecured debts (1535 observations) 
during the sample period from April 11, 2008 to March 30th, 2012 and report the 
summary statistics in Panel B. Apparently, these results verify that the real recovery rates 
depend on the type of default events. We note that around half of the default events are 
triggered by “Distressed Exchanges”. 102  As distressed exchanges can trigger default 
                                                 
102 Distressed exchange is the substitution of a bond by its issuer with a financial asset of lower value. A 
distressed exchange was possible but sometimes not likely to trigger a default event in the CDS market. As 




events for some CDS contracts with modified-restructuring (MR) clauses, Modified-
modified restructuring (MM) clauses under certain circumstances and sometimes not,103 
we also report the average real recovery rates after excluding the distressed exchanges.  
Compared to the real recovery rates, the estimated recovery rates are much higher in term 
of both the mean and median. Given the LCDS recovery rates, buying CDS contracts and 
selling LCDS contracts generates much more profits when the real recovery rates are low, 
which is generally the case for our trading strategies. 
Next, we benchmark our recovery rates to those reported in the literature. Acharya, 
Bharath and Srinivasan (ABS, 2007, pp. 797-798) provide recovery rate data from a 
sample of defaulted firms for the 18-year period ending in 1999. They report median 
rates of 91.55%, 61.99% and 54.63% for bank loans, senior secured debt and senior 
unsecured debt, respectively. The first two recovery rates correspond to our LCDS and 
the last one to our CDS. The average recovery rates for senior secured bank loans and 
senior unsecured bonds are 70.47% and 36.69%, respectively, during the period from 
1982 to 2007, as reported in Moody’s special comment.104 The results from Moody’s 
special comment (1982-2007) and observed defaults including distressed exchanges in 
Panel B of Table IV-5 (2008-2012) are much closer to the estimates given in our Markit 
data than the ABS results. They preserve in the entirety or even increase the estimated 
arbitrage profits that we report. 
                                                 
103 During the current 2012 negotiations regarding the restructuring of Greek sovereign debt, one important 
issue is whether the restructuring will trigger CDS payments. ECB and IMF negotiators are trying to avoid 
these triggers as they may jeopardize the stability of major European banks who have been protection 
writers. (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_default_swap#Terms_of_a_typical_CDS_contract) 
104 Moody’s special comment, “Corporate Default and Recovery Rates, 1920-2007”, February 2008. 
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ii Implied recovery rates 
Although we verified empirically that on average the real recovery rates are smaller 
but close to the estimated recovery rates, deviations between the real recovery rates and 
estimated recovery rates of the CDS contracts vary dramatically among the individual 
cross-sectional observations. To verify the cross sectional and time series sources of this 
variability, we now check the implied recovery rates in the presence of transaction costs 
by setting the profits of the arbitrage portfolio equal to zero. Mathematically, the implied 
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 (3.3) 
Where ˆCDSR  is the implied recovery rate of the CDS contract. Compared to the daily 
average of estimated recovery rates, the daily average implied recovery rates that are 
reported in Panel A of Figure IV-3 are greater and also more volatile.  
[Insert Figure IV-3 and Table IV-6 about Here] 
Theoretically, the recovery rates cannot be negative because of the limited liability 
of the debt holder. However, we observe some negative implied recovery rates and some 
of them even last for periods as long as a couple of months. According to (3.3), the 
observed CDS and LCDS spreads, LCDS recovery rates and the transaction costs affect 
the implied CDS recovery rates directly. In order to identify the most important of these 
factors in terms of the negative implied recovery rates, we collect all the turning days on 
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which the implied CDS recovery rates become negative (First Day). Thus, each such 
identified implied CDS recovery rate is positive on the day before the turning day (1 Day 
Before). Table IV-6 reports the means and medians of all the variables which might 
affect or be affected by the implied recovery rates. Based on the two-sides Wilcoxon two 
sample test, we observe that the LCDS recovery rates decrease significantly on the 
turning days and their spreads also decrease on those days (albeit with less than 
conventional significance). Intuitively, when the LCDS recovery rates decrease, the 
corresponding LCDS spreads should increase because the loans have become more risky. 
Such counter-intuitive market behavior supports the failure of the LCDS market as 
reflected in the negative implied CDS recovery rates. Both CDS spreads and recovery 
rates increase but not significantly at conventional levels. Since the CDS spreads depend 
on both default probabilities and recovery rates (see (2.4)), we test for changes in the 
spread ratios defined as CDS LCDSc c  and recovery rates ratios defined as 
   1 1CDS LCDSR R  in order to rule out any impacts on default probabilities. Not 
surprisingly, the spread ratios significantly increase but the recovery rates ratios decrease, 
which indicate market failure. In the presence of such market failure, the mean profit of 
our trading strategy on the first day of about 5.7% is significantly greater (almost double) 
the mean profit on the one day before of approximately 2.9%. We also observe a decrease 
in equity returns, CDS spreads and an increase of CDS recovery rates, but none of them 
are significant at conventional significance levels.  
iii Market Failure 
Given market frictions, negative implied recovery rates could appear occasionally 
but should disappear after a reasonable period of time because prices should adjust 
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quickly in a well-functioning market. In this section, we define 19 single name contracts 
in our sample as market failure contracts because they have ten or more consecutive days 
(approximately two weeks) on which their respective implied CDS recovery rates are 
negative.  
[Insert Table IV-7 about Here] 
Comparison statistics of failure and non-failure firms are reported in Table IV-7. 
Compared to the non-failure firms, the failure firms are usually small firms in terms of 
total asset value with relatively higher leverage on average. The idiosyncratic volatilities 
of the failure firms are noticeably higher than those of non-failure firms. We also note 
dramatically higher CDS spreads and slightly higher LCDS spreads for the failure firms 
compared to the non-failure firms, although their CDS and LCDS recovery rates are very 
similar. Based on the results reported in Panel C of Table IV-7, all of the means and 
medians of the differences in these variables between failure and non-failure firms with 
the exception of median difference of the LCDS spreads is significant at the 1% level. 
Given these differences in firm-specific characteristics, the trading strategy of selling 
CDS contracts and buying the corresponding LCDS contracts of failure firms dominates 
all other strategies for non-failure and failure firms, as depicted in Figure IV-4.  This 
indicates that the CDS spreads are generally over-priced for the failure firms compared to 
their corresponding LCDS spreads. We also note that the market failure behaviors 
reflected by the negative implied recovery rates are clustered and occur with greater 
frequency during the 2008 financial crisis, as depicted in Figure IV-5. 
[Insert Figure IV-4 and Figure IV-5 about Here] 
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After removing all the market failure firms from the full sample, we find that the 
implied recovery rates become less volatile and are consistently above the estimated 
recovery rates with only one (inverted) spike during May 2011, as shown in Panel C of 
Figure IV-3. It appears that the uncertainty of the implied CDS recovery rates is mostly 
contributed by the failure firms.  
5. IMPACT OF MACRO AND FIRM-SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
The outcomes of the risk-free portfolio differ among the single names and are also 
time-varying. In this section, we study the impacts of different macro-economic and firm-
specific variables on the outcomes of the arbitrage portfolios in the presence of 
transaction costs.  As the outcomes of the arbitrage portfolios depend on the CDS and 
LCDS spreads and recovery rates, we list the most important factors explaining the levels 
and changes of credit spreads reported in the existing literature, including Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2007), 
Acharya and Johnson (2007), and Cao, Yu and Zhong (2010). Then we refine the list 
based on multicolinearity105 and data availability to arrive at the subsequently discussed 
variables whose correlations are reported in Table IV-8.  
[Insert Table IV-8 about Here] 
5.1 Firm specific variables 
Logarithm of total assets (LOGA): the logarithm of total asset value. The total asset 
value equals the sum of book value of total liabilities and the market value of total equity 
                                                 
105 For instance, we use the yields on 5-year US treasury bonds since both CDS and LCDS contracts in our 
sample have five years to maturity. We use the spread between the yields on Aaa and Baa corporate bonds 
(CBS) and eliminate the VIX because we find that these two variables are highly correlated and the CBS 
has better explanatory power than VIX.   
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including traded equity and non-traded equity. The total asset value is used to control the 
size impacts on arbitrage profits. The relationship between total assets and arbitrage 
profits is ambiguous.  
Current asset over current liability ratio (CAL): this ratio equals current assets 
divided by current liabilities. This ratio indicates the ability of a firm to pay short term 
debt with current assets (i.e., assets that should be easier to liquidate). The current ratio is 
expected to be inversely related with the default probability. Lower default probabilities 
are expected to decrease both the CDS and LCDS spreads. As the arbitrage profit 
measures the deviations between the CDS and LCDS markets, the impact of CAL on 
arbitrage profits is indeterminate. 
Leverage ratio (LEV): this ratio equals total liabilities divided by total assets, which 
indicates the capital structure of a firm. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) 
find that the change of the leverage ratio is positively correlated with the change of credit 
spreads for groups with leverages greater than 15%,106 while Acharya and Johnson (2007) 
find that the leverage ratio has an insignificant impact on the level of the credit spread.107 
Economically, firms with high leverage ratios will have both higher CDS and LCDS 
spreads due to an increased probability of default. As the impact on the spread moves in 
the same direction for both markets, it may not change the deviation between these two 
markets. However, as highly levered firms issue more debt but with less equity backing, 
the recovery rates of the senior unsecured debts should decrease much more compared to 
the syndicated secured loans which usually have collateral backing and claim priority. 
                                                 
106 Table 2 on page 2186 in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001). 
107 Table 10 on page 136 in Acharya and Johnson (2007). 
188 
 
Such a decrease of CDS recovery rates are expected to increase the profits of the 
portfolio. Overall, we expect the leverage ratio to be positively correlated with the 
arbitrage profits.  
Tangible assets (TANG): this variable equals the total value of property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets. Acharya and Johnson (2007) find that the tangible 
asset ratio increases the credit spread using Fama-MacBeth regressions but has an 
insignificant effect using panel regressions. As tangible assets can be considered as a 
collateral proxy, the recovery rates of CDS should be higher with higher tangible asset 
ratios. Furthermore, tangible assets are much easier to estimate and monitor compared to 
intangible assets, making the estimate of recovery rates much closer to real recovery rates. 
Higher expected recovery rates of CDS contracts are expected to decrease the expected 
profits of the arbitrage portfolio. Hence, we expect to have a negative coefficient for the 
TANG factor.   
 Idiosyncratic volatilities (IDIO): The idiosyncratic volatilities are the conditional 
volatility of equity return residuals which cannot be explained by the asset-pricing model. 
For the calculation, we collect the daily closing equity price, denoted by itp , for firm i at 
day t  and calculate the daily returns by 1 1it it itr p p   . We run the following 
regression using the Fama-French three-factor model to get the residual itH , 
  1 2 3it t t t t itr rf R rf SMB HMLD E E E H        (4.1) 
The idiosyncratic volatilities, ith , which are the conditional volatilities of the 
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 The idiosyncratic volatilities can be considered as measures of the firm-specific 
noise. Idiosyncratic volatility is used as a measure of pricing uncertainty or price 
informativeness. While some empirical researchers argue that greater idiosyncratic return 
volatility is an indicator of more informative stock prices (e.g., Brockman and Yan, 2009), 
most argue that it is an indicator of less informative stock prices due to more noise and 
pricing errors and greater asymmetric information (e.g., Chen, Huang and Jha, 2012; 
Krishnaswami and Subramaniam, 1999). Lee and Liu (2011) reconcile these two 
opposing views by empirically documenting that the relation between idiosyncratic 
volatility and price informativeness is either U-shaped or negative. We conjecture that 
higher idiosyncratic volatility is associated with lower market efficiency, since 
idiosyncratic noise generally reflects firm-specific factors which indicate increased 
information asymmetry. Thus, we expect that higher idiosyncratic volatilities are 
associated with increased arbitrage profits.  
5.2 Macro variables 
Publication of ISDA dummy (ISDA): As an administrator of the globally agreed 
standards of credit default swaps, the International Swaps and Derivative Association 
(ISDA) became more proactive after the sub-prime financial crisis and released a series 
of publications providing guidance and standards to try to protect investors and improve 
the efficiency of the CDS market. As our analysis focuses on the relative efficiency of the 
CDS and LCDS markets (especially the US market), we examine the impact of the 
release on April 5, 2010 of a series of documents published by the ISDA regarding the 
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North American Loan CDS market. The documents include the “Bullet Syndicated 
Secured Loan Credit Default Swap Standard Term Supplement”, “Bullet Syndicated 
Secured Loan Polling Rules”, “Bullet LCDS Auction Rules and LCDS Auction 
Settlement Terms” and “Bullet LCDS Continuity Procedures”.108 Further details on each 
publication are found in the appendix. Overall, these rules and supplements established 
the global standards for LCDS contracts from the aspect of definition, qualification, 
settlements, continuity and documentation. Thus, we expect that the LCDS market should 
become more efficient with standardization and that the deviation from efficiency should 
be narrowed after this event date. The ISDA dummy variable is equal to zero before the 
publication of ISDA to regularize and standardize the LCDS market, including the 
publication day and equals to one after this event date. Hence, we expect a negative 
coefficient for this dummy variable.  
5-year US treasury bond yield (TB5Y): is the yield on US 5-year treasury bonds. 
This bond yield is usually considered as a risk-free rate and also as an indicator of the US 
economy. Lower interest rates usually coincide with a weakening economy as the 
government keeps interest rates at a low level to try to stimulate the economy. In a 
recession, recovery rates are generally low and the credit spread is generally high. From a 
different perspective, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) point out that the static effect of a 
lower spot rate decreases the risk-neutral drift of the firm value process, which, in turn, 
increases the probability of default.109 Since a high credit spread caused by an increase of 
default probabilities should affect the CDS and LCDS markets in the same direction, the 
net impact on the deviation of these two markets should be small. However, the decrease 
                                                 
108 http://www.isda.org/publications/isdacredit-deri-def-sup-comm.aspx#ra 
109 This result is also verified by Duffee (1998). 
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of CDS recovery rates will increase the deviations, which should increase the arbitrage 
profits. Therefore, we expect a negative coefficient for this factor. 
Slope of the term structure (SL): this variable is measured by the difference between 
the yields on 5- and 1-year US treasury bonds. The slope of the term structure is one of 
the most important factors documented by Litterman and Scheinkman (1991). A low 
slope indicates low forward interest rates, which means that the level of the current spot 
interest rate is high. For a higher interest rate level, the theory predicts a lower default 
probability and a higher recovery rate. Thus, higher CDS recovery rates indicate lower 
arbitrage profits and the expectation of a positive coefficient for this factor.    
Yield spread between Aaa and Baa corporate bonds (CBS): this variable equals the 
difference between the yields of Aaa corporate bonds and Baa corporate bonds.  The 
increase of the spread between these corporate bonds indicates an increase of credit 
spreads, especially the CDS spreads as CDS contracts usually have lower ratings 
compared to the same-firm LCDS. Thus, the yield spread between Aaa and Baa corporate 
bonds can be considered as the spread between CDS and LCDS. Intuitively, an increase 
in their yield spread will increase the probability of violations of CDS and LCDS parity 
and lead to higher arbitrage profits.    
Return of the S&P 500 total return index (SP): this is the daily return on the S&P 
500 total return index. This is an economic indicator from the perspective of the equity 
markets. Intuitively, positive S&P 500 returns imply a strong economy with a low default 
probability and high recovery rates. Thus, we would expect to have a negative coefficient 
for this factor. 
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The accounting variables, including total assets, book value of total liabilities, 
market value of equity, current assets, current liabilities and tangible assets, are obtained 
from the COMPUSTAT database via the WRDS platform. The data are updated quarterly. 
We convert the frequency from quarterly to daily by keeping the value constant within 
each quarter and then take a one quarter lag. The fixed income macro variables, including 
the yields on 1- and 5-year US treasury bonds, and Aaa and Baa corporate bond yields 
are obtained from the US Federal Reserve H15 database. The equity prices and S&P 500 
total return index data are obtained from Bloomberg. 
5.3 Regression results 
The panel regression results are reported in Table IV-9. Overall, the combination of 
the firm specific variables and macro variables is able to explain 63.9% of the deviations 
between the CDS and LCDS markets in the presence of transaction costs on average. The 
lowest R-square of 39.20% is observed for the regression for the failure firm sub-sample 
followed by an R-square of 46.81% for the regression for the investment grade sub-
sample. The R-squares for the junk-rated, not rated and non-failure subsets are all above 
79%. With the exception of the S&P 500, whose coefficient is not significant for all 
subsets, the coefficient estimates of all the independent variables are significant for most 
subsets. The signs of the estimated coefficients that are significant are generally 
consistent across the subsets.  
The leverage ratio consistently increases the profits of the arbitrage portfolio for all 
the samples apart from the not-rated firms and exhibits greater sensitivity for failure firms. 
A higher idiosyncratic volatility increases the arbitrage profits significantly across most 
of the samples except for the junk and failure firms. In particular, for the investment 
193 
 
grade firms the arbitrage profits increase by 0.37% on average for every 1% increase in 
idiosyncratic volatility. We also note that the impact of idiosyncratic volatility is much 
greater for the non-failure firms compared to that for the failure firms. In addition, 
although the logarithm of asset value has an expected positive relationship with arbitrage 
profits, its impact is unclear for the different sub-samples as all the coefficients are not 
significant.  
[Insert Table IV-9 about Here] 
For the macro factors, only the yield on 5-year US treasury bonds (TB5Y), the slope 
of the yield curve for treasury bonds (SL) and the spreads between Aaa and Baa 
corporate bonds (CBS) are significant at the conventional level for the full sample. The 
coefficients of the ISDA publication dummy are not significantly different from zero 
expect for the not-rated sub-sample. Compared to the rated firms, the ISDA regulations 
seem to be more important for not-rated firms in terms of the magnitude of their 
reduction in arbitrage profits of around 0.65% after the ISDA publications. According to 
Table IV-2, we note that the not-rated sample has the highest volatility for the profits 
compared to others. Since the purpose of the ISDA publications is to standardize and 
regulate the LCDS markets, their effect should be much more important for the samples 
with the most volatile profits, as in our empirical findings.  With the exception of the 
failure firms, the variables associated with the state of the economy generally have their 
expected impact on arbitrage profits, with economic downturns corresponding to higher 
profits. The impact of the yield of 5-year US treasury bonds on arbitrage profits is 
consistently negative for all sub-samples but not significant for not-rated and failure 
samples. Numerically, a 1% increase in the yield of 5-year US treasury bonds decreases 
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arbitrage profits by 0.51% on average for the full sample. The slope of the yield curve for 
treasury bonds positively affects arbitrage profits (it is not significant only for the failure 
sub-sample), which is consistent with theoretical predictions.  The spread between the 
yields on Aaa and Baa corporate bonds (CBS) significantly increases the profits on the 
arbitrage portfolio for the full sample. Since an increase in the yield spread is generally 
associated with an economic downturn, this is consistent with our predictions. Further, 
we note that the impact of CBS is more important for the not-rated firms compared to the 
rated firms. The sign of the S&P 500 total index return coefficient is negative and 
insignificant for the full sample and all the sub-samples.  
5.4 Robustness test 
The separate contributions of the macro and firm-specific factors are studied by 
conducting regressions for restricted models and the results are reported in Table IV-10. 
For the restricted model of fixed effects only, the goodness of fit of about 58.18% is 
slightly lower than that of the unrestricted model of about 63.90%. This implies that the 
cross sectional effect is much more important than the time series effect. Then, we restrict 
the model with only one firm-specific factor at a time in order to detect the maximum 
contribution of individual factors. As expected, LOGA and LEV are very important to the 
arbitrage profits. Interestingly, we find IDIO is also noticeably important, which 
emphasizes the role of information asymmetry in arbitrage profits. We also find that the 
coefficient of LOGA is now negative unlike its sign in the full sample due to its highly 
negative correlation with both LEV and IDIO. Hence, after removing the impact of LEV 
and IDIO, the relationship between LOGA and arbitrage profits becomes negative 
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(consistent with expectations), indicating that arbitrage profits decrease with higher total 
assets.  
[Insert Table IV-10 and Table IV-11 about Here] 
Although more than half of the coefficients of the macro factors are significantly 
different from zero, their contribution to arbitrage profits is much smaller compared to 
that of the firm-specific factors. Numerically, the maximum contribution of all macro 
factors is only approximately 1.87% in term of R-square.  In other words, the marginal 
contribution of macro variables to the explanation of abnormal profits is very small 
compared to that of firm specific factors.  
In addition, we also check the robustness of our findings when we reduce the 
frequency of our time series data. In these exercises, the daily profits are aggregated into 
weekly, monthly and quarterly time intervals and the panel regressions are repeated for 
the full sample in each case. The results are reported in Table IV-11. As the table shows, 
both the sign and (most of the times) the significance levels of the coefficients are very 
robust with respect to the level of aggregation, but their magnitude depends on the 
frequency of the data.   
In summary, the contribution of the cross sectional effect on arbitrage profits 
dominates that of the time series effect.  The firm-specific factors, especially firm size, 
leverage ratio and idiosyncratic volatility, are much more important than the macro 
factors in explaining the observed arbitrage profits. Our findings are very robust even 




We identify a model-free parity relation between CDS and LCDS contract spreads 
under the no arbitrage assumption in the absence of market frictions, as well as a non-
trading zone in the presence of market frictions. The parity relation uses only the 
observed CDS and LCDS spreads and the recovery rates of the underlying contracts in 
the event of default. We then examine whether these relations hold in a sample of paired 
CDS and LCDS contracts for exactly the same underlying firm, maturity, currency and 
restructure clauses. We document extensive violations of this parity relation, implying a 
time-varying and significant positive arbitrage profit from artificial default risk-free 
portfolios that simultaneously long the CDS contract and short the corresponding LCDS 
contract for each pair or vice-versa, depending on the direction of the violation of the 
parity.  
We verify whether the arbitrage profits are robust with respect to the inclusion of 
proportional trading costs. We find that such costs can explain at most 10% of the profits. 
We then examine the reliability of the recovery rates reported in the data base and used in 
the parity relation. Using reported recovery rates from defaulted firms, including some in 
our data base, we find that the reported recovery rates are, if anything, overestimates of 
the true ones and understate the assessed arbitrage profits.   
Given the inability of trading costs or recovery rate data to explain the observed 
arbitrage profits, we examine the possibility of inefficiency or market failure in the CDS-
LCDS market pair. We construct artificial implied recovery rates for CDS under the 
assumption that parity holds in the presence of trading costs, and we identify a large 
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number of data points for which these implied rates are negative. We also find a subset of 
firms for which CDS implied recovery rates are negative for at least ten consecutive days 
(the failure firm subset). We find that the failure firm subset differs significantly from the 
other firms in our data set in their levels of CDS and LCDS spreads, in their recovery 
rates, and in the size of every firm-specific variable used in our tests.     
We use panel regressions of the arbitrage profits in the presence of trading costs 
against macroeconomic and firm-specific variables. We disaggregate the sample between 
bonds of various rating classes, as well as between failure and non-failure firms. We find 
that there are some significant differences in the sign and significance of the coefficients 
and the explanatory power of the regressions between failure and non-failure firms, and 
also between bonds of different rating classes.  
We find that the contribution of the cross sectional effect to arbitrage profits 
dominates that of the time series effect.  We find that firm-specific factors are much more 
important than various macro variables in the explanation of the observed arbitrage 
profits identified herein. These firm-specific factors measure a high level of indebtedness 
and difficulties of recovery in case of default (leverage ratio) and large firm size. Other 
important explanatory factors associated with arbitrage profits are those related to 
measures of pricing uncertainty or informational asymmetry. We find that the 
standardization of contracts and clarifications of the contract rules reduce profits 
(measure of informational asymmetry), while a firm’s idiosyncratic volatility (measure of 




Overall, we conclude that there is evidence of market inefficiency and failure of 
arbitrage to equalize the spreads in the CDS and LCDS markets. The failure is more 
prevalent in times of financial crisis, but is also present under more normal circumstances. 
Further, there is significant evidence that information asymmetry is an important 
contributing factor to this market failure. Last but not least, on the methodological side 
there is evidence that firm-specific variables play an important role in the determination 
of CDS and LCDS spreads, implying that structural models of the firm are more 





A: Some Details about the North American Loan CDS Documentation Published on 
April 5, 2010 by the ISDA110 
Document Name Abstract 
Bullet Syndicated Secured 
Loan Credit Default Swap 
Standard Terms Supplement 
“This template is designed to document credit default 
swap transactions where the Deliverable Obligations 
are limited to Syndicated Secured Loans of the 
Reference Entity. This form is primarily intended for 
use in the North American market. The contract: (a) 
has a "bullet" maturity, i.e. not subject to acceleration 
in the case where the Reference Entity's loans are 
repaid; (b) is subject to a credit event determination by 
a Determinations Committee; (c) provides for auction 
settlement if the Participating Dealers vote to hold an 
auction under the Bullet LCDS Auction Rules in 
relation to a Reference Entity and Designated Priority; 
and (d) contains specific rules and procedures for 
determining Successors to the Reference Entity (the 
procedures are contained in the Bullet LCDS 
Continuity Procedures). If no auction is held or the 
auction fails or is abandoned, Physical Settlement will 
apply to LCDS transactions under the most recently-
published form of LSTA Physical Settlement Rider, 
which is available from the LSTA’s website.” 
  
Bullet Syndicated Secured 
Loan Polling Rules 
“This document contains the rules and procedures that 
apply to determine whether a loan qualifies as a 
"syndicated secured" loan of the Reference Entity, for 
purposes of the syndicated secured list.” 
  
Bullet LCDS Auction Rules 
and LCDS Auction Settlement 
Terms 
“The Bullet LCDS Auction Rules and LCDS Auction 
Settlement Terms are designed to facilitate the 
settlement of Bullet Syndicated Secured Loan Credit 
Default Swap transactions.” 
  
Bullet LCDS Continuity 
Procedures 
“The Bullet LCDS Continuity Procedures contain the 
procedural rules for determination of a Successor 
under the Bullet LCDS documentation.” 
                                                 




B: Restructuring Clause111 
Restructuring Clause Details 
Cum Restructuring (CR) or old 
restrucuring 
Any Restructuring event is qualified as a credit event 
and any bond of maturity up to 30 years is deliverable. 
(1999 ISDA credit derivative definition) 
  
Modified Restructuring (MR) Restructuring events are considered as a credit event 
and the bonds with maturity of 30 months or less after 
the termination date of the CDS contract are 




Restructuring events are considered as a credit event 
and the bonds with maturity of 60 months or less for 
the restructured obligations and 30 months for all the 
other obligations after the termination date of the CDS 
contract are deliverable. (2003, ISDA credit derivative 
definition) 
  
Ex-Restructuring (XR) or 
without restructuring 
All the restructuring events are not considered as a 
credit event.  
 
                                                 
111 See Packer and Zhu (2005) and Berndt, Jarrow and Kang (2006). 
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Table IV-1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics for the full sample and sub-samples during the period from April 11th, 2008 
to March 30th, 2012. The idiosyncratic volatilities are the conditional daily volatilities of individual equity return 
residuals by fitting the Fama-French three-factor model. The total asset equals the sum of book value of total 
liabilities and market value of total equities. Leverage equals book value of total liabilities divided by the total asset 
value. Tangible ratio equals the book value of tangible assets divided by the total asset value. The current ratio 


















Full Sample (No. of Observations: 68147) 
minimum 0.0027 0.0125 0.0001 0.0750 0.0053 446.51 0.0834 0.2398 
maximum 0.9651 0.7050 0.8984 0.9775 0.8429 295142.56 0.9857 5.8299 
mean 0.0461 0.3817 0.0367 0.6523 0.0237 25193.94 0.6045 1.5413 
median 0.0311 0.4000 0.0243 0.7000 0.0203 13565.72 0.6126 1.4112 
standard deviation 0.0684 0.0567 0.0482 0.1128 0.0172 37329.28 0.1842 0.6878 
skewness 6.7356 -1.8116 6.4265 -0.7765 10.8217 4.17 -0.2464 1.3736 
1st Order 
Autocorrelation 0.9783 0.7730 0.9690 0.9273 0.8162 0.9904 0.9890 0.9874 
Investment Grades (Above and include BBB, No. of Observations: 41327) 
minimum 0.0027 0.0722 0.0001 0.0750 0.0053 446.5 0.0834 0.2398 
maximum 0.9453 0.6750 0.8671 0.8500 0.6991 295142.6 0.9746 5.2277 
mean 0.0418 0.3809 0.0331 0.6386 0.0229 31707.0 0.5912 1.4944 
median 0.0252 0.4000 0.0210 0.6750 0.0194 17942.9 0.5964 1.3890 
standard deviation 0.0614 0.0506 0.0497 0.1152 0.0161 40757.4 0.1834 0.6286 
skewness 5.4439 -3.2517 6.7415 -0.6919 8.5820 3.7 -0.2199 1.1164 
1st Order 
Autocorrelation 0.9659 0.7369 0.9346 0.8946 0.7962 0.9594 0.9709 0.9748 
Junk (Below BBB, No. of Observations: 11665) 
minimum 0.0028 0.0125 0.0001 0.3250 0.0054 446.51 0.0834 0.2398 
maximum 0.9651 0.7050 0.6253 0.8500 0.5781 257135.61 0.9794 5.2277 
mean 0.0543 0.3750 0.0384 0.6349 0.0240 23330.80 0.6341 1.4500 
median 0.0391 0.4000 0.0257 0.6500 0.0215 13154.38 0.6582 1.3259 
standard deviation 0.0765 0.0556 0.0416 0.1136 0.0155 38118.25 0.1939 0.6880 
skewness 7.5180 -2.3062 3.0163 -0.6069 8.1152 4.50 -0.4206 1.8634 
1st Order 
Autocorrelation 0.8493 0.6214 0.8495 0.8364 0.6903 0.8697 0.8719 0.8730 
Not Rated (No. of Observations: 15155) 
minimum 0.0037 0.0188 0.0001 0.1000 0.0056 450.51 0.1008 0.2398 
maximum 0.9463 0.7050 0.8984 0.9775 0.8429 249734.43 0.9857 5.8299 
mean 0.0515 0.3889 0.0449 0.7030 0.0255 8867.08 0.6178 1.7393 
median 0.0363 0.4000 0.0349 0.7250 0.0218 5739.02 0.6364 1.6201 
standard deviation 0.0781 0.0707 0.0476 0.0882 0.0209 15260.94 0.1746 0.7961 
skewness 7.4978 -0.2131 7.5601 -1.0831 13.8551 11.73 -0.1909 1.2968 
1st Order 
Autocorrelation 0.7864 0.7350 0.8066 0.8261 0.6336 0.8855 0.8320 0.8339 
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Table IV-2: Summary Statistics of Trading Profits 
This table reports the summary statistics of the trading profits generated by the risk-free portfolio when the CDS and 
LCDS parity is violated for the cross-sectional daily observations, firm daily average across the time span and index 
daily across all the available firms during the sample period from April 11th, 2008 to March 30th, 2012. Panel A 
reports the results in the absence of transaction cost and Panel B reports the results in the presence of transaction 
costs. It is assumed that the transaction costs are same under CDS and LCDS market. The daily transaction costs 
come from the daily average bid-ask spread observed in Bloomberg database with the sample firms in Table IV-3.  
Panel A: Profits in the absence of Transaction Costs 
Minimum maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Cross-Sectional Daily Observations (68147 Observations) 
Full Sample 0.0000 1.6514 0.0375 0.0160 0.0754 8.4029 118.5388 
Investment 0 1.6514 0.0301 0.0118 0.0656 11.3542 229.9689 
Junk 3E-07 0.5186 0.0326 0.0142 0.0532 3.7779 18.3441 
Not Rated 8.3E-06 1.3179 0.0615 0.0389 0.1043 5.7209 42.1163 
Firm Daily Average Profits (120 Firm-Clause Contracts) 
Full Sample 0.0006 0.6853 0.0452 0.0250 0.0830 5.5332 36.6491 
Index Daily Profits (959 Daily Observations) 
Full Sample 0.0214 0.0950 0.0369 0.0319 0.0134 1.1235 0.5672 
Investment 0.0082 0.0823 0.0291 0.0253 0.0134 1.0790 0.7642 
Junk 0.0036 0.1495 0.0350 0.0298 0.0213 1.4305 2.4680 
Not Rated 0.0210 0.1499 0.0608 0.0500 0.0333 0.8264 -0.5001 
Panel B: Profits in the presence of Transaction Costs 
Minimum maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Cross-Sectional Daily Observations (68147 Observations) 
Full Sample 0.0000 1.6471 0.0338 0.0124 0.0740 8.5618 123.3978 
Investment 0 1.6470 0.0266 0.0079 0.0649 11.6478 238.8615 
Junk 0 0.5149 0.0292 0.0106 0.0527 3.8685 19.0626 
Not Rated 0 1.2905 0.0568 0.0344 0.1015 5.7636 42.8601 
Firm Daily Average Profits (120 Firm-Clause Contracts) 
Full Sample 0.0000 0.6572 0.0413 0.0210 0.0811 5.4707 35.5509 
Index Daily Profits (959 Daily Observations) 
Full Sample 0.0166 0.0855 0.0332 0.0288 0.0120 1.0370 0.3901 
Investment 0.0057 0.0781 0.0257 0.0225 0.0122 1.0986 1.1091 
Junk 0.0012 0.1466 0.0315 0.0264 0.0207 1.4661 2.7208 
Not Rated 0.0135 0.1386 0.0562 0.0462 0.0316 0.8427 -0.4417 
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Figure IV-1: Distribution of Trading Strategies 
This figure depicts the distribution of trading strategies with and without transaction costs for the cross-sectional 
daily observations of the full sample during the sample period from April 11th, 2008 to March 30th, 2012.  
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Table IV-3: Summary statistics of bid-ask spreads (Unit: basis points) 
This table reports the summary statistics of bid-ask spreads. The Firm Averages shows the average bid-ask spread 
for each firm during the period from January, 2nd, 2008 to November 23rd, 2012 upon the data availability. The Daily 
Average shows the average bid-ask spread for each day across all the available firms. The unit is basis points. 
 Firm Average  Daily Average (Cross Firms) 
Minimum 3.76  4.50 
Maximum 283.24  93.23 
Mean 35.15  26.13 
Median 17.68  21.62 
Standard Deviation 47.35  14.83 
Skewness 3.28  1.89 
Kurtosis 13.27  3.31 
No. of Observations 61 Firms  1219 Days 
 
Table IV-4: Summary Statistics of Implied Transaction Costs in the absence of Profits  
This table reports the summary statistics of the implied transaction costs under which the CDS and LCDS parity is 
not violated for the cross-sectional daily observations (Panel A), firm daily average across the time span (Panel B) 
and index daily across all the available firms (Panel C) during the sample period from April 11th, 2008 to March 30th, 
2012. It is assumed that the transaction costs are same under CDS and LCDS market. The transaction costs showed 
in the table are round trip transaction cost (Bid-Ask spread) in basis points. 
Panel A: Cross-Sectional Daily Observations (69805 Observations) 
maximum Minimum Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Full Sample 10254.70 0.00 199.89 73.49 404.40 8.97 159.88 
Investment 10254.70 0.00 175.04 55.08 429.77 10.58 194.06 
Junk 2547.22 0.00 172.70 44.46 350.95 3.61 14.41 
Not Rated 6401.14 0.00 288.59 227.50 356.07 5.91 71.13 
Panel B: Firm Daily Average Profits (141 Firm-Clause Contracts) 
maximum Minimum Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Full Sample 2032.92 0.00 202.52 116.02 288.07 3.46 16.24 
Panel C: Index Daily Profits (1036 Daily Observations) 
maximum Minimum Mean Median Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Full Sample 509.57 101.39 196.01 162.59 74.94 1.24 0.49 
Investment 513.04 17.46 168.73 156.59 69.85 1.21 2.54 
Junk 826.96 19.63 191.45 159.44 119.70 1.25 1.75 
Not Rated 1084.12 111.29 283.12 216.36 168.70 1.78 2.53 
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Table IV-5: Real Recovery Rates versus Estimated Recovery Rates 
This table reports the means and medians of both real recovery rates and estimated recovery rates of the firms which 
have default events documented by Moody’s Default and Recovery Database during the sample period from April 
11th, 2008 to March 30th, 2012. The real recovery rates (Real RR) are the bonds market value one month after 
default events divided by the face value of the bonds retrieved from Moody’s Default and Recovery Database. The 
estimated recovery rates are the CDS recovery rates estimated by the data provided and reported in Markit datasets. 
Both real recovery rates and estimated recovery rates are all on senior unsecured bonds. 
Panel A: Observed Defaults in the Sample 










CCU Distressed exchange 284 0.32 0.25 0.32 0.11 
GGC Missed interest payment 207 0.35 0.18 0.35 0.40 
LVLT Distressed exchange 123 0.96 0.33 0.96 0.36 
UIS Distressed exchange 185 0.99 0.21 0.99 0.16 
Total  799 0.58 0.25 0.35 0.24 












Bankruptcy 7 0.3464 0.3650 0.0748 
Chapter 11 436 0.1377 0.1000 0.1185 
Chapter 7 1 0.0053 0.0053 
Distressed exchange 799 0.5439 0.6500 0.2284 
Missed interest payment 91 0.2794 0.2775 0.2034 
Missed principal and interest payments 40 0.1905 0.0850 0.1707 
Missed principal payment 8 0.3685 0.2500 0.2357 
Payment moratorium 8 0.2036 0.2100 0.0215 
Placed under administration 1 0.0700 0.0700 
Prepackaged Chapter 11 119 0.2404 0.1100 0.2818 
Receivership 5 0.2650 0.2650 0.0000 
Seized by regulators 16 0.0319 0.0300 0.0040 
Suspension of payments 4 0.2040 0.2075 0.0540 
Total 1535 0.3687 0.2975 0.2756 
Total(without Distressed Exchange) 736 0.1785 0.1000 0.1800 
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Figure IV-4: Trading Strategies of Failure and Non-Failure Firms 
 
Figure IV-5: Time Distribution of the Negative Implied Recovery Rates 
This figure depicts the percentage of the negative implied recovery rates over the total availabel observations for the 




Table IV-6: Event study of Negative Implied Recovery Rates 
This table reports the means and medians of the interesting variables on one day before (1 Day Before) and the first day (First Day) of the negative implied 
recovery rates for the full sample. Spread ratios are equal to the CDS spreads/LCDS spreads. Recovery Rates Ratios are equal to (1-CDS Recovery Rates)/(1-
LCDS Recovery Rates). For the means, the two-sides two-sample tests with normal  and t approximation are conducted and the corresponding p-values are 
reported as difference test. For the medians, the Wilcoxon median two-sample tests are conducted and the corresponding p-values are reported. ***, ** and * 
indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. 
 Mean  Median 














CDS Spreads 0.1424 0.1582 0.2163 0.2160  0.0918 0.0935 0.2446 
LCDS Spreads 0.0728 0.0639 0.1174 0.1169  0.0323 0.0309 0.1245 
Spreads Ratios 6.0397 7.9953 <.0001*** <.0001***  2.8469 3.3583 0.019** 
CDS Recovery Rates 0.3379 0.3405 0.4852 0.4852  0.3667 0.3667 0.5 
LCDS Recovery Rates 0.6277 0.5977 0.0270** 0.0265**  0.7000 0.6708 0.0799* 
Recovery Rates Ratios 1.9249 1.7988 0.0191** 0.0187**  2.0000 1.9355 0.0516* 
Profits 0.0293 0.0567 <.0001*** <.0001***  0.0222 0.0347 <.0001*** 
Equity Returns -0.0055 -0.0160 0.3304 0.3303  -0.0054 -0.0071 0.3224 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.0469 0.0405 0.3360 0.3358  0.0305 0.0311 0.2446 
Bid-Ask Spreads 0.0035 0.0034 0.3534 0.3532  0.0024 0.0024 0.3224 
No. Observations 150 150    150 150  
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Table IV-7: Summary Statistics of Failure Firms and Non-failure Firms 
This table reports the summary statistics of implied CDS recovery rates for the failure firms and non-failure firms during the sample period from April 11th, 2008 
to March 30th, 2012. The summary statistics of CDS and LCDS spreads and recovery rates, arbitrage profits and firms individual characteristics are reported as 
well. We define the market failure as that a firm has at least 10 consecutive negative implied recovery rates on all trading days. According to such criteria, we 
























Panel A: Failure Firms (19 Firms with 9745 observations) 
minimum 0.0060 0.0001 0.0125 0.0750 -6.1276 0.0078 1627.32 0.2795 0.2398 0.0000 
maximum 0.9651 0.8984 0.6750 0.8100 0.9001 0.8429 70984.20 0.9854 3.1077 1.6471 
mean 0.1059 0.0478 0.3443 0.6545 0.0255 0.0329 16019.43 0.6678 1.5216 0.0480 
median 0.0653 0.0224 0.4000 0.7000 0.2837 0.0280 9774.30 0.7012 1.5002 0.0168 
standard deviation 0.1421 0.0850 0.0905 0.1008 0.8329 0.0271 16562.91 0.1940 0.6384 0.1180 
1st order autocorrelation 0.9706 0.9648 0.8623 0.9386 0.9504 0.7896 0.9914 0.9913 0.9863 0.9360 
Panel B: Non-Failure Firms (83 Firms with 58402 observations) 
minimum 0.0027 0.0001 0.1500 0.3500 -12.3582 0.0053 446.51 0.0834 0.4169 0.0000 
maximum 0.7014 0.6200 0.7050 0.9775 0.9918 0.6991 295142.56 0.9857 5.8299 1.2905 
mean 0.0362 0.0348 0.3879 0.6519 0.5691 0.0221 26724.81 0.5939 1.5446 0.0314 
median 0.0291 0.0243 0.4000 0.7000 0.5582 0.0194 14131.86 0.6048 1.4050 0.0115 
standard deviation 0.0373 0.0385 0.0459 0.1147 0.2310 0.0144 39545.36 0.1803 0.6956 0.0635 
1st order autocorrelation 0.9797 0.9698 0.7551 0.9252 0.9234 0.8212 0.9903 0.9885 0.9876 0.9177 
Panel C: Difference Test (p-value) between Failure Firms and Non-Failure Firms 
Mean 
(Wilcoxon Paired  
t Approximation) 








Table IV-8: Correlation Matrix of Variables 
This table reports the correlation matrix of  firm specific and macro variables, including the profits in the presence 
of transaction costs (PR), publication of ISDA dummy (ISDA), total asset (LOGA), current asset over current 
liability ratio (CAL), leverage ratio (LEV), tangible asset ratio (TANG), idiosyncratic volatility (IDIO), 5-year US 
treasury bond yields (TB5Y),  slope of the yield term structure (SL), the spread between Aaa corporate bonds’ yield 
and Baa corporate bonds’ yield (CBS) and S&P 500 index return (SP). The numbers in the parentheses are the p-
values of Pearson correlation coefficients. 
PR ISDA LOGA CAL LEV TANG IDIO TB5Y SL CBS SP 
PR 
1.00 -0.09 -0.23 0.00 0.26 -0.02 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.00 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.47) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.47) 
ISDA 
-0.09 1.00 0.05 0.03 -0.15 -0.05 -0.30 -0.62 -0.27 -0.55 0.01 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.00) 
LOGA 
-0.23 0.05 1.00 -0.13 -0.42 -0.14 -0.32 -0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.01 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.02) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.11) 
CAL 
0.00 0.03 -0.13 1.00 -0.26 -0.16 0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.04 0.00 
(0.47) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.02) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.50) 
LEV 
0.26 -0.15 -0.42 -0.26 1.00 0.41 0.39 -0.01 -0.05 0.19 0.00 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.11) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.93) 
TANG 
-0.02 -0.05 -0.14 -0.16 0.41 1.00 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.00 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.04) (0.00) (<.0001) (0.93) 
IDIO 
0.24 -0.30 -0.32 0.02 0.39 0.11 1.00 0.13 -0.14 0.39 -0.03 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001)  (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
TB5Y 
0.03 -0.62 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.13 1.00 0.58 0.03 0.01 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.04) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.03) 
SL 
0.02 -0.27 0.08 0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.14 0.58 1.00 -0.26 0.04 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.00) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
CBS 
0.12 -0.55 -0.06 -0.04 0.19 0.07 0.39 0.03 -0.26 1.00 -0.03 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
SP 
0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.03 1.00 





Table IV-9: Panel Regression with Important Events and Macro Economic Factors 
This table reports panel regression results with single name fixed effects during the sample period from April 11th, 2008 to March 30th, 2012. The variables are the 
intercept (INT), publication of ISDA dummy (ISDA), total asset (LOGA), current asset over current liability ratio (CAL), leverage ratio (LEV), tangible assets ratio 
(TANG), idiosyncratic volatility (IDIO), 5-year US treasury bond yields (TB5Y), slope of the yield term structure (SL), the spread between Aaa corporate bonds’ 
yield and Baa corporate bonds’ yield (CBS) and S&P 500 index returns (SP). The statistical significant coefficients are marked with ***, ** and * for significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. The standard errors are calculated by the clustering standard error approach in order to remove the serial 
correlation effect. 
































































































































No. of Observations 68147 41327 11665 15155 9745 58402 
Adjusted R2 63.90% 46.81% 86.16% 81.72% 39.20% 79.35% 
MSE 0.0445 0.0474 0.0197 0.0435 0.0921 0.02887 
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Table IV-10: Regression Results of Restricted Models 
This table reports the regression results for restricted models. The standard errors are calculated by the clustering standard error approach in order to remove the 
serial correlation effect. 
Variables Macro Factors Only 
Firm Specific Factors with 





























ISDA 0.0004 (0.9602)        
LOGA  -0.0107** (0.0134)  
-0.0159*** 
(0.0019)     
CAL  -0.0002 (0.9735)   
0.0003 
(0.9424)    
LEV  0.0917*** (0.0028)    
0.1026*** 
(<.0001)   
TANG  -0.0095 (0.4759)     
-0.0043 
(0.6282)  
IDIO  0.4087*** (0.0072)      
1.0154*** 
(<.0001) 
TB5Y -0.0803 (0.8027)        
SL 0.9902** (0.0194)        
CBS 1.4874*** (<.0001)        
SP -0.0051 (0.4601)        
No. of 
Observations 68147 68147 68147 68147 68147 68147 68147 68147 
Adjusted R2 1.87% 61.67% 58.18% 5.44% .007% 6.52% 0.05% 5.58% 
MSE 0.0733 0.0459 0.0479 0.720 0.074 0.0715 0.0740 0.0719 
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Table IV-11: Regression Results for Low Frequency Data 
This table reports the regression results for lower frequency data. We aggregated the daily current payoffs 
for one week, one month and one quarter, respectively. The standard errors are calculated by the clustering 
standard error approach in order to remove the serial correlation effect. 
Variables Weekly Monthly Quarterly 























































No. of Observations 15077 3663 1303 
Adjusted R2 64.02% 62.30% 61.26% 
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